As the political earthquake caused by the UKIP-orchestrated British leave vote reverberates across the EU, the full force of European anti-establishment parties is hitting home. Sinn Fein has called for a vote on reunifying Ireland and Northern Ireland, and pressure is mounting from the Scottish National Party for a second independence referendum. The rest of the EU is in no way insulated from the impact of the Brexit vote. Within hours of the UK’s decision, the news had been welcomed by “insurgent” parties across the continent – the Front National in France, the PVV in the Netherlands; the AFD in Germany; Lega Nord in Italy; and FPO in Austria, all calling for the referendum to be emulated in their countries.

Across Europe, traditional political elites are being challenged by newer, smaller, and leaner parties from both left and right. They are winning office – currently holding 1,329 seats in 25 countries – and playing a direct role in government in eight member states.

Some key trends can be identified in their views on international affairs: they are sceptical about the EU, resent the United States, and are sympathetic to Russia. Most prefer borders closed, migration low, and trade protected. They all want to return power to the people through direct democracy.

These parties could act as a significant block in upcoming EU Council plans for a migration compact with neighbouring transit countries, and many will oppose the extension of Russia sanctions beyond the summer.
the EU, resent the United States, and are sympathetic to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. They prefer borders closed, migration low, and trade protected. Above all, they want to return power to the people through direct democracy.

The UK’s vote on the EU and the Dutch vote on Ukraine could be just the first in a landslide of popular referendums across Europe. ECFR’s research found that outsider parties across the EU have plans to push for votes on 34 issues that would have direct consequences for the EU in the coming years. These insurgent forces are using the media, popular pressure, and political office to force national referendums on issues that were previously the preserve of governments and civil servants.

Insurgent parties are winning seats in local, regional, national, and European parliaments, and challenging establishment views on how policymaking should be done. In Italy, the Five Star Movement won the mayoral elections in Rome.

Who are Europe’s new insurgent parties?

This study looks at voices outside the political mainstream that are influencing and shaping the development of EU foreign policy today. For each member state we selected the most influential non-mainstream groups – for some countries such as Slovakia or the Czech Republic, where there are many such parties, we focused on a selection. The only member state in which we decided there was no relevant party was Luxembourg.

The parties we have included are not exclusively of the right or the left, ranging from the Communist Party in France and socialist Die Linke in Germany, through to far-right groups such as Golden Dawn in Greece, Lega Nord in Italy, and Jobbik in Hungary. Some challenge the establishment from the sidelines, and some, such as Law and Justice in Poland, and Syriza and the Independent Greeks in Greece, are serving in current coalition governments. The insurgent parties are broadly sceptical about the EU in its current state. Their positions range vastly within this, from France’s Front National and Britain’s UKIP, which was founded with the aim of taking the UK out of the EU, through to Portugal’s Left Bloc and Spain’s Podemos, which advocate for EU reform.

A sense of the need to “re-democratise” policymaking nationally and across the EU is common to almost all these parties, with Switzerland often held up as an example. They all see their role as speaking the truth and challenging the elites on behalf of the people. The youngest, ALFA, was formed in Germany in July 2015 as a breakaway from anti-immigrant party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), while the oldest, Ireland’s Sinn Féin, was founded in 1905. A full list of the parties and their stance on various issues can be found in the annex to this paper.

Foreign policy

Through interviews with foreign policy representatives of each party that agreed to meet up – 41 out of the 45 we covered – and analysis of their public pronouncements, we explored their positions on the key foreign policy challenges facing the EU. These include the refugee crisis and the EU’s relationship with Turkey; security and terrorist threats to Europe; the Ukraine crisis and the EU’s relationship with Russia; EU-US relations, including on Middle East policy and trade; and the UK referendum.

Most of the parties focus primarily on domestic issues, and some lack fully developed foreign policy positions – for example, different representatives of Germany’s AfD gave different answers on foreign policy, and other party representatives stated that they could only answer in a personal capacity. But even newer parties, which have had less time to elaborate policy beyond the core issues on which they were founded, are quickly developing their positions on foreign policy. They are driven towards this by the impact of the refugee crisis across the EU, and the interplay between its foreign and domestic dimensions.
There was a surprising amount of consensus on the existential threats facing the EU. For 34 out of the 45 parties covered, the refugee crisis or the threat of terrorism and radical Islamism (these issues were inextricably linked in the responses of most) were among the top two threats facing the EU. This response was not the preserve of the right wing: it was shared by Germany’s Die Linke, the French Communist Party, Spain’s Podemos, and the Lithuanian Labour Party.

On the refugee crisis, Angela Merkel’s “refugees welcome” policy does not appear to attract the criticism that might have been expected: only seven parties put it among their two most important explanations for the refugee crisis. US strategy in the Middle East was the most popular answer, with the violence sponsored by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in second place.

There is widespread scepticism around European or US interventionism generally, particularly in the Middle East. This sentiment was expressed by parties ranging from Ireland’s Sinn Féin, Britain’s UKIP, France’s Front National and Communist Party, Germany’s AfD and Die Linke, Hungary’s Jobbik, and Italy’s Five Star Movement. On the prospect of collective European intervention in Syria, 32 parties responded that this should not even be on the table.

This position is linked to a general anti-Americanism and a distaste for the EU towing the US line, particularly on Middle East policy. As the Front National told our researcher: “The roots of all the main conflicts in Europe and its neighbourhoods can be tracked back to the actions of Washington as a hegemonic power.” For many insurgent parties, this spurning of transatlanticism is also linked to strong suspicions about the impact of TTIP, with 27 of the parties interviewed answering that the EU should not make this deal with the US. But there were some notable exceptions among the parties that we interviewed – including the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, the Estonian Party of People’s Unity, Germany’s ALFA, Syriza, and the Independent Greeks – who thought the deal could have a positive impact under the right conditions.

In terms of policy towards Europe’s neighbourhood, there is a general consensus among the insurgent parties that more enlargement would be a bad thing – that the EU is big enough and, if anything, should be gradually dissolved. However, there is slightly more openness to the inclusion of countries to the east (notably Ukraine) than to the south (notably Turkey, with major fears expressed about the possibility of Turkish accession). Still, only 10 parties responded unequivocally that they supported Ukraine’s path to EU accession and, of these, two wouldn’t support NATO accession for Ukraine (UKIP’s position was the reverse, supporting Ukraine joining NATO but not the EU).

Conversely, there is strong suspicion of cooperation with Turkey on the refugee crisis. Twenty-seven parties opposed this, and many more voiced concern that it paved the way for closer EU–Turkey cooperation. Though far-right parties, such as France’s Front National or the Czech Republic’s Dawn, led those expressing concerns about increased immigration flows from Turkey, other parties had a more nuanced view. The Sweden Democrats argued that the agreement would be ineffective at stopping migration flows and would simply push traffic to other routes; whereas leftist parties, for example France’s Communist Party, Cyprus’s AKEL, and Italy’s Five Star Movement, opposed the deal on the grounds that Turkey was not a safe country for refugees and that as a result the deal violated international law.

Twenty-two parties opposed cooperation with Turkey on the Syrian conflict, and the same number opposed counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkey. On other issues, such as the Ukraine crisis and the eurozone crisis, very few could see a case for talking to Turkey at all.

When questioned on Europe’s engagement with powers further afield, particularly China, few parties had a developed view, and fewer still on questions such as whether China should be granted market economy status under World Trade Organization rules. There is no real evidence that positions on China varied between right and left: 15 parties simply had no official position. The European communist parties often confessed to having little understanding of today’s China
or how to work with it, although some maintained historical contacts with the Chinese Communist Party.

Perhaps the most significant issue that divides the challenger parties is how to engage with Russia. There is general sympathy for Russian foreign policy (30 parties expressed support for at least some recent Russian positions, particularly its intervention in Syria, in the absence of other actors taking a decisive position on the conflict), and a sense that the EU’s policy on its neighbourhood should not be pitted against that of Russia. However, when it comes to specific policies such as EU sanctions against Russia, views were much more mixed. Twenty-four parties argued that the sanctions should not stay in place beyond July, with parties as diverse as the French Communist Party, Cyprus’s AKEL, Dawn and other Czech parties, and Syriza and the Independent Greeks viewing them as an obstacle to dialogue with Russia, and damaging to EU economies.

These views on Russia policy do not fall naturally along the lines of left and right, but tend more towards national perspectives – for example, in Germany, both Die Linke and AfD believe that the sanctions on Russia should be lifted, while in Greece, Syriza and Golden Dawn agree on this. On the question of Ukraine’s accession, however, more of a left–right split is evident, with parties on the left generally more supportive of Ukraine’s path to EU membership.

However, some parties in countries where the threat from Russia was felt more acutely – the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Poland’s Law and Justice, Hungary’s Fidesz – were in favour of keeping the sanctions, while in Greece, Syriza and Golden Dawn agree on this. On the question of Ukraine’s accession, however, more of a left–right split is evident, with parties on the left generally more supportive of Ukraine’s path to EU membership.

The parties were divided over security questions too, with seven responding that NATO should build up militarily against the Russian threat; eight arguing that NATO should take in more members from the European neighbourhood; and another seven arguing for their countries to withdraw from the alliance altogether. Many parties were undecided or felt that none of the options reflected their views, while others were reasonably comfortable with the status quo.

The foreign policy implications

One of the issues where there is most consensus between the insurgent parties is their desire to reduce the number of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe, and the numbers granted refugee status. They may be able to exert serious political pressure on this issue. The EU–Turkey deal is already viewed sceptically by a number of key member state governments, including France, and the visa liberalisation component in particular is likely to face opposition in the European Parliament. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s patience with the slow pace of implementation is wearing thin. Governments across the EU will have to answer to the concerns of insurgent parties at home if they want to move it forward – and the same applies to quid pro quo deals with other neighbouring transit countries such as Libya under the migration pact proposal from Italy. If the growing pressure for referendums and more consultation on refugee crisis policy is successful, the European Council could find itself even more hamstrung in acting on this dossier.
Beyond the upcoming Council decision on whether to extend EU sanctions, and the question of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine, and its eventual accession. The Dutch population rejected the Association Agreement with Ukraine (an outcome for which the PVV campaigned fiercely). The spectrum of views from the insurgent parties on these issues in some ways mirrors the wide range of views across member states. However, in some countries, such as Germany, Lithuania, and Poland (where the Law and Justice party is in government), there are insurgent parties for and against the use of sanctions on Russia, further complicating any deal.

Many of the challenger parties want to place clear limits on support for Ukraine. The accession conversation is over as far as the majority of these parties are concerned: their vision is of guaranteeing EU security through hard power, not through supporting neighbours to become more similar to the EU, and eventually join the club.

The insurgent parties’ vision of a Europe that operates through stick rather than carrot could help the goal of developing European defence capacity in order to make it a more independent security actor. Many of the parties are pushing for greater investment on this front. Many of the parties, including the French Front National and Belgian Vlaams Belang, as well as parties from newer member states that are geographically closer to Russia, such as the Estonian Conservative People’s Party, have a vision of a militarily strong Europe that invests more in its own security – largely at national level – and consequently in independence from the US. It is likely that these parties will voice strong opinions and exert pressure on their national governments regarding how they engage with the new US administration. Republican candidate Donald Trump’s arguments that Europeans and others need to pay their way within the NATO alliance in exchange for a security guarantee are resonating strongly with some of the insurgent parties.

However, for the insurgent parties, investment in security and defence should not necessarily be read as groundwork for increased interventionism. As set out above, many of the parties are extremely wary about engagement in the Middle East and elsewhere, and are critical of previous interventions. As a growing force, these parties are likely to bolster the sense of intervention fatigue in EU foreign policy over the coming years, making it even more difficult for national governments to sell future military deployments to their populations: insurgent parties largely view increasing military capacity as important to make the threat of European retaliation or intervention real, but are sceptical of arguments for using it in most circumstances.

Surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the parties see European solutions as more appropriate than national solutions in dealing with the crises currently facing the EU. This was most pronounced on terrorism, where 34 opted for European-level solutions, compared to 29 on the Syrian conflict, 28 on Ukraine, and 24 on the refugee crisis. In a post-UK referendum EU that is likely to face increasing pressure for reform, simplification, and making decisions at the national level as much as possible, these results indicate that there may be less pressure for reform on foreign and security policy, and that even the insurgent parties are willing to see this remain largely at EU level.

How are the insurgent parties influencing foreign policy?

With the exception of Malta’s Imperium Europa, all 45 parties that we surveyed hold at least one seat in their national parliaments or the European Parliament. However, for many of these groups, their most effective levers of influence are their ability to drive debate in the media and challenge the establishment rather than working within it.

For example, although Britain’s UKIP has been successful in European Parliament elections – it is the largest UK party, with 22 MEPs – and at local level, with 488 councillors, it holds only one seat in the UK House of Commons. Its major success has been outside its elected role, stirring the debate on UK membership of the EU to a degree that reopened rifts in the ruling Conservative Party, so that Prime Minister David Cameron felt it necessary to put the matter to a national vote.

The referendum is a tool that appeals strongly to challenger parties, resonating with their wish to “re-democratise” decision-making. The 2016 Dutch referendum on the Ukraine Association Agreement had strong backing from the PVV, and the UK Brexit vote is undeniably a success story for UKIP. Many of the parties we interviewed saw the building momentum of referendums in 2016 as an opportunity.

However, insurgent parties are also working within government: in Bulgaria, the Patriotic Front supports the governing coalition; in Finland, the Finns Party is participating in the ruling coalition and its leader, Timo Soini, is serving as Foreign Minister; in Greece, Syriza and the Independent Greeks are currently in government; in Hungary, Fidesz is the leading party in the governing coalition. In Latvia, the National Alliance holds a number of high offices including the Ministry of Justice; in Lithuania both the Order and Justice Party and the Labour Party are in government; Law and Justice are in power in Poland; and SMER-SD and the Slovak National Party are two of the four-party governing coalition in Slovakia. Polls ahead of the 26 June national elections in Spain are putting the Podemos-led coalition in a strong position. The odds are strong that the Front National’s Marine Le Pen will make it into the second round of the French presidential elections in 2017.

As this study shows, these parties are not all of one mind on key foreign policy challenges, from the war in Syria, to the US relationship and the Ukraine crisis. However, on some broader points it would be possible for coalitions of “insurgent governments” to operate within the Foreign Affairs Council. For example, all insurgent parties currently
playing a role in their national government answered “yes” or “maybe” when asked whether they wanted to return to business as usual in relations with Russia. Similarly, they shared roughly the same analyses of the causes of the refugee crisis. Following the UK referendum this grouping could also form an important driving force for a process of EU reform. The potential for foreign policy coalitions is greater if these included larger states with governments that are under intense political pressure from insurgent parties, such as France and Spain.

However, our research also shows that challenger parties do not just change the system – the system can also change them. For example, Syriza’s experience in government has significantly tempered its pre-government promises of rapprochement with Russia, and the Finns Party has broadly toed the government line on the EU since joining its coalition. This is also true for Bulgaria’s Patriotic Front, which has tempered its nationalistic rhetoric and has actually gained popularity after backing the coalition government.

Finally, it is clear that in addition to developments in the Council, the European Parliament’s increasingly assertive role in foreign policy – as seen most recently in its vocal opposition to elements of the EU–Turkey deal on refugees – is set to continue. The great majority of the challenger parties have representation in the parliament, and many of them are stronger at this level than nationally. Where their views go against establishment EU thinking, the consultation role of the parliament on international agreements provides a tool for them to shape policy. As the insurgent parties grow in confidence and influence across the EU, we can expect them to use this tool more often.

Referendum watch

The most common position of the insurgent parties on the impact of the UK vote on EU membership was that it would trigger gradual disintegration of the EU. Twelve parties cited this as the most likely or second-most likely consequence of the vote. The issues that they said they would like to see popular referendums on are the following:

**Their country’s EU membership:** Austria’s FPÖ, France’s Front National and Communist Party; Czech Republic’s KSCM, Party of Free Citizens, and Dawn – National Coalition; Sweden Democrats; Danish People’s Party; Belgium’s Vlaams Belang; Bulgaria’s Ataka; Germany’s AfD; Hungary’s Jobbik; Italy’s Lega Nord; Conservative People’s Party of Estonia; the Netherlands’ PVV

**Ukraine Association Agreement/other association agreements:** Belgium’s Vlaams Belang; Germany’s AfD

**Turkey’s EU membership:** Bulgaria’s Ataka and Patriotic Front

**NATO membership:** Bulgaria’s Ataka

**Legitimacy and content of refugee policy:** Conservative People’s Party of Estonia; Germany’s AFD; Belgium’s Vlaams Belang

“Abuse of free movement”: Sweden Democrats

**Refugee relocation quotas:** Estonia’s Party of People’s Unity; Hungary’s Fidesz; and Jobbik; Poland’s Kukiz’15

**Their country’s eurozone membership:** Germany’s AfD; Italy’s Five Star Movement

**Eurozone responsibility towards Greece/Compliance with Stability and Growth Pact:** Estonian Party of People’s Unity; Portugal’s Left Bloc

**Enlargement issues:** Germany’s AfD; Austria’s FPÖ

**Future changes in EU treaties/Further transfer of sovereign powers:** Portugal’s Left Bloc; Sweden Democrats; Estonian Party of People’s Unity; Austria’s FPÖ

**TTIP:** Slovenia’s United Left and Slovenian People’s Party

**National issues, such as independence of regions, repercussions for elected officials:** Spain’s Podemos; Romania’s Democratic Nationalist Party; Croatia’s Human Shield Party and MOST
Meet the insurgents¹

The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) was founded in 1956 by Anton Reinthaller, who had served in the national socialist government that was formed in collaboration with Adolf Hitler after the Anschluss in 1938. The FPÖ was the party for those uncomfortable with the domination of Austrian politics by the socialist-clerical coalition governments. The party had liberal and nationalist wings, which frequently disagreed over strategy. The FPÖ had governing stints in various coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s. After a split in the party in 2005, it attracted an increase in popular support, leading to very good results in the latest elections under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache.

Views on Europe

The FPÖ sees a lack of solidarity and unity between EU member states as the main cause of the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis, which in turn are considered to be the biggest problems facing Europe. It terms the EU–Turkey deal a disaster, because it is against any alignment of the EU with Turkey. It considers the big difference in the standard of living between Europe and the rest of the world as a key cause of both the refugee crisis and radical Islam, believing that young people become radicalised when their vision of a better lifestyle is not achieved. The FPÖ feels that living standards for citizens of Austria should be protected, and that immigrants who are unwilling to integrate in Austria under the present conditions should be forced to leave the country.

The FPÖ is worried about Brexit because it might lead to a disintegration of the EU, but thinks the debate might have a positive effect if direct democracy is used as a tool for EU integration. Issues like enlargement, treaty changes, and new treaties should be voted on in EU member states. It argues that another positive outcome of Brexit could be that there is a step back from supra-nationalism and a step towards more intergovernmental policies. In the opinion of the FPÖ, there should be a two-tier euro currency – a strong northern euro and a weaker southern euro, with the possibility to depreciate the currency if necessary.

Views on foreign policy

The FPÖ considers Russia to be the most important partner for Europe and Austria, especially on energy and in the agricultural sector. Even as sanctions were being implemented, the FPÖ began meeting Russian leaders to build up an alliance against the “American and NATO-influenced” EU policy. The party sees American interventionism in the Middle East as extremely problematic, and thinks the EU should not cooperate with the US on a solution for the Syria war, preferring cooperation with Russia. The FPÖ opposes any alignment of Austria with NATO, and accepts a Russian sphere of influence in the east.

¹ For all parties in this publication the number of European Parliament seats held by the party is expressed as a total of that country’s total allocation of seats, rather than of the total number of seats in the European Parliament.
Meet the insurgents

Flemish far-right parties started to develop in the 1950s, and are traditionally associated with advancing the cause of the Flemish – a Dutch-speaking minority based largely in the north of the country. This phenomenon was not replicated in the French-speaking part of the country, partly because of the omnipotence of the French-speaking socialist parties, and the lack of a charismatic leader to bring the myriad small right-wing parties together.

The Vlaams Blok (VB) was created in 1977, and enjoyed a steady rise until the mid-2000s. It had to change its name to Vlaams Belang in 2004 after being convicted of racism. Its influence was limited because of a cordon sanitaire installed by other parties in the country. However, during the last decade, the VB has lost considerable influence because of the dramatic rise of the more moderate Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, which is currently in the federal majority.

Views on foreign policy

The VB blames EU countries for escalating the Syria conflict by supporting anti-Assad forces, and also blames the EU for contributing to the rise of fundamentalist governments all over the world. Siding with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Vladimir Putin’s Russia is therefore seen as part of the solution. The party is one of the few to support a European intervention against ISIS. The VB also wants to build up financial support for NATO, and ally Belgium with Russia in a fight against terrorism, multiculturalism, and radical Islam. It thinks Putin shares true European values, and wants to end sanctions to open the way for renewed cooperation with Russia. The party is opposed to TTIP because of the opacity of negotiations, the chance of a lowering of sanitary and environmental standards, and the possible damage it could cause to small and medium-sized enterprises.

Views on Europe

The VB sees the refugee crisis, terrorism, and Islam as the biggest threats facing Europe. The party links these problems to multiculturalism, which it has compared to a disease weakening the body of the EU. It also sees the eurozone crisis as a big issue, since it reveals two weaknesses of the EU: that its institutions are not democratic and that the common euro currency is a failure. The party sees the Brexit referendum as the “Copernican revolution” the EU needs, and hopes that it will lead to the disintegration of the EU.
Meet the insurgents

There are two parties in the Patriotic Front – the VMRO and the NFSB. The VMRO (also VMRO–BND, in English: Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Bulgarian National Movement) was established in 1989, claiming to be the successor to the historic VMRO, which fought for the liberation of Bulgarian lands from the Ottoman Empire. The National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) was established in 2011, after its founder Valeri Simeonov broke with the Ataka party.

Ataka quickly became an important, although relatively small, player in politics after its establishment in 2005 by a former pro-democracy, pro-reformist politician, Volen Siderov. The party combined nationalism and populism as it started to speak about corruption, poverty, income, and pensions. It also gradually became overtly pro-Russian and leader Siderov clearly backs all Russian-led investment projects. The party had a key role in supporting the government of 2013–2014, but was less successful in the next elections.

Both parties identify as nationalist organisations and have a strong focus on ethnic and religious minorities in the country – Turks, Muslims, and Roma. They both have their own TV channels and are influential in shaping the debate, but haven't held high positions in the executive.

Views on Europe

Both parties are Eurosceptic, but Ataka is more openly anti-EU. The party is strongly against the EU’s immigration policy, as it sees a direct correlation between the number of incoming migrants and terrorist attacks in Europe, and wants to remove all “illegal migrants” hailing from North Africa and the Middle East. Ataka is hoping for Brexit because it might speed up the dissolution of the EU, and is pursuing a Bulgarian exit from the EU.

The Patriotic Front has similar views on immigration, but is slightly more moderate. The party sees Brexit as a bigger threat to the EU than the eurozone crisis or the Ukraine crisis, and thinks it might trigger the disintegration of the EU.

Views on foreign policy

Both parties have strong anti-Turkey positions and are against plans for Turkish membership of the EU. They are also strongly anti-Muslim and anti-refugee parties. They are anti-Western and especially anti-American, too. Ataka has the strongest views on the US, which it accuses of having caused the refugee crisis by funding and training groups such as ISIS, with the aim of destroying its competitor – Europe. The party wants to leave NATO and cooperate with Russia on energy connections and military-political protection. It believes the conflict in Ukraine was also instigated by the US, and sees Russia as protection against Islamist invaders.

The Patriotic Front also criticises US and EU policy in the Middle East as one of the reasons for the rise of radical Islam, and it is against attempts to bring down the Syrian government. However, it is less supportive of Russia; it advocates neutrality regarding the Ukraine crisis and is open to EU and NATO accession for Ukraine.
Meet the insurgents

The largest traditional parties in Croatia were formed after the end of the socialist regime, partly by groups that were responsible for its independence. They are now challenged by anti-establishment parties that have quickly risen to power in recent years.

The MOST party (the Bridge of Independent Lists) was founded in 2012 as a regionalist political platform. During the last (November 2015) parliamentary elections, the party established itself as the third-most influential political force at the time. The party formed a coalition with the biggest party in Croatia – the Croatian Democratic Union party – which is riddled with crises because of intra-coalition disputes. The MOST platform is concerned with reducing government spending and public debt, reforming the public sector, and reducing administrative units in Croatia. After assuming power, the party toned down its demands, and has suffered an astonishing decrease in popularity.

At the same time, the Human Shield (Živi zid) party surpassed the MOST party in terms of voter support. The party was formed in 2014 by an anti-eviction group of the same name. This group mostly fights foreclosures by occupying property and forming “human shields”. The party is anti-EU and pro-Russian. If the popularity trends continue, it is likely that Human Shield will assume MOST’s role of “kingmaker” in the next parliamentary elections.

Views on Europe

MOST sees the refugee crisis as linked to terrorism and therefore considers it to be the biggest threat to Europe. It thinks that stronger common European responses should be developed. The party is cautiously supportive of the EU–Turkey refugee deal, and is hopeful for the future of Europe.

It believes the Brexit debate will help EU countries to consolidate and rediscover their faith in the EU.

Human Shield has quite the opposite view, and sees the EU as a totalitarian entity and the biggest threat to its member states, as it limits their sovereignty. It hopes that Brexit will cause the disintegration of the EU, and advocates Croatia’s withdrawal as well.

Views on foreign policy

As a relatively new party, MOST does not yet have very developed views on foreign policy, and mostly sides with its coalition partner. As such, it is supportive of a continuation of sanctions against Russia and more cooperation with Ukraine, as well as continuing the build-up of NATO and ratifying TTIP.

Human Shield is Russia-oriented in its foreign policy, and blames the EU for the Ukraine crisis. It often uses Russia as a counterweight when attacking the US for imperialism and interventionism, and sees NATO as an instrument for oppression that Croatia should withdraw from. The party sees the US as directly responsible for creating, arming, and financing jihadist groups, and sees China as a better economic partner with a better human rights record. It is also against TTIP, which it views as a tool for corporations to put citizens at a disadvantage. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it advocates national solutions rather than European solutions for all big foreign policy issues.
Meet the insurgents

Since the division of Cyprus in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus has been governed solely by the representatives of the Greek Cypriot community. None of the Greek Cypriot parties has managed to elect a president by itself or win a majority in the 56-seat House of Representatives and form a single-party government. There are two main political parties in Cyprus — the socialist Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and the right-leaning Democratic Rally (DISY), the latter of which is more popular.

AKEL supports an independent, demilitarised, and non-aligned Cyprus, and a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. It places particular emphasis on rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots. It supported Cyprus’s EU accession, albeit with some reservations, and is still regarded as a marginally eurocentric party. AKEL is a strong supporter of welfare benefits and the nationalisation of industry and services. However, it is often accused of mismanaging the country’s economy during the 2012–13 Cypriot financial crisis.

Views on Europe

AKEL was originally against Cyprus joining the EU. It does not share the view of many that the EU is crumbling, and does not see the refugee crisis, terrorism, Brexit, the Ukraine crisis, or the eurozone crisis as threats. The party feels strongly that the EU should be guided in its actions by adherence to international law, and it is very much against the EU–Turkey deal and the other actions of the EU regarding the refugee crisis on account of them being in contradiction of it. According to AKEL, the crisis has worsened dramatically as a result of the repressive and inhumane immigration policy implemented by the EU, the logic of military and police repression of the refugee flows by Frontex, NATO, and EUNAVFOR Med, the Dublin II Regulation which imprisons refugees in specific countries, the closing of the so-called Balkan corridor, and the refusal of EU member states to participate in refugee hosting plans.

Views on foreign policy

Regarding foreign policy, Cyprus’s relationship with Russia is important. Cyprus is favoured by Russian oligarchs because of its low taxes, and is considered to be a popular destination for Russian capital with a large Russian community. AKEL was a close supporter of Soviet Russia’s policies, and opposes the very existence of NATO. The party also feels that Russia played a positive role on the Cyprus problem as a member of the UN Security Council. AKEL has opposed the sanctions launched against Russia by the EU and considered the removal of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the Maidan uprising as a coup d’état.

The party’s view is that US strategy in the Middle East, in conjunction with the EU’s “European Security Strategy”, has provoked the violent redrawing of borders in that region and the overthrow of “non-cooperative” governments. The bloody civil war raging in Syria and the millions of Syrians becoming refugees is the result of US–NATO–EU–Turkey–Gulf monarchy policies to overthrow the Assad government.

The party is against TTIP, which it sees as the formation of an “economic NATO”, developed in secrecy, with the goal to counter the rise of the BRICS nations and give multinational monopolies the chance to operate unchecked in a single Euro-Atlantic market.
Meet the insurgents

The Velvet Revolution in 1989 enabled the development of multi-party democracy. Since the division of Czechoslovakia, only two political parties have been able to lead governments: the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) on the right and the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) on the left. The other party that has always been present in the dominant chamber is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM – a direct successor of the Communist Party). However, it has never become part of the coalition government as the two other dominant parties refuse to directly cooperate with it on a governmental level. KSČM’s membership base combines mostly old Communist Party members and younger opportunists. They demand withdrawal from NATO, and are largely anti-EU.

Dawn – National Coalition is a populist, anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and Eurosceptic party. It succeeded in the 2013 elections as Dawn – Direct Democracy, and the main point of their election programme was to call for the introduction of referenda as a regular decision-making tool in the Czech Republic. The Party of Free Citizens is a smaller, right-wing, libertarian, and anti-EU party that demands Czech withdrawal from the EU.

Views on Europe

All three parties think Brexit might cause the disintegration of the EU, and have initiated or supported proposals for a referendum on Czech membership of the EU. According to Dawn, the Brexit debate has been triggered by the centralisation of the EU. The EU institutions let the eurozone crisis happen because they were focused on banal regulatory issues concerning bananas and coffee machines instead of real problems. All three parties oppose the deal with Turkey. Dawn believes Turkey is blackmailing the EU and has the means to destroy the EU singlehandedly. The Party of Free Citizens thinks the deal will simply not work and is legally questionable. KSČM sees Turkey as a dictatorship that should not be allowed to have a visa-free regime. Dawn is the most outspoken on migration, seeing Islam as a threat to the future of Europe and its culture, tradition, and values.

Views on foreign policy

The parties agree that the main cause of the refugee crisis is US interventionist policy in the Middle East. KSČM and the Party of Free Citizens also agree that the threat of radical Islam has grown because Muslims have failed to integrate in Europe, whereas Dawn sees the nature of Islamic doctrine itself and support from the West as the main causes. All three parties have been impressed with Russian action against ISIS, are against supporting Ukraine against Russia, and want to normalise relations with Russia in the long term.

KSČM wants the Czech Republic to withdraw from NATO and advocates a more neutral position for the country. The Party of Free Citizens would like to strengthen NATO, but not necessarily in juxtaposition to Russia. Dawn would also like the Czech Republic to stay in NATO because it feels that NATO will ensure its security, but it does not want the country to be drawn into conflicts that are not directly relevant to its security interests.

The parties are all opposed to TTIP for varying reasons, including the much-reviled arbitration clause, fear about the risks that come with the harmonisation of standards, and the secrecy of the negotiations.
Meet the insurgents

The Danish People’s Party (DPP) party was founded in 1995 by Pia Kjersgaard, a former carer for the elderly. With her non-academic background and level-headed rhetoric, she instantly wooed certain segments of Danish workers, especially in provincial areas. The DPP grew out of the Progress Party, which towed a staunchly anti-immigrant line focusing mainly on non-Western immigrants and zero-taxes rhetoric.

The party’s policy is aimed at safeguarding Danish (and sometimes Western) cultural heritage and unity. The core-family unit is often pictured in their election campaign materials. The party’s rhetoric and symbols include the Danish monarchy, the Lutheran Protestant Church, anti-immigration, animal welfare, and a strong welfare system. In 2015, the DPP became the second-largest party in Denmark, and the largest party on the right wing. The DPP entered into negotiations with the liberal party in regards to forming a government. In the end, the party decided to remain in opposition where it thought it could be more influential, not least because it disagreed heavily with the liberal party over critical issues such as redistribution policy and immigration policy.

Views on Europe

According to the DPP, radical Islam is the main threat to Denmark and Europe. The Ukraine crisis and the eurozone crisis are not seen as existential threats but problems that can be solved with diplomacy. The party is very much opposed to the EU–Turkey refugee deal, and is worried that the EU will allow an Islamic state into the Union. The DPP also blames the German “refugees welcome” policy for the current refugee crisis in Europe, and is critical of Greece’s handling of the situation at the borders, as well as the lack of support from Brussels.

The DPP sees the in/out referendum in the UK as an “hour of destiny” for the EU, and wants to use the opportunity to negotiate a new kind of partnership with the EU. In the event of Brexit, it expects Britain to negotiate a new kind of hybrid partnership with the EU, somewhere between full membership and the European Economic Area – a model that might also be suitable for Denmark. The party is willing to call for a referendum on this matter.

Views on foreign policy

The DPP also sees the EU’s foreign policy through the prism of the Islamic threat facing Europe, and is irritated by the fact that political discussions centre on the perceived need to find a counter-balance to Russia. Instead, it sees the need for “Western civilisation” as a whole to be protected, through cooperation with both NATO and Russia, and participation in a US-led coalition against ISIS. It does not support the sanctions against Russia and is worried about their effect on businesses in Denmark.

The party is against giving market economy status to China because of the risks it poses to the Danish market, but also cites concerns about the human rights situation in China. Support from Danish politicians for the Tibetan cause has met with resistance from China, and the DPP is unhappy that China, as a trading partner, is pressuring Denmark with political demands. The DPP is generally open to TTIP but has concerns about the regulatory council, workforce protection for Danish citizens, animal welfare, and environmental protection laws.
Meet the insurgents

The history of populist radical parties in Estonia starts in 1991. However, it was only in 2000 that the first anti-EU arguments began to appear among rural, right-radical nationalist, and left-radical pro-Russian parties.

The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (CPP) was founded in 2012. The CPP is focused on the development of the Estonian economy, stopping the demographic crisis facing the country, and stopping EU federalisation and centralisation. Referenda are seen by the party as a positive instrument for making political decisions related to the EU in the future. The party has been clear about its opposition to immigration, claiming that migrants are a source of criminality and do not integrate into the labour market. The party is also opposed to gay rights, as well as financial solidarity in the EU and support for Greece. The support for the CPP has been growing, and it is now the third most supported political party in the country, with around 8,000 members.

The Party of People’s Unity (PPU) was created in 2014 by Kristiina Ojuland, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of the European Parliament. Since its earliest days, the party’s goal has been to meet the demands of the “simple voter”. In the 2014 elections, the PPU received less than 1 percent of the vote, but nonetheless had an impact due to widespread media coverage. In April 2016, the PPU made a proposal to criminalise the teaching of the Koran. The party has also been active in collecting information related to possible crimes carried out by refugees or migrants, and seeks to uncover suspected censorship in the media related to that matter.

Views on Europe

The CPP thinks there is a growing tendency in Europe towards thinking in terms of national needs and interests instead of forced European solidarity. Debates in Estonia over the rationality of EU membership will grow, and for the CPP disintegration is inevitable unless radical reforms are undertaken. The PPU thinks Europe needs to address this trend and move instead towards intergovernmentalism if it wants to survive. Both parties think a debate is needed on Estonia’s membership of the EU, but don’t foresee an Estonian exit under the current coalition. They do support referenda on a number of items in the European decision-making process.

On the refugee crisis, both parties blame Germany and Greece for the fact that instability in the Middle East has become a European problem.

Views on foreign policy

The CPP and the PPU are both cautious towards Russia, and support ongoing sanctions, the DCFTA with Ukraine, and paths for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. The PPU is a bit more optimistic than the CPP, and has developed some sympathy for Russian positions where they overlap with their own, such as the decisive approach to radical Islam and refugees, criticism of the eurozone, and the idea of having a strong and conservative nation. This is reflected in the PPU’s approach to NATO, which it wants to strengthen but not in clear opposition to Russia. The CPP, on the other hand, thinks it is vital to step up against Russia.

On trade, the CPP is opposed to TTIP because it is does not agree with the European decision-making process on these kinds of treaties. The PPU is not necessarily against the trade agreement, but wants more information on the impact it will have on Estonia.
Meet the insurgents

The Finns Party (FPP) was established in the 1990s out of the ashes of the Finnish Rural Party – an agrarian, anti-establishment, and anti-communist party that was active from 1959. The FPP blends centrist, or left-leaning, socio-economic views and conservative values, and pitches the preferences of the “people” against those of the ruling elites. Euroscepticism has become more and more important for the party’s identity and platform over the years. At the same time, the party has also adopted more sceptical views on immigration and multiculturalism. After having long been a rather marginal party, the FPP started to grow in the latter half of the 2000s. Following the 2015 parliamentary election, in which it won the second-biggest number of seats in the Finnish parliament, the FPP joined the government, where it now sits in coalition with two centre-right parties. FPP officials hold both the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry.

Views on Europe

As a governing party, the FPP has had to compromise on its views about EU cooperation, for example by subscribing to strengthening the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and defining the EU as a “political choice that connects Finland to the Western community of values” – something they had been in opposition to. The party previously supported the idea of organising a referendum on Finnish EU membership, but most party members have now tabled this idea since a clear majority of Finns are not interested. Part of the party has constantly highlighted the possible negative consequences of immigration and multiculturalism, and the refugee crisis is seen as a threat to the viability of the Nordic welfare model. The party sees the ever-deepening, all-encompassing integration process of the EU as a threat to its unity, as member states are looking for alternatives.

Views on foreign policy

The FPP thinks it is important to maintain good relations with Moscow regardless of what happens between the EU and Russia, since it will remain an important trading partner for Finland. Sanctions are seen as a necessary evil. There is some disagreement on NATO, as some party members would like to see Finland join NATO and others favour military and political non-alliance. The party doesn’t see a military solution to the war in Syria, but accepts the actions taken by the various actors against ISIS.

On trade, the party is relatively liberal. It is generally positive towards TTIP, but identifies potential worries about the protection of foreign investment, labour norms, and food safety.
Meet the insurgents

France has had two distinct types of anti-establishment radical parties since the end of the Second World War. The first group, united around far-left revolutionary ideologies, now has a secondary role in French politics. The French Communist Party was the largest party of opposition in France shortly after the Second World War, but its influence has slowly decreased since the 1980s. It is critical of globalisation and capitalism, and has a positive view of immigration, which are both reasons to criticise the EU as far as it is concerned.

The second political family unites around far-right populist and reactionary ideologies. The leading party is the Front National (FN), created in 1972 and today considered as one of the three main parties in French politics: a novelty in the traditional bipartisan landscape. The FN experienced its first electoral successes in the 1980s, and got to the second round of the presidential elections in 2002, a feat it could reproduce in 2017. In 2011, Marine Le Pen became president of the FN, and quickly engaged in a process of “normalising” the party and dampening the stigma historically attached to it. Its inability to forge political alliances has prevented it from major electoral victories so far.

Views on Europe

The FN views the refugee crisis (to which it closely links the threat of terrorism and the growing influence of Islam) as “a security emergency” for Europe, arguing that it threatens the fundamental values on which European civilisation has been built. The FN blames US and EU strategy in the Middle East, as well as Germany’s “refugees welcome” policy, for the present situation. The FN continues to promote the complete reconstruction of the European project and a return to total national sovereignty. It hopes Brexit will trigger the use of more referenda Europe-wide, and wants to have a referendum on taking France out of the eurozone.

The French Communist Party criticises socio-economic policies decided at the European level and prompted by Germany, but not the European project itself. It is opposed to the idea of Brexit, but is interested in renegotiations to work towards more ambitious social rights for all EU countries.

Views on foreign policy

The FN sees the aggressive policy of NATO and recent US interventions as the biggest threat to European peace and French interests. It wants to be able to act independently from NATO and wants a pan-European partnership with Russia that excludes the US. The party also supports Russia regarding Ukraine, and sees the Ukraine crisis as the result of an aggressive attempt from the EU and the US to contain Russia.

The French Communist Party agrees that the influence of external powers in the Middle East is to blame for the refugee crisis, but also points to the role of violent dictatorial regimes in the region. It is less positive towards Russia than the FN, supporting the will of the Ukrainian people regarding the DCFTA and EU and NATO accession. At the same time, it advocates France’s withdrawal from NATO, and the eventual dissolution of NATO, claiming it to be an outdated organisation.
Meet the insurgents

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), founded in 2013, is a relatively new right-wing populist and Eurosceptic party. The AfD was founded as a single-issue party that campaigned against the euro currency and the bailouts resulting from the European debt crisis. In 2015, after a split, the party’s new leader transformed the party into an anti-immigration and anti-Islam platform. There is still an open dispute within the party and its MEPs on how far it should shift to the right.

The party that split off from the AfD in 2015 became the Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA). It is a Eurosceptic, liberal-conservative political party. The party is concerned with economic and financial policies, calling for a Greek exit from the eurozone or Germany’s withdrawal from the euro and a return to national currencies.

Die Linke is a democratic-socialist political party founded in 2007 out of a fusion of several left-wing parties. The party calls for a statutory minimum wage, for an annulment of some social-welfare reforms, and for an increase in inheritance tax and the top rate of tax, as well as international disarmament.

Views on Europe

The AfD sees the refugee crisis and related integration problems as the biggest threat facing Europe, but thinks the eurozone crisis could easily top the list again, as the EU’s solutions are not sustainable. The party sees Brexit as a big threat for Europe, but hopes it can have some positive effects in terms of European reforms and a more widespread use of referenda in Europe.

Apart from its economic and financial policies described above, ALFA’s general view on the EU is that it should no longer be an organisation based on supranational decision-making and instead be a loose federation of states.

Die Linke sees the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis as the biggest threats to the EU, and blames a lack of solidarity between member states for the current crisis. The party thinks referenda should be used for decision making in the EU more often, and some members feel that Brexit might make the development of a stronger European core more likely.

Views on foreign policy

The AfD has strong sympathies with Vladimir Putin’s views and policies – it is pro-law and order, anti-mucultralism, pro-individualist-pluralist in society, pro-national sovereignty, and pro-emancipation from the US and Brussels. It opposes continuing EU sanctions against Russia, and calls for the replacement of NATO by a security order that integrates Russia. The party is building close ties with Russia, which might be underlined soon by the partnership of the AfD’s youth wing with the youth wing of Putin’s party, United Russia. It is critical of US actions in the Middle
East, partly blaming interventionism for the refugee crisis and the rise of radical Islam.

As opposed to the AfD, ALFA is in favour of Germany’s Westbindung (security cooperation with Western partners) and the commitment to NATO as part of the transatlantic security and defence structure. In addition, ALFA is in favour of TTIP.

Die Linke calls for international disarmament, and rules out any form of military engagement of the Bundeswehr outside Germany. The party calls for NATO to be replaced with a collective security system that includes Russia as a member country, and is aimed at disarmament on both sides.
Meet the insurgents

After the establishment of democracy in Greece in 1974, a two-party system dominated the political landscape for decades, but popular responses to the economic crisis facing the country have caused a shift in Greek politics.

Syriza was founded in 2004 as an alliance of small left-wing parties. In January 2015, the party won the national elections and formed a government in cooperation with the Independent Greeks party. Syriza suffered a serious internal crisis in the summer of 2015 when the decision of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to make a U-turn from its pre-election anti-austerity platform led party members to jump ship. The party is now pro-EU and committed to applying the agreed bailout terms.

The Independent Greeks party was founded in February 2012, championing the idea of Greece gaining “independence” from its international creditors and protecting its national sovereignty. The Independent Greeks party is a highly personified political vehicle for its leader Panos Kammenos, who has a remarkable flexibility in adopting himself to political conditions. The Independent Greeks party is currently in a governing coalition with Syriza.

Golden Dawn is a neo-Nazi party, established in 1980 by its current leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos, an admirer of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi era. Until 2012, the party had enjoyed only marginal support, but by investing in populism during the economic crisis it managed to be elected in 2012. The party preserved a core base of supporters despite the ongoing trial against it after the killing of the pop artist Pavlos Fyssas by a Golden Dawn member in September 2013. Golden Dawn employs a political communication strategy against establishment political parties, refugees, and the creditors of Greece which still finds resonance in Greek society. Its members also provide poor Greeks with food and attempt to replace the police by offering protection against potential criminals.

Views on Europe

Syriza and the Independent Greeks see the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis as the biggest threats to the EU. The parties believe that the current policy of austerity is not appropriate for steering the EU out of the crisis. They also consider the stance of some EU countries on the refugee crisis (such as Austria and Hungary) as counter-productive and express their concern that the future of Europe might be jeopardised should principles of humanity and free movement of persons not be respected. The right-wing Independent Greeks would in theory be negatively predisposed vis-à-vis migrants and refugees in Greece, but in practice they cooperate with Syriza to ensure governmental unity. Regarding Brexit, the two governing parties hope that the Brexit debate will give them some more flexibility with their creditors, since the EU would not be prepared for a new Greek crisis during a period of concern about Britain’s position in the EU. However, they are also concerned that if Brexit does happen, Grexit could follow, especially if the country does not meet its fiscal targets.

From the perspective of Golden Dawn, the eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and radical Islam and terrorism are the top threats. The party advocates for Greece to stop paying its creditors, and condemns “illegal immigrants” that come to the country.
Views on foreign policy

On the whole, Golden Dawn invests in a strong pro-Russia position but lack positions on many specific foreign policy issues. As for the two governing parties, many of their foreign policy views come back to their financial concerns. They are not in favour of an extension of sanctions against Russia beyond July, because they count on Greek-Russian economic cooperation. They were originally very critical of TTIP, but need the US for potential debt-restructuring in Greece and will not oppose an agreement.

While in opposition, Syriza had been against NATO as a matter of principle. While governing, it respects the commitments of Greece as a member of the alliance. The Independent Greeks are positively predisposed vis-à-vis NATO as a matter of principle and would agree with the enlargement of the alliance. However, both parties do not want to see NATO build up militarily against Russia because they believe that such a development will harm relations between Brussels and Moscow and increase the possibility of large-scale war.
Meet the insurgents

Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) was founded under the name of Alliance of Young Democrats in 1988 as a youth movement in opposition to the ruling Communist Party. The party has had representation in parliament since the first free elections, although it has undergone several waves of ideological change in the course of the past three decades, from liberalism and libertarianism via conservatism to nationalism. Since 2010, the party has developed a strong nationalist line, with frequent references to the importance of the sovereignty of the nation in opposition to “Brussels’ rule” and a turn towards traditional values. Because of the strong representation of Fidesz politicians in relevant institutions, the governmental foreign policy line can be considered as that of Fidesz.

Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) was founded in 2003, but failed to gain parliamentary representation until 2010. Jobbik is a nationalist Christian party claiming to defend Hungarian values and interests.

Views on Europe

Fidesz sees the refugee crisis as the biggest threat to Europe, as it has shown that the EU is not capable of protecting itself. The governing party generally sees the incoming people as (economic) migrants who could undermine the European way of life, rather than as refugees. The threat of Brexit worries the government because of the impact it would have on the EU as a whole, and also because it raises questions about what would happen to the more than 56,000 Hungarians living and working in the UK. The crisis of the eurozone enforces the generally negative opinion the government holds about the capacity of the EU to recover from the economic crisis. Fidesz is supportive of the refugee deal with Turkey.

Jobbik used to be strongly against Hungary’s EU membership, but it has toned down this rhetoric and no longer calls directly for a Hungarian exit from the EU. However, it would like the opportunity to renegotiate membership and hold a referendum on the subject. The party supports cooperation with Turkey on the refugee crisis but sees the Turkey deal as a complete failure.

Views on foreign policy

Fidesz started out on a strong anti-Soviet, anti-Russian platform, but has changed its views in recent years. The party’s leader, current Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, shows a certain degree of admiration towards Putin’s governance style, and high-level visits between the two leaders take place regularly. Nevertheless, the party would support a renewal of sanctions if a majority of countries voted for this, and it supports Ukraine on the DCFTA, NATO accession, and EU accession. The party officially supports TTIP but is worried about GMOs, the investor-state dispute settlement clause, and the secrecy of the negotiations. Jobbik opposes TTIP with the same concerns as Fidesz.

Jobbik has also become increasingly supportive of Russia, and has opposed the sanctions and EU support for Ukraine. The party is critical of NATO as a geopolitical tool used by the US to weaken Russia. The party also blames the US and its main allies for the crisis in Syria, and is against a European military intervention in the country. Fidesz would be open to such an intervention through a Europe-wide initiative or a coalition of the willing. Both Jobbik and Fidesz MPs have argued that one of the most important reasons for the growth of radical Islam is the inevitable failure of Western European societies to integrate Muslim communities.
Meet the insurgents

Sinn Féin (SF)’s post-war history is complicated. The party has split multiple times, and the beginning of the IRA’s campaign of violence in Northern Ireland and the UK in the 1960s led to the birth of the modern Sinn Féin and its military wing, the Provisional IRA (PIRA). The modern Sinn Féin was banned in the UK until 1974 but by the mid-1980s had begun to participate in local and national government on both sides of the border. The PIRA ceasefire in 1997 opened the door for SF to take its seat at the table for multiparty peace talks, resulting in the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998 and ultimately in the decommissioning of the PIRA.

Though SF continued to be seen as a party with many legacy issues, it is now the second-largest party in Northern Ireland, and in the Republic of Ireland it has made enormous gains in the wake of the economic crisis. In 2011, it capitalised on anti-government and anti-Troika sentiment to become the fourth-largest party in the country. In 2016, it benefited from the electoral collapse of the Labour Party, whose role in the previous pro-austerity coalition government had damaged its credibility among its traditionally working-class base. SF is now the third-largest party in the country.

Views on Europe

SF is in an interesting position – it is an anti-EU party that campaigning against Brexit. It opposed Britain leaving the EU due to the potential economic, political, and social impact it would have on Ireland, and sees the referendum as undemocratic because of the British electoral system. At the same time, the party has firm ideas about how Europe must be changed and reformed, in particular with respect to what it considers the “declining importance of social Europe”. SF has been critical of the Irish and European commitments in the refugee crisis, arguing that resettlement of Syrian refugees needs to be sped up. It is also opposed to the EU–Turkey refugee deal because of Turkey’s poor human rights record.

Views on foreign policy

SF’s foreign policy approach is characterised by anti-globalisation, anti-interventionism, anti-war, and anti-austerity sentiments. The party is strongly opposed to TTIP, mainly because of concerns over mismatched regulatory standards, environmental standards, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, and the lack of transparency of the negotiations.

Given SF’s history, the party has a different view of Islamic terrorism than most other parties. One representative called the problem first and foremost a failure of politics, and said that the solution would inevitably have to involve empowering disenfranchised or isolated minorities that might be vulnerable to radicalisation. SF blames the refugee crisis on a combination of Western interference in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and insufficient aid for the region. It also puts much of the blame of the Ukraine crisis on EU and NATO expansion, and opposes the sanctions against Russia. The party considers NATO to be a “Cold War relic” and is opposed to any cooperation between Ireland and NATO, including the Partnership for Peace.

Many of these views overlap with Russia’s, but SF opposes Russia’s use of military force to achieve its objectives, and there does not appear to be any collaboration with the country.
Meet the insurgents

Lega Nord is a regionalist political party that was founded in northern Italy in 1991. Its original aim was the transformation of Italy into a federal entity. Gradually, the focus of the party shifted to a more moderate position advocating a decentralisation of power and stronger autonomy for the regions. The party started to grow as it exploited the widespread disillusionment generated by corruption scandals. It played a major part in pushing the government to take drastic measures to tackle illegal immigration, and has become increasingly Eurosceptic since the election of Matteo Salvini as secretary general.

The Five Star Movement was founded in 2009 by the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo and internet entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio. In its early days the party was an environmental and pacifist organisation, which also advocated different means of direct participation via the internet and anti-system and anti-political narratives. As the Five Star Movement grew, it started developing foreign policy strategies, based around its pacifism and Euroscepticism.

Views on Europe

Both parties share the opinion that the “EU super-state” and the Italian government, seen as excessively accommodating towards the EU, are equally to blame for Italy’s existing political and economic difficulties. They both aim to take Italy out of the eurozone, although this issue has fallen down the agenda since a referendum on the matter was rejected by the senate.

The Five Star Movement has criticised the EU’s austerity policies and its financial rules, and wants the eurozone to be more democratic. It has also denounced what it perceives as a lack of democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions and their intrusion in the political decision-making of EU member states. Lega Nord blames migration and Italy’s struggle to deal with it on EU-related policies and obligations. It sees the “refugees welcome” policy as a threat to Europe because of the risk of terrorism that they believe it poses. Both parties are also strongly against the EU–Turkey refugee deal.

Views on foreign policy

In international politics, Lega Nord is pro-American and pro-Israeli, but it is still critical of US actions in the Middle East. Salvini has made no mystery of his personal admiration for Vladimir Putin, and the party wants sanctions against Russia to be removed as soon as possible.

As a non-violent movement, the Five Star Movement has often criticised any Italian military intervention in the MENA region (both in Syria and Libya), and it also voiced concerns about Italy’s sale of arms to Middle Eastern countries. The movement argues that Italy has been directly damaged by the sanctions on Russia since Moscow has shifted its geostrategic interests away from Italy. It wants to stop sanctions and return to “business as usual” as soon as possible.
Meet the insurgents

Latvia has a typical multi-party system where new parties are often created shortly before elections, and various pre-existing parties form alliances over the years. Due to their strong ethnic stances and openness to the formation of alliances, the two longest-surviving political forces in Latvia are the National Alliance and the Social Democratic Party “Harmony”.

The National Alliance (Full title: National Alliance “All For Latvia!” – “For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK”) is a coalition of Latvian nationalists, conservatives, and economic liberals, dating back to 2010. It is a nationalist party, typically anti-Russian, and oriented towards maintaining so-called traditional Latvian values. The National Alliance is typically included in the coalition government as it is the fourth-largest force in the Parliament, and is usually needed to form a governing majority.

Social Democratic Party “Harmony” is a catch-all, centre-left party that aims to represent the interests of Russians in Latvia. The party has little success at forming coalitions due to its label as an “ethnic Russian party”. Forming a government with it is perceived as political suicide by the parties that are oriented towards the electorate of ethnic Latvians. It was established in its current form in 2010.

Views on Europe

The National Alliance sees the refugee crisis as one of the biggest threats facing the EU, and strongly opposes the introduction of mandatory quotas for the relocation of refugees, which is now also the government position. However, the party does support the EU–Turkey refugee deal, seeing it as a positive development, but would still prefer for all refugees to be sent back. The National Alliance is strongly against Brexit because it endangers the position of Latvian migrants in the UK, and thinks it would cause a disintegration of the EU and trigger wider use of referenda in the EU.

Harmony sees the eurozone crisis as the only considerable threat facing the EU at the moment. It was supportive of the Brexit debate, viewing it as an opportunity for the EU to address questions on its future development, regardless of the outcome of the referendum.

Views on foreign policy

The different views the parties hold on Russia can be seen as emblematic of their foreign policy stance. The National Alliance does not side significantly with Russia, supporting sanctions and a route to EU and NATO membership for Ukraine. The party also believes that NATO should be built up in response to the Russian threat. Harmony also thinks sanctions should stay in place until the conditions of their being lifted have been fulfilled, but generally advocates a positive relationship with Russia. Surprisingly, the National Alliance can be considered to be closer in many of its policies to Russia than Harmony is, especially in relation to nationalism, militarism, and policies towards gender, traditional values, and religion, even if it supports sanctions and the strengthening of NATO against Russia.

The National Alliance blames Assad and ISIS for the refugee crisis, but points to Germany’s policy on refugees as the reason the crisis moved to Europe. The party would support military intervention by the EU, if it were in cooperation with the US. Harmony blames the Middle East strategy of the US and the EU, who intervened without doing enough analysis on social and economic processes in the region. It does not support further intervention.

The National Alliance supports TTIP, whereas Harmony wants to know more about the effects it will have on the Latvian economy.
Meet the insurgents

The Labour Party was founded in 2003 as a one-man project by Russian-born businessman and millionaire Viktor Uspaskich. A year later, it became the biggest party in parliament on a platform of anti-corruption and the defence of the “common people”. Once in power, it faced scandals regarding fraudulent accounting, of which it was found guilty in 2013. In recent years, the party has tried to regain popularity by using populist rhetoric and appealing to anti-immigrant sentiments in the country.

The Order and Justice Party was established as a liberal democratic party in 2002 and changed its name in 2006. The party has a clear anti-establishment appeal and explicitly contrasts the self-enriching, oligarchic elite with the ordinary Lithuanian people. The party’s programme includes elements of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and moral conservatism, and also promotes a more pragmatic approach to Russia than some traditional parties.

Views on Europe

The Labour Party is sure that Brexit would lead to the disintegration of the EU. Britain leaving the EU would serve as a bad example to other EU members. The party is also worried about terrorism, the refugee crisis, and the eurozone crisis as threats to the EU. It blames the latter on more recent newcomers to the eurozone ignoring its requirements.

The Order and Justice Party also sees only negative consequences following Brexit: disintegration of the EU and a recession for all countries including Britain. The party is strongly opposed to the EU–Turkey refugee deal, and sees Australian-style control of the EU’s outer borders as the only solution to the refugee crisis, as well as a stop to the illegal movement of migrants within Europe. It is worth mentioning that only 11 refugees have entered Lithuania since the beginning of the refugee crisis.

Views on foreign policy

Both parties take the threat from Russia very seriously and believe in further strengthening NATO to combat it. At the same time, they are wary about sanctions against Russia, because they fear an economically weakened Russia will have more extremist policies. The Labour Party wants to prolong sanctions but simultaneously search for other ways out of the situation, and the Order and Justice Party wants to end sanctions as soon as possible. The latter has been haunted by accusations of having pro-Russian ties since onetime leader Rolandas Paksas was removed from office in 2002 after supposedly providing a Russian citizen with Lithuanian citizenship and secret information after receiving campaign support.

The Labour Party is open to TTIP as it supports trade agreements, but it is cautious when it comes to the ability of the EU to negotiate favourable conditions and protect the market from GMOs and pesticide-grown agricultural products. The Order and Justice Party opposes TTIP for similar reasons, and is also opposed to the secrecy of the negotiations.
Meet the insurgents

Imperium Europa was founded in 2000 by current leader Norman Lowell, a Maltese far-right writer. Since its inception, the party has failed to secure any seats in Malta’s National Parliament. The party now rejects participation in national politics, claiming that the “local parliament is a place for 65 part-time dilettantes who approve the laws made in Brussels”, and it believes change can only come from Brussels now. It has focused on contesting European Parliamentary elections, and its electoral results have slowly improved.

Imperium Europa runs on an overtly pro-white, anti-immigrant platform calling for the unity of all European “Caucasians” within a single domain to be ruled by an elite of two million white men. They reject the “fratricidal tendencies” of European history, the democratic process, race mixing, integration, the “dogma of equality”, and the power of a financial capitalist elite. By creating a pan-European network of likeminded parties under the banner of Nova Europa, they seek to avoid the “extinction of the biological aristocracy that gave the world everything” and manifest an “Aryan age of light”.

Views on Europe

Imperium Europa sees the EU as a mercantile organisation that imposes economic threats on countries that do not fulfil their obligations. It is strongly opposed to the idea of imposing fines on countries that do not cooperate on the burden-sharing plans for the refugee crisis, and also rejects the EU–Turkey refugee deal. The party thinks that Brexit would trigger the disintegration of the EU, because other countries would notice that Britain would fare better outside the EU when it can make its own laws. Instead of the current EU, built on pillars of finance and economy, it wants a cultural EU.

Views on foreign policy

Imperium Europa does not think the EU should concern itself with matters outside its borders, and should focus on guarding them to protect the identity of those inside. It is open to improving dialogue with Russia, based on ideas about the cultural, racial, and traditional kinship of “native” Europeans and Russians, but does not want to get involved in sanctions or a policy towards Ukraine. It also opposes membership of NATO, as it does not believe European countries should be drawn into wars outside their own territories.
Meet the insurgents

In the post-Second World War era, several small anti-establishment, populist, and radical parties have existed in the Netherlands. Since 2006, the Party for Freedom (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, PVV), led by Geert Wilders, managed to significantly influence political debates in parliament. Between 2010 and 2012, the PVV supported the minority government coalition of the right-wing liberal party and the Christian Democrats. The PVV started primarily as an anti-Islam party, but increasingly also became an anti-EU party.

Views on Europe

The PVV’s agenda is consistently and explicitly anti-euro and anti-EU. The party supports Brexit and hopes that Britain leaving the EU will help the Netherlands follow suit, eventually causing the disintegration of the EU. The party sees terrorism, radical Islam, and the refugee crisis as some of the biggest threats for the EU, and thinks they are aggregated by EU policies. It sees the inflow of refugees as a threat to national identity and the welfare state, thinks Schengen is dead, and wants to reintroduce national borders. After the EU–Turkey refugee deal, Wilders accused Dutch and German governments of letting the Turkish government decide their policies. The party considers the deal a sell-out and is very negative towards Turkey and its current leadership.

Views on foreign policy

The PVV is generally pro-US and critical of Russia in its foreign policy. The party is in favour of a strong NATO, but primarily because it helps to serve Dutch interests. It wants fewer peace operations, and is in favour of removing an article in the Dutch constitution which determines that the promotion of the international rule of law is a task assigned to the Dutch armed forces. It supports Dutch airstrikes against Syria as part of the anti-ISIS coalition. The party has been very outspoken with its negative views on the nature of Islam, as well as the failure of integration of Muslim communities in EU societies.

The PVV had an impact on the EU’s foreign policy recently when it campaigned for a “No” vote in the Dutch referendum on the Association Agreement with Ukraine. The party has been critical of Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine, but also blames the EU and its member states for fuelling Russia’s behaviour. To the PVV, it is logical that Vladimir Putin decided to act against a threat in its sphere of influence when the EU offered an Association Agreement to Ukraine. It presented the “No” vote, which was successful in the referendum, as a vote against the Brussels elite, the expansion of Europe, and sending money to a corrupt and bankrupt country.

Regarding TTIP, the PVV is opposed but primarily because it would like the Netherlands to have its own trade deals with the US after a Dutch exit from the EU.
Meet the insurgents

Voter turnout in Polish parliamentary elections is typically rather low, as is membership of political parties. The post-1989 political scene started to stabilise around 2005, when there were two clear parties vying for power – the centre-right liberal-conservative Civic Platform and the nationalist traditionalist Law and Justice party (PiS). The latter won the most recent elections, in October 2015, with promises of more welfare spending, a lower retirement age, and new taxes on foreign banks, as well as by criticising EU migration policies. The country now has the first single-party government in modern Polish history, and has launched a deep reshuffle of the Polish state, which has heightened tensions with the European institutions.

Kukiz’15 was established before the 2015 elections as a populist anti-establishment party. Led by punk musician Paweł Kukiz, it is especially popular with younger voters. Because of its heterogeneous character, it doesn’t have clear policies on all issues. One aim of the party is to implement a first-past-the-post voting system to speed up decision-making and forge stronger ties between constituents and elected representatives.

Views on Europe

PiS is sceptical about further integration with and of the EU, and would prefer an EU that manifests as a very loose alliance of nation states. It is also outspoken in its negative approach towards Polish membership of the eurozone. It sees the refugee crisis and Brexit as the biggest threats to Europe, partly blaming the former on Germany’s open policy towards refugees. However, the party has a relatively positive view on the EU–Turkey refugee deal, accepting it as the lesser of two evils.

Kukiz’15 sees the United Kingdom as an important partner in the EU, and thinks Brexit could lead to serious questions being raised about Poland’s membership of the EU. The party understands the rise in migration towards the EU as the result of Angela Merkel’s invitation, and because they seek social benefits and jobs. It is currently collecting signatures for a referendum against the EU relocation programme.

Views on foreign policy

PiS fully supports sanctions against Russia and the opportunities for Ukraine to join NATO and possibly the EU, since it expects that this will bring stability to Eastern Europe and deter Russia. It also supports building up NATO against the threat of Russia. It supports TTIP in principle, but with reservations over investor-state dispute settlement and regulations on agriculture and energy intensive industries.

Kukiz’15 also sees Russia as a threat, and not only in the eastern neighbourhood: some in the party believe Russia has secret agents within ISIS and is out to destabilise the MENA region. It also believes NATO should build up militarily against the Russian threat, and supports the EU sanctions policy and support for Ukraine. The party is relatively open to TTIP, but worried about the lack of transparency in the negotiations, the spread of GMOs, and limitations on internet freedom.
Meet the insurgents

During Salazar’s New State authoritarian regime (1933–1974), only one party was legal: the National Union (União Nacional, UN), later renamed the National Popular Action (Acção Nacional Popular, ANP). The UN/ANP was dissolved in the first weeks of the coup that took place in April 1974, and a great variety of new parties soon replaced it. Some political parties emerged very quickly because they already existed in an embryonic state. That was the case for the Socialist and Portuguese Communist parties. By the beginning of the early 1990s, only four parties regularly won seats in the Parliament, and two were so much stronger than the others that Portugal seemed to be well on its way to an essentially two-party system. The two major parties – PS (Socialist Party) and PSD (Social Democratic Party) – dominated political life. The communists and the centre-right conservatives were the two other political groups with seats in the Parliament. That changed with the creation in 1998 of the Left Bloc, a new far-left party that is critical of the capitalist model of economic growth and opposes policymaking procedures that restrict popular participation. However, it also defends certain issues, such as new policies for drugs, gender equality, more rights to the LGBT community, and so on. Since its appearance on the Portuguese political scene, the Left Bloc has more or less monopolised the representation of “new” political issues, trying to appeal to young, urban, and more educated voters.

Views on foreign policy

In terms of international politics, the Left Bloc is highly critical of transatlantic relations and NATO, globalisation, and TTIP, and is mostly committed to reducing unfair trade and promoting an increasing convergence between North and South. Not ignoring the violence associated with the civil war in Syria and the instability created by ISIS, the Left Bloc is of the opinion that the roots of the refugee problem can be found in the policy of the West towards the MENA region, especially the interventionist policies of the US and some European powers. The party argues that sanctions against Russia make sense for now because of its annexation of Ukrainian territory, but that the EU and the US still have a moral responsibility for the situation because of their attempts to strongly influence the Ukrainians towards the path of the Association Agreement. The Left Bloc does not believe that China should be granted market economy status, and does not approve of the country’s lack of respect for individual rights.

Views on Europe

The Left Bloc has been very critical of the EU, denouncing its neoliberal policies for only promoting inequality and privileges. It views the refugee crisis and the possibility of Brexit as major existential threats to the EU, but sees the EU as being on a path to disintegration regardless. It is very critical of the EU–Turkey refugee deal, viewing it not as a solution to the refugee problem, but instead as a means for Europe to clear its conscience of the problem.
Meet the insurgents

In spite of a series of corruption scandals that shook the highest levels of Romanian politics throughout 2015 and 2016, implicating former prime minister Victor Ponta and his Social Democratic Party (PSD), the PSD and the National Liberal Party remain the two biggest and most influential political parties in Romania.

The National Democratic Party (PND) is a nationalist political party formed in 2015 by former MPs from the populist People’s Party – Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD). The PP-DD officially merged with the National Union for the Progress of Romania in 2015, after Dan Diaconescu was convicted of extortion. The party has mainly focused on national issues.

Views on Europe

The PND is greatly influenced by the general trend in Romania to adopt and promote anything European. The party sees the refugee crisis and terrorism as the biggest threats to the EU, and supports a European approach to the crisis. The PND supports Romania’s decisions to take in a set number of migrants, taking into account national capacities, and means to integrate foreign citizens into Romanian society. It sees the EU–Turkey refugee deal as positive because of the chance to improve the refugee crisis and stabilise the EU. It strongly supports the accession of Romania to the Schengen Area, and hopes this accession would help the country play a more active part in the refugee crisis. It sometimes feels that the EU treats Romania as an outsider and a border country, despite the sacrifices the country made to join the EU.

Views on foreign policy

The PND believes that Romania’s security interests are closely aligned with NATO’s. It believes NATO should accept new members from the eastern neighbourhood to reinforce its European pillar. However, it also feels that Romania has had to pay an extraordinary high price for joining NATO; the failed and expensive deal between the Romanian state and US company Bechtel for the construction of the Transylvania Motorway was understood by the party as an attempt at winning membership of NATO.

Since Romania actively positioned itself against Russian aggression in Ukraine, the PND has become unwilling to support cooperation with Russia on many issues, and supports upholding the sanctions against Russia until the conditions of the Minsk agreement are fulfilled. It is supportive of military action in Syria against ISIS, in a partnership with the US or NATO. The PND is likely to be opposed to TTIP because of concerns about the Romanian market.
Meet the insurgents

SMER-SD, Slovakia’s largest political party, was created after splitting from the Party of the Democratic Left, the successor to the Communist Party, in 1999. By 2005, it led in Slovakian opinion polls with 30 percent support. In 2006, it was suspended from the Party of European Socialists for inciting racial hatred, but was allowed to join again in 2008 after pledging to respect European values. After forming a coalition government in 2006, in 2012 it became the first single-party government in Slovakia since 1993.

The Slovak National Party (SNS), a junior party in the current governing coalition, was founded in 1989, and has three ideological pillars – Christianity, nationalism, and socialism. It has courted controversy for its inflammatory rhetoric against Roma and Hungarian people.

Freedom and Solidarity, founded in 2009, is a relatively new anti-corruption liberal opposition party that served as part of a coalition government in 2010. It is also Eurosceptic, and in favour of reform of EU bureaucracy, but cooperates within the European Conservatives and Reformists group of the European Parliament.

Views on Europe

For the government parties (SMER-SD and SNS), the refugee crisis, and what they see as the inextricably linked terrorist threat, supersede all other threats to the EU, although other issues – the eurozone crisis and the Ukraine crisis – also preoccupy them somewhat. These parties are also deeply concerned about EU policies that respond to the refugee crisis, and in particular the relocation scheme, which is viewed as being taken forward “against the will of member states”. They are sceptical about key aspects of the EU–Turkey refugee deal, including visa liberalisation, terming them blackmail. Freedom and Solidarity agrees that the refugee crisis poses a threat, but is also strongly concerned about the potential of Brexit contributing to the disintegration of the EU.

Views on foreign policy

SMER-SD takes a pragmatic approach towards Russia – arguing that it should support Ukraine immediately. The party believes strongly in NATO and indeed expansion to new members in the neighbourhood. There are mixed views on TTIP in both SMER-SD and SNS, and the government parties are strongly opposed to intervention in Syria.

Freedom and Solidarity, on the other hand, is supportive of the Russian sanctions, but also of negotiating a DCFTA with Ukraine and the country’s eventual NATO accession. It believes in EU-level cooperation with all global actors including Russia, Turkey, and the US on the EU’s current challenges. It reserves judgment on TTIP, but does not believe that China should have market economy status.
Meet the insurgents

After gaining its independence in 1991, Slovenia started transitioning to a liberal democracy. The political structures established during the former regime remained present and continued to exert influence on political life. Until 2004, a grip on the power was, with short interruptions and the support of smaller coalition parties, held by Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, a successor of the Communist Party structure. Through the 2000s, the number and strength of smaller parties began to grow. The United Left (Združena levica, ZL), a coalition of social democratic and green parties, was formed to contest the European and national elections, and entered Parliament. Its support has since oscillated between 7 and 10 percent. The party has so far had to deal with a high level of heterogeneity, cleavages within its ranks, and unstable support within the electorate, which depends to some extent on the crisis of more traditional/centrist parties. On the centre-right, the SLS (Slovenian People’s Party) is of particular note in terms of foreign policy. Formed in 2008 as the Slovenian Peasant Union, the party – which is now just below the 4 percent parliamentary threshold – recently launched the idea of “Great Slovenia” which, with regard to the traditionally timid foreign policy of Slovenia, is creating waves nationally. The party has a chance to gain seats in Parliament at the next elections.

Views on Europe

Both parties favour EU reform in order to achieve more equal representation in decision making – the ZL in particular calls for fairer governance of the EU, particularly related to monetary and economic matters. In the context of the refugee crisis, the ZL believes that Greece should be given more support for having borne the brunt of arrivals. Regarding the effectiveness of the EU–Turkey deal in reducing flows of refugees, they believe the jury is still out, but are sceptical that ultimately the two sides have common-enough interests to work together effectively. Neither party believes that Brexit is particularly likely but, in the event that it does happen, they feel that this could contribute to greater consolidation of the EU, rather than create a domino effect.

Views on foreign policy

For both the SLS and the ZL, the refugee crisis has its roots in the interventionist policy of the US, supported by the EU, in the Middle East. The ZL termed it “military extortion by NATO and political extortion by the US and EU with the intention of undermining the stability in the region”. Regarding Ukraine, both parties advocate a broadly supportive role from the EU. Neither party has fully developed positions on the EU–Russia sanctions, the DCFTA with Ukraine, or Ukrainian accession to the EU or NATO, but the ZL is broadly in favour of keeping the path to accession open. The SLS, on the other hand, thinks it is important to resume full cooperation with Russia in the future, and is concerned with the negative impact that sanctions have on Slovenian businesses.
Meet the insurgents

Spain has traditionally combined a pro-European rhetoric with a geopolitically minded approach, but this changed in 2015 when traditional politics was shaken up by the rise of new parties. Podemos was founded in March 2014 by political scientist Pablo Iglesias in the aftermath of protests against inequality and corruption. Podemos is a left-wing party made up of grassroots coalitions channelling the discontent of “indignados” and a general disaffection in the public with mainstream parties. It is motivated by the European debt crisis, and is seeking to remedy the problems of inequality, unemployment, and economic malaise, as well as a democratic regeneration and even generational cleavage. Podemos seeks to curtail the effects of the Lisbon Treaty and has called for a renegotiation of austerity measures. It has a focus on citizens’ involvement, transparency, and accountability. Its geographic priorities on foreign policy, as for most Spanish parties, are the EU, Latin America, and the Mediterranean/North Africa. In Latin America, it has very strong ties with Venezuela, and abstains in the European Parliament on resolutions critical of the Venezuelan government.

Views on Europe

Podemos sees the refugee crisis and the eurozone crisis as the main threats to the EU. It has strongly criticised the inaction of the Spanish government in hosting refugees, and is creating local networks to support the reception of asylum seekers.

It is worried about a loss of sovereignty for member states, especially on financial matters, and shares close ties with Syriza on this issue. It is critical of intra-EU financial support packages with reform strings attached. It is strongly opposed to the EU–Turkey refugee deal because of human rights considerations, to the point where four Podemos lawmakers organised a hunger strike. Podemos opposes Brexit, but is also against the EU–UK renegotiation deal and other special arrangements for the UK, fearing that this hampers the construction of a more social Europe.

Views on foreign policy

Podemos, along with other upcoming parties in Spain, did not engage particularly on foreign policy to begin with, and therefore failed to challenge a more passive and inward-looking Spanish policy that has dominated in recent years. However, this has changed somewhat because of the accumulation of crises. It emphasises national sovereignty and human rights in its approach towards foreign policy, but in relation to Russia and some Latin American countries, these principles are not necessarily followed through on. On Syria, Podemos rejects the international coalition against ISIS, and believes that working with Bashar al-Assad and Russia is part of the solution. It is very critical of the Ukrainian government and its treatment of political opposition, and opposes ongoing sanctions against Russia. The party is also critical of NATO and believes Europe needs a new security structure that includes Russia and Ukraine. In its recent manifesto it sets out a need to “neutralise the destabilising role of NATO in Eastern Europe and freeze the current borders of the alliance”. Economically, it believes in strong trade protection instruments to secure jobs and protect EU social and environmental standards. It is against market economy status for China, and leads the opposition against TTIP in Spain.
Meet the insurgents

Sweden has a multi-party system and currently eight parties in the Parliament. The left-of-centre parties are the Left Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and the Green Party. The centre-right parties are the Moderate Party, the Liberals, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats. The eighth party is the Sweden Democrats, a socially conservative anti-immigration party which is currently Sweden’s third largest and in a swing-vote position. The party was founded in 1988, and has a strong domestic policy focus on law and order, “traditional” family values, and managing immigration, and it rejects multiculturalism in favour of integration. Although the Sweden Democrats have been growing in strength electorally in recent decades, they have never served in a coalition government, since all other political parties refuse to cooperate with them.

Views on Europe

The Sweden Democrats are critical of the EU and are highly sceptical of what they perceive as supra-national decision-making within the Union. They aspire to using the UK referendum to trigger a similar debate in Sweden on EU membership. They oppose further enlargement, in particular Turkish accession, but they also feel it is too soon to be discussing Ukraine’s accession, arguing that more work needs to be done on issues such as the economy, organised crime, and border control. They oppose Swedish euro membership, and they want a new Schengen arrangement that grants member states greater control of their national borders. The Sweden Democrats are keen to prevent further illegal sea crossings to the EU via the Mediterranean but do not see the EU–Turkey refugee deal as the solution. In their view, it only increases Turkey’s influence over EU members and pushes refugee flows elsewhere. The party also fears that the European Commission will turn a blind eye to the conditions that Turkey is supposed to fulfil for gaining visa liberalisation. The Sweden Democrats advocate providing increased support to Syria to manage refugee flows and are in favour of resettling a limited number of the most vulnerable refugees. They have zero tolerance for irregular migration.

Views on foreign policy

Sweden is not a member of NATO and the Sweden Democrats oppose joining it, arguing that cooperation should not go beyond Sweden’s current level. The party is against the Host Nation Support Agreement that Sweden has signed with NATO and that the Riksdag will vote on soon. However, they view TTIP positively – with some reservations regarding investor-state dispute settlement. They are broadly in favour of continuing EU sanctions against Russia, and oppose normalisation of relations until the Minsk conditions are fully met, and Russian destabilisation of Ukraine and Crimea ceases. Some party members more sympathetic to Putin’s policies have recently been expelled. The Sweden Democrats do not currently express a view on China’s market economy status.
Meet the insurgents

Since 1990 there has slowly been a rise in the prominence of anti-establishment parties. The British National Party was the most prominent in the 1990s and the early 2000s, gaining 6.3 percent in the 2009 European election. However, with the rapid rise of UKIP since 2010, the BNP has become a fringe party. UKIP was founded as a single-issue party with the aim of taking the UK out of the EU. However, since Nigel Farage took over leadership of UKIP in 2009, it has achieved significant electoral success, with a slightly broader right-wing populist agenda, and a particular focus on reducing immigration to the UK. In the 2010 national elections, its share of the vote remained very low, at around 2–3 percent. But, in the 2014 European Parliament elections, it secured 27.5 percent of the vote, becoming the largest UK party in the European Parliament, with 22 MEPs. It struggles to secure seats at Westminster. In the 2015 general election, UKIP gained a substantial 12.6 percent share of the vote, yet secured only a single MP. UKIP also has three party members in the House of Lords.

Views on Europe

UKIP has achieved its aim of securing a majority vote for a British exit from the EU. Throughout the early 2010s, UKIP was able to apply pressure from the right of the political spectrum, influencing public debate and pushing the Conservative Party towards a more open embrace of Euroscepticism in an effort not to lose votes to UKIP.

Though its focus is on the UK in the EU, it would welcome the dissolution of the EU altogether, and sees the eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis as potential triggers for this, since they expose serious tensions between member states. In particular, UKIP highlights attempts to push through the relocation deal as an example of unacceptable EU interference which exacerbates inter-state tensions and leads to further dislike of the EU in many countries.

Views on foreign policy

UKIP is strongly sceptical of Western interventionism, particularly in the Middle East. The actions of the EU and the US since 2011 are seen as having exacerbated the conflict in Syria, in particular through the continued refusal to abandon the demand for Assad to step down, and the provision of military aid to groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Alongside Germany’s “refugees welcome” policy and regime and rebel violence in Syria, it sees these actions as key contributory factors to the EU’s refugee crisis. It is highly critical of the EU–Turkey deal on the basis that it “rewards Turkey for what it should have been doing anyway”.

UKIP believes in extensive cooperation with Russia on a range of international issues, from Syria to refugees and terrorism. The party opposes sanctions on Russia, which are seen as ineffective and counterproductive. UKIP sees the extension of the EU’s influence in Eastern Europe as one of the main triggers of Russian intervention in Ukraine, and would like to see sanctions lifted and co-operation with Russia properly restored.

UKIP is opposed to TTIP, and does not believe that China should be given market economy status.
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About the authors

Susi Dennison is co-director of the European Power Programme and senior policy fellow at ECFR. Her recent publications at ECFR include “One hundred years of British solitude: Magical thinking about Brexit and security” co-authored with Mark Leonard and Nick Witney, “Bear any burden: How EU governments can manage the refugee crisis” coauthored with Josef Janning, the “European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2016”, “The road back to European Power” (both with other ECFR authors) and “Europe’s neighbourhood: crisis as the new normal”, with Nick Witney.

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