Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management

The European response to the Ebola crisis was similarly half-hearted throughout much of the year, although this also reflected a failure by the WHO to grasp the scale of the problem early enough. International action was only galvanised in the third quarter of the year by a US push to contain the disease. The UK and the European Commission responded with a major increase in direct and indirect assistance, but other EU members, including France, lagged behind (although French bilateral support to Guinea was strong). By the end of the year, Cuba had deployed more doctors to Ebola-stricken countries than had any EU member.

The EU’s weakness vis-à-vis these crises reflects the effects of austerity. Some EU members have promoted lower-cost multilateral initiatives to address crises. Luxembourg made unusually good use of a temporary seat on the UN Security Council to push through two resolutions on humanitarian access to Syria in cooperation with Australia and Jordan. France persuaded the US to back another resolution, which was vetoed by China and Russia, to refer Syria to the ICC. But such diplomatic flourishes had little or no impact on the ground.

The Ukraine crisis also highlighted the flaws of multilateral diplomacy. Britain and France worked with the US to raise the crisis in the Security Council and the UN General Assembly. Yet Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution on Crimea’s referendum on its status and ignored a General Assembly vote condemning the referendum. Big non-Western powers such as Brazil and India refused to side with the West in these debates.

The Netherlands, supported by Australia and Malaysia, placed sufficient pressure on Russia to pass a Security Council resolution in the wake of the destruction of Flight MH17. This helped facilitate recovery efforts but had little lasting political effect.

EU and US efforts to shape Russian decisions through the G7/8 and G20 have proved equally futile. The European members of the G8 backed Moscow’s exclusion from the group in the first half of the year, but this diplomatic slap on the wrist had no notable impact on Vladimir Putin’s behaviour. Western statements on the events in Ukraine at the G20 summit in Brisbane in November caused Putin to leave early – a largely symbolic success.

European officials have been able to take some comfort from their influence over longer-term multilateral processes. Hungary’s ambassador to the UN played a pivotal role in debates on future international development goals, co-chairing a complex UN working group designed to draft successors to the MDGs. But major EU donor countries, notably the UK, are worried that the resulting framework contains 169 goals. Further discussions of this text loom next year and issues such as reforms to the IMF and the World Bank may be disruptive.

There is likely to be an uptick in talks on UN reform in 2015 too, as the organisation reaches its 70^th birthday. Anticipating this, Germany has reinvigorated its perennial quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council, together with Brazil, India, and Japan. Berlin seems less committed than its partners, while Italy continues to campaign against the German bid.

The EU has also played a prominent role in advancing UN negotiations on climate change prior to a major conference in Paris in February. The Europeans have agreed to make pioneering cuts in their carbon emissions, despite opposition from sceptics such as Poland. They have also been criticised by developing states and big non-Western economies, including China and Brazil, for failing to commit more financial aid for poor states to handle climate change. Tellingly, the most widely noted advance in this process was November’s Sino-American promise on cutting carbon emissions, rather than any European action.

Shortly after its climate change statement with Beijing, the US announced a tariff deal with India that unblocked the stalled WTO negotiations. For all their financial and political commitments to multilateral diplomacy, the EU and its members seem unable to deliver such breakthroughs.

This shortcoming has applied to negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme. The talks were meant to conclude in November but have been extended. Outgoing EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton continues to coordinate the talks and has been praised by both US and Iranian officials for her diplomatic role. But it has been clear that the decisive actors in the process are Washington and Tehran: Brussels, Berlin, London, and Paris are at best significant but limited supporting actors.

Whereas 2015’s development and climate talks are likely to bring deals of some sort – although not necessarily good ones – Europe’s ability to engineer satisfactory deals through multilateral institutions is still very much in question. In the interim, the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean is profoundly hurting the EU.