If 2012 was a year in which the EU’s lack of a political approach to the changing Middle East and North Africa region disappointed, 2013 was the year in which the irrelevance of the ENP to major developments in the southern Mediterranean became clear. The EU’s performance worsened in the Middle East and North Africa in 2013. The challenges in the region are undoubtedly huge: a complex environment riven by a civil war in Syria, a military-dominated Egypt, growing sectarian tensions, and a barely concealed power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. What makes it even more challenging for the EU is the attempt by the US – for decades the partner in the region whose lead the EU followed – to gradually extract itself from entanglements in the Middle East and “pivot” towards Asia. This dynamic situation presents opportunities as well as obstacles, but the EU has not yet found a new role in the region. [...]
In 2013, there were even clearer disagreements in approach between different EU member states than elsewhere. In addition to the now familiar “north-south” member state divide on how the EU uses trade, aid, and political leverage over the longer term in its neighbourhood, EU member states also disagreed about how to deal with crises. France and the UK, in particular, operated largely outside the EU framework on Syria. France and the UK were in favour of arming rebel groups, which led to the de facto lifting of the EU arms embargo in May. In response to the regime’s use of chemical weapons in Damascus in August, they supported a military intervention in spite of strong opposition from EU partners. However, after the British parliament voted against it, the US stepped back from the idea as Russia pushed for internationally overseen chemical weapons removal in agreement with President Bashar Assad’s government and a diplomatic process. The French government also surprised E3+3 colleagues in the second round of Geneva talks on Iran’s nuclear programme in early November when it raised concerns about the deal on the table – apparently without prior discussion with its European colleagues.
The EU’s response to the military overthrow of Mohammed Morsi’s government in Egypt in July highlighted the extent to which the ENP no longer provided a useful framework for engagement in North Africa. EU states had little confidence in their influence in tackling severe backsliding in the political transition of such a key regional actor, and as a result they settled on a common position which indicated to the rest of the region that the EU’s commitment to upholding the rule of law and democratic development was, at best, highly conditional. The EU continued to engage with General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s interim regime and to provide non-military aid, but this approach failed to win the EU leverage to really impact on the emerging situation in Egypt in the second half of the year.
Overall, then, while Europeans’ technocratic engagement through the ENP has continued with some successes such as the signature of a limited mobility partnership with Morocco in 2013, its policy framework failed to help the EU to tackle first order issues in the wider region. There were, however, two important exceptions to this trend this year. First, under the stewardship of High Representative Catherine Ashton, the E3+3 achieved a historic interim deal in the nuclear talks with Iran. Second, the EU’s guidelines on financing to settlements gave a signal of intent to make a clear distinction between engagement with Israel and engagement with settlements. But, despite these two successes, three overarching challenges mean that European engagement in the Middle East and North Africa could be even more complex for Europeans in the years to come.
Firstly, as the Arab Spring turned sour and bloodshed and instability spread across this strategically vital region, Europe has been unable to play any effective security role. As the member states have feuded over Syria, the EU’s contribution to regional stability has been confined to a small and much-delayed border assistance mission (EUBAM) to Libya and to humanitarian aid. Though some member states such as Italy and the UK have been more active, Europe as a whole has opted for a literally marginal role. It made progress in Somalia and the Sahel but left the Mali intervention to France and thus confirmed that CSDP ambitions are now limited to training and advisory tasks. The evident reluctance of the “Big Three” member states to engage in any renewed strategic discussion at the EU level (as urged by Sweden) suggests that they prefer it this way.
Secondly, there has been no debate, let alone agreement, on how Europe should address the growing sectarian crisis in the Middle East and North Africa. Although the positive outcome of the second round of talks on Iran’s nuclear programme in November could represent a first step along the long road to a regional deal, the EU does not appear to have a broader plan. Nowhere do the paradoxes of the regional crisis and Europe’s response come together more acutely than in Iraq, where Europe is providing the increasingly repressive government with ongoing support in order to help it quash a revived insurgency that is directly tied to the same Sunni rebel movement that Europe backs in Syria.
Finally, the EU has no policy towards the Gulf, which is growing in importance as an actor across the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, it is increasingly hard to conceive of any event in the region in the coming years in which the Gulf powers will not be significant. Europe therefore needs to reflect on how it wants to work with this growing force. The actions in 2013 of some member states, such as France, which has particular ties to Saudi Arabia, suggested that they see the region above all in commercial terms. But these bilateral economic relationships put the EU at risk of divide and rule in the coming years if they are not integrated into a more collective, strategic approach to the region.
