



EUROPEAN
COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
ecfr.eu

POLICY
MEMO

JORDANIAN TREMORS: ELUSIVE CONSENSUS, DEEPENING DISCONTENT

Julien Barnes-Dacey

SUMMARY

November's surge of nationwide protests over rising fuel prices serves as a stark reminder of the immediate challenges facing the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While King Abdullah has largely succeeded in navigating the challenges imposed by the Arab uprisings in the face of two years of low-level unrest, the coming months promise renewed tests. Faced with contentious parliamentary elections and IMF-mandated price increases, there is a very real prospect of widening discontent, particularly given ongoing regional uncertainties. Yet, the king, prodded by an assertive security service, continues to resist substantive reform aimed at cementing his government's legitimacy, increasing the risk of instability in the kingdom.

While it remains important that Europe maintains solid public support for the kingdom in this period of uncertainty, it is high time for a more critical dialogue in private, which would bolster the legitimacy and stability of the royal system - an altogether realistic aim given the moderate tone of the opposition and the deep legitimacy of the Hashemite system. Ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for January, Europe should press for more immediate progress in creating an inclusive political system that will be better equipped to deal with the economic difficulties that Jordan now faces. Europe should also raise concerns over the expansive political role of the security service and press for more meaningful action against corruption.

Two years after the outbreak of the rebellion that has shaken the Middle East, and despite the wave of protests that broke out in November following an increase in fuel prices, the Jordanian authorities appear to believe that they have averted the threat of popular unrest in the kingdom. Despite thousands of nationwide demonstrations and the political paralysis caused by a rapid succession of governments (five prime ministers in two years), the royal court exudes surprising confidence. The court's reading of domestic and regional dynamics lead it to believe that it has regained the initiative. The mood in Amman stands in stark contrast to that of one year ago, when the palace expressed real concern about the potential for dangerous instability and the king had indicated a willingness to embrace a measure of genuine reform to avert the prospect of turmoil.

The soundness of the palace's political judgement is likely to be severely tested in the coming months. The controversy surrounding upcoming parliamentary elections, which are likely to set the political tone for the coming years, as well as mounting economic concerns that are being exacerbated by price increases, suggest that Jordan is by no means out of the woods. Indeed, the lack of substantial progress on reform, the widening political polarisation, and the dangers posed by spillover effects of the deadly conflict in neighbouring Syria suggest that the royal system faces a very real threat of instability. It is instructive that while the palace projects confidence, the consensus among analysts and diplomats in Amman remains one of concern.

Europe also faces sobering questions about the nature of its relationship with a key strategic ally long accustomed to unquestioned public and private support. Although the challenging regional situation has highlighted the importance of a stable Jordan, failure to secure a more inclusive political system rooted in popular legitimacy risks hastening the arrival of instability. It behoves friends of the Hashemite monarchy to engage in a more critical dialogue.¹

Renewed royal confidence

The royal court's current confidence is based on two key calculations. First, the palace believes that its reform programme has rallied domestic popular support. Since 2011, the king has publicly embraced the mantra of reform and has pushed through amendments to one third of the provisions of Jordan's constitution. Having also established an independent electoral commission and constitutional court, the palace presents itself, domestically and internationally, as the driver of the country's reform process. It has pledged itself to the eventual establishment of a constitutional democracy, though cautioning that this is a longer-term aim given the country's lack of political maturity. The palace highlights voter registration numbers of 2.28 million (approximately 70 percent of eligible voters) for January's parliamentary elections as a symbol of sweeping popular support. At the same time, it points to the Muslim Brotherhood's inability – through its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) – to mobilise more than 15,000 people during much-heralded recent protest marches as a sign of the movement's minority status. Similarly, November's nationwide fuel price protests are blamed on an unrepresentative fringe. Praise for the king's reform agenda by the US and Europe has cemented royal confidence in its political strategy.

Second, the palace believes regional volatility has reinforced support for the perceived stability of Jordan's status quo. The civil war raging in Syria and the political turmoil of the transitions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia have amplified the appeal of Jordan's stability. Domestically, there is growing concern that political conflict could embroil the country in instability, particularly given longstanding divisions between the native East Bank minority and the ethnically Palestinian majority. Elements of the population are also wary of regional Islamisation, and the October arrest of 11 militants allegedly connected to al-Qaeda has raised fears of terrorist attacks emanating from Syria. Regional turmoil has also underscored the importance of maintaining Jordan's stability in the eyes of the kingdom's strategic allies and the king now feels more assured than ever that he will face no external pressure for reform. The US government is firmly backing the king, making it difficult for Europe to take a more critical position. For its part, Israel, citing national security concerns, is placing a premium on the stability of Jordan's status quo: in conversations with European counterparts,

¹ This memo is based on October 2012 interviews in Amman and Europe with senior royal court and government figures, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, and other opposition forces as well as youth activists, independent analysts, and European diplomats. The memo is a follow-up to our April 2012 report, "Jordan: Reform before it's too late", available at http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/jordan_reform_before_its_too_late.

Israeli officials describe Jordan as "a red line" in their case for caution on the part of Western governments promoting a democratisation agenda that has seen Islamist gains and uncertain transitions across region – the like of which in Jordan could dramatically alter the tranquil relations between the two countries.

Europe has, by and large, accepted the royal narrative. The EU, led by foreign-policy chief Catherine Ashton, has placed implicit trust in the king, praising his reform agenda and cautioning against any moves that might endanger stability.² On one level, the logic behind this position is self-evident: Jordan is a key strategic ally and, at a moment of significant regional volatility, the preservation of calm in the kingdom is clearly an important aim. Moreover, despite thousands of opposition protests, there has been no large-scale government security crackdown, highlighting the kingdom's willingness to permit a measure of open dissent – an approach that rightfully deserves to be lauded, given regional comparisons. Officials can credibly remind interlocutors that there has been "no bloodshed" in Jordan (though reports that one protester may have been killed by security forces during November's fuel price protests point to the potential for escalation). Over the past year, the EU has offered increased economic backing, allocating €220 million in neighbourhood support for 2011–2013, an additional €70 million from the SPRING (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) programme, and €40 million to finance the Good Governance and Development Contract. Member states, led by the UK, France, and Germany, have committed approximately €1.2 billion over the coming three years in the form of bilateral loans and grants.

All not as it seems

Despite Jordanian and European confidence, the appearance of stability in the kingdom may be deceptive. Indeed, popular frustration and widening economic challenges continue to threaten an outbreak of turmoil, as made clear by November's fuel price protests. While the Brotherhood's much-vaunted October protest did not draw the 50,000 promised demonstrators, it was still the largest opposition gathering in two years of anti-government demonstrations. Nor is opposition sentiment confined to the Brotherhood (or to Jordan's urban Palestinian population). East Bank discontent, fuelled by economic frustration resulting from dwindling state finances, widespread corruption, and a sense that the political system is no longer working to their favour, is bubbling up across the country, slowly making common cause with broader forces, including the Brotherhood. Perhaps surprisingly, it is East Bank tribal elements rather than Brotherhood agitators who are today making the more radical demands, including on occasion calling for Abdullah to step down.

The economic challenges facing Jordan risk a further erosion of support from among the king's East Bank base, which now

² For the latest European comments, see "Written Statement by President Barroso after his meeting with H.M. King Abdullah II of Jordan", European Commission press release, Brussels, 7 October 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-748_en.htm.

bears the greatest burden of poverty and unemployment. Disruptions to natural-gas supplies from Egypt have forced Jordan to rely on expensive oil imports from Iraq. Tourism revenues and foreign remittances are also down, while government spending has increased because of new measures aimed at cementing domestic stability such as salary increases for state employees, as well as the needs of a growing Syrian refugee population (which now numbers more than 200,000, according to Jordanian authorities). The country's budget deficit has surged to more than 10 percent and unemployment levels could be as high as 30 percent, with the country's youth population most affected.

The August acceptance of a \$2.05 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlights the growing challenges. The loan will have been made conditional on, among other things, politically explosive commodity price increases and cuts to public subsidies.³ The November decision to cut subsidies on fuel, resulting in price increases of more than 50 percent for cooking gas and 30 percent for transport and heating fuel, provoked a wave of nationwide protests. For the first time, demonstrators called for the fall of the regime rather than just reform. With employment in the bloated public sector and security service – long an East Bank prerogative in the agreement governing their relations with the king – also likely to come under IMF pressure, tensions stand to be exacerbated further.

Indeed, were it not for foreign economic support in 2011, particularly from Saudi Arabia, which provided \$1.4 billion in aid, Jordan would already be in dire straits. However, such support is no longer as forthcoming as previously assumed. It is reported that Jordan has only received \$250 million this year, transferred in October, out of a promised five-year \$5 billion Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) grant agreed in December 2011.⁴ (There are some claims that Jordan was forced to turn to the IMF after GCC money failed to materialise.) Moreover, much of the GCC support is project-specific, and thus unable to plug the government's significant budget shortfall.

The pressing need for structural reforms in Jordan's economy underscores the need for political reform to broaden government legitimacy as it imposes necessary austerity measures. However, two years after the king's initial promise to accelerate the pace of change, the results remain disappointing. Despite changes to the constitution, few restrictions have been placed on the king's direct political authority. Abdullah retains the power to unilaterally appoint and summarily dismiss the government, and while he promises to consult with parliament over the choice of the next prime minister, this remains at his discretion. (The Brotherhood demands that the leader of the largest parliamentary party be appointed prime minister.)

Although the creation of an independent electoral commission is a positive step, it is tasked with monitoring implementation of a controversial electoral law passed by the king in July. Urban voters continue to be discriminated against through gerrymandering in favour of tribal districts and only 27 out of 150 seats (18 percent) are elected by party lists.⁵ Widespread fraud has also been reported during the voter registration process, raising serious doubts about the claimed registration of 70 percent of eligible voters and portending negatively for the legitimacy of the vote.⁶

In the face of criticism, the palace says that the new parliament will be a launch pad for more intensive change. However, the rules of the game make that an unlikely outcome. While the king blames parliament for the slow pace of reform – a questionable assertion given parliamentary compliance with palace and security-service diktats – the electoral law's allocation of seats all but ensures that the makeup of the new parliament will be virtually the same as the current body. That reality also undermines the palace's argument that the king is held accountable through parliament (such as when his choice of prime minister is put before a parliamentary vote of confidence). As a result, opposition parties, including the IAF and the National Reform Front, led by Ahmad Obeidat, a former prime minister and intelligence chief, have announced that they will boycott the January vote. The new parliament is likely to be neither representative nor empowered to advance meaningful reform, let alone deal with the pressing economic challenges.

According to one very senior Jordanian political figure, until recently intimately involved in the reform process at the highest level, the king – pushed by an increasingly assertive intelligence service – has grown in confidence since the outbreak of regional unrest and is now less inclined to initiate substantive reform. The role of the security service is widely viewed as a key obstacle to reform, given its influence over the king and parliament. While Jordan has largely eluded the violent turmoil of some of its neighbours, it shares their habit of allowing the mukhabarat, or security service, to play a central role in politics.

The power of the unaccountable, corruption-prone, and resented security service could provoke an unravelling of the kingdom's capacity to build consensus around a reformed system. While the November sentencing of former head of intelligence Mohammed al-Dahabi to 13 years in prison on corruption charges was significant, the palace has shown no desire to loosen the grip of the security service. On the corruption front, many Jordanians are sceptical of al-Dahabi's sentencing, which they believe reflects a selective scapegoating of a small number of former officials aimed at deflecting public criticism rather than a wholehearted attempt to tackle the issue. The subject is gaining wider

³ The loan conditions have not been made public, but the following IMF article gives a sense of some of the necessary reforms: "Jordan Gets \$2.0 Billion IMF Loan to Support Economy", *IMF Survey*, 3 August 2012, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/INT080312A.htm>.

⁴ "Jordan is banking on Kuwait", *Al Bawaba*, 7 October 2012, available at <http://www.albawaba.com/business/jordan-banking-kuwait-445094>.

⁵ When criticised over the small number of seats given to political parties, the palace says that party candidates can still run as independents for individual seats. However, again, seat-to-district ratios discriminate considerably against urban centres where party candidates are more likely to run.

⁶ While conducting research in Jordan over the registration period, we heard numerous anecdotal stories of whole families being registered when only one family member was doing so and of families surreptitiously being registered when conducting non-related business in government offices.

traction given the austerity measures now being imposed on the wider population.

Dangerous hubris?

Given the still precarious situation in Jordan, the king and his backers are playing a dangerous game. In the face of growing political and economic challenges, stability in Jordan cannot be guaranteed. This environment risks being worsened, given ongoing violence in Syria and Gaza (Jordan is now the only Arab country with a resident ambassador in Israel and, given Jordan's large Palestinian population, the conflict could inflame domestic opinion). However, the king's continued preference for policies that sideline the political opposition, and his apparent unwillingness to fully embrace the fight against corruption, risk radicalising the mainstream opposition. East Bankers are already becoming more confrontational in their demands, while the Brotherhood perceives a regional shift in its favour. Without swifter and more inclusive change to draw critics into the system and establish a national consensus, the political balance that has safeguarded stability until now could well come unstuck. This will be particularly true if external financial bailouts from the GCC fail to materialise, forcing painful public-sector cuts upon the kingdom. November's fuel price protests serve as a warning of what may lie ahead.

The king's continued popularity and the historic legitimacy imbued in the Hashemite monarchy give Abdullah ample room for manoeuvre. Most of the opposition is still demanding reform rather than regime change, and the IAF – the object of most royal ire (and politically advantageous fear-mongering) – has softened its tone over recent months (it is notable that it did not actively take part in protests in mid-November, though it did use them to pressure the king for reform).⁷ Brotherhood leaders now cite Morocco, whose king continues to enjoy vast powers, as the model that Jordan should follow. The movement has also signalled its desire to cut a deal that would see it end its parliamentary boycott on the basis of a compromise agreement over a reformed election law and an empowered parliament. But the opposition reject engagement on terms solely set by the king, which appear designed to sideline them and prevent real change. The unwillingness of the king and the security service to countenance a deal that opens the door to wider inclusivity points to intransigence at a moment of potential opportunity.

The argument that the Brotherhood would irreversibly hijack the political system is contentious. A move to a more inclusive system in which the king retains some executive powers would provide constraints while giving other political parties time to mature in controlled circumstances. While the Brotherhood may be moderating their tone as a tactical ploy to gain wider favour – and while it is clear that

7 In meetings with the senior leadership of the IAF in February 2012, the movement presented a significantly more hawkish face than in October 2012. It also now makes a point of laying blame for the slow progress in reform on the security service and not the king.

they do not hold the popular support of the majority of the country – continued exclusion will only hasten a hardening of their position. The king claims he wants to create political parties based on left, right, and centre platforms as opposed to parties centred on religious or identity politics. However, with limits on political party life in parliament remaining in place, it remains difficult to see how parties of any stripe can develop and mature. A failure to engage with the country's existing political contours, and the king's patronising attitude on the political maturity of the population, risks fuelling polarisation rather than the moderation that he intends.

A European response

There is growing consensus among European diplomats in Amman that the reform process lacks meaningful substance. Indeed, European heads of missions (HoMs) have, on occasion, wanted to engage in a more critical dialogue, and there has been some discontent about the entirely supportive position taken by Brussels. Prior to the October visit to Amman by José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, the HoMs had been considering pushing for the introduction of a greater degree of conditionality – only to be undermined by Barroso's announcement of a further €40 million in financial assistance. The EU mission in Amman has also failed to deliver strong messages agreed upon by European HoMs, in part because it has been hamstrung by the line set in Brussels.

Europe – so keen to make Jordan a success story for reform in the MENA region – risks repeating the mistakes that marked its relationship with North African states prior to the 2011 uprisings. Its unquestioning support for Abdullah and unwillingness to engage in a critical dialogue is positioning it on the wrong side of history – and, as in North Africa, helping to feed a complacency that could breed destabilising results. November's unrest should be rapidly sharpening European minds.

In this context, and based on a desire to preserve the stability of Jordan and its monarchy, Europe should recalibrate elements of its relationship with the kingdom. Public support for Amman remains understandable, given regional uncertainties and the kingdom's role as a strategic ally; however, a more critical dialogue, even if only in private, is growing ever more essential. At present, European praise is reported to be as vocal in private as it is in public. While the kingdom does face threats associated with regional volatility and terrorism – which the king will adeptly use to leverage international support – deferring action on domestic challenges invites growing political risk.

As the lead European actor, Ashton – backed by key member states, the UK, France, and Germany – should challenge the king on the lack of substantive reform and press for real change to allow for wider political inclusion, ideally ahead of the upcoming parliamentary election. Failure to secure

an inclusive parliament will condemn the country to further political stagnation and tension. It will also leave the palace and government politically vulnerable when making painful economic decisions. Successful political reform that broadens popular engagement will, in contrast, bolster stability and the king's ability to steer the country through stormy waters. The role of the security service in politics should also be raised as a serious issue of concern, and Ashton should press the king for meaningful action against corruption, a source of deep resentment for many Jordanians.

The EU's election observer mission must not be used to whitewash January's parliamentary vote. The preference would be for a large presence that can offer active monitoring and a credible assessment. However, given the small number of monitors likely to be involved and the difficulty they will face in providing an absolute judgment on transparency, post-election language should remain measured (particularly given issues concerning the legitimacy of the broader process and voter registration fraud).

European states, and particularly those that channel most support into the country – the UK, France, and Germany – should focus enhanced practical and public support on the country's independent media sector as well as pro-reform civil society activists, both of which have come under intensified government pressure over the past year. The September passage of a restrictive press law included restraints on online outlets which were widely perceived as an attempt to shackle critical commentary rather than simply prevent unwarranted defamation as authorities claim.

The financial burden of supporting the Syrian refugee population must be shared by all EU member states. While critical dialogue is needed on issues relating to internal reform, Europe should be fulsome in offering financial support to help the country deal with the consequences of a crisis for which it bears no responsibility and that appears likely to further deteriorate.

Some claim that pushing reform in Jordan threatens the country's stability and may open the door to a hostile Muslim Brotherhood takeover. However, in the midst of deep challenges, the need for political inclusivity is more urgent than ever – and, contrary to some claims, national consensus may in fact be attainable; certainly, a range of government and opposition figures from across the country's demographic divide share a vision of moderate yet substantial reforms that could help steer the country through its current challenges. The royal court has laid out an admirable end-goal of a true constitutional system with an empowered government and a mature political life. Europe should use its influence to press for the realisation of that goal.

About the author

Julien Barnes-Dacey is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Previously he was based in Syria and Egypt as a researcher and journalist, writing for a number of publications including the *Wall Street Journal*, *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Financial Times*. Julien also headed the MENA practice at Control Risks and worked for Channel 4 News. His publications for ECFR include *Europe and Jordan: Reform before it's too late* (2012) and *Lebanon: Containing the spillover from Syria* (2012).

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Daniel Levy for his valuable input into this memo and Jacqueline Shoen for editing it. ECFR would also like to extend its thanks to the governments of Norway and Sweden for their ongoing support of ECFR's Middle East and North Africa programme.

Among members of the European Council on Foreign Relations are former prime ministers, presidents, European commissioners, current and former parliamentarians and ministers, public intellectuals, business leaders, activists and cultural figures from the EU member states and candidate countries.

Asger Aamund (Denmark)
President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S

Urban Ahlin (Sweden)
Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and foreign policy spokesperson for the Social Democratic Party

Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)
Chairman of the Board, Crisis Management Initiative; former President

Giuliano Amato (Italy)
Former Prime Minister and vice President of the European Convention; Chairman, Centre for American Studies; Chairman, Enciclopedia Treccani

Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain)
Diplomat; former Member of Parliament

Viveca Ax:son Johnson (Sweden)
Chairman of Nordstjernan AB

Gordon Bajnai (Hungary)
Former Prime Minister

Dora Bakoyannis (Greece)
Member of Parliament; former Foreign Minister

Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland)
Professor of Economics at the Warsaw School of Economics; former Deputy Prime Minister

Lluís Bassets (Spain)
Deputy Director, El País

Marek Belka (Poland)
Governor, National Bank of Poland; former Prime Minister

Roland Berger (Germany)
Founder and Honorary Chairman, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants GmbH

Erik Berglöf (Sweden)
Chief Economist, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland)
Chairman, Prime Minister's Economic Council; former Prime Minister

Carl Bildt (Sweden)
Foreign Minister

Henryka Bochniarz (Poland)
President, Polish Confederation of Private Employers – Lewiatan

Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria)
Founder, Communitas Foundation and President of Venture Equity Bulgaria Ltd.

Ingrid Bonde (Sweden)
CFO & Deputy CEO, Vaffenfall AB

Emma Bonino (Italy)
Vice President of the Senate; former EU Commissioner

Stine Bosse (Denmark)
Chairman and Non-Executive Board Member

Han ten Broeke (The Netherlands)
Member of Parliament and spokesperson for foreign affairs and defence

John Bruton (Ireland)
Former European Commission Ambassador to the USA; former Prime Minister (Taoiseach)

Ian Buruma (The Netherlands)
Writer and academic

Erhard Busek (Austria)
Chairman of the Institute for the Danube and Central Europe

Jerzy Buzek (Poland)
Member of the European Parliament; former President of the European Parliament; former Prime Minister

Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden)
Minister for International Development Cooperation

Maria Livanos Cattauri (Switzerland)
Former Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce

Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey)
Director of Melak Investments/ Journalist

Carmen Chacón (Spain)
Former Minister of Defence

Charles Clarke (United Kingdom)
Visiting Professor of Politics, University of East Anglia; former Home Secretary

Nicola Clase (Sweden)
Ambassador to the United Kingdom; former State Secretary

Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany)
Member of the European Parliament

Robert Cooper (United Kingdom)
Counsellor of the European External Action Service

Gerhard Cromme (Germany)
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the ThyssenKrupp

Maria Cuffaro (Italy)
Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI

Daniel Daianu (Romania)
Professor of Economics, National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA); former Finance Minister

Massimo D'Alema (Italy)
President, Italianeuropei Foundation; President, Foundation for European Progressive Studies; former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Marta Dassù (Italy)
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey)
Foreign Minister

Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia)
Poet and Cultural Critic

Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium)
Member of the European Parliament; former Prime Minister

Gianfranco Dell'Alba (Italy)
Director, Confederation of Italian Industry (Confindustria) - Brussels office; former Member of the European Parliament

Pavol Demeš (Slovakia)
Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States (Batislava)

Kemal Dervis (Turkey)
Vice-President and Director of Global Economy and Development

Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary)
President, DEMOS Hungary

Hanzade Doğan Boyner (Turkey)
Chair, Doğan Gazetecilik and Doğan On-line

Andrew Duff (United Kingdom)
Member of the European Parliament

Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia)
Former Foreign Minister

Hans Eichel (Germany)
Former Finance Minister

Rolf Ekeus (Sweden)
Former Executive Chairman, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq; former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; former Chairman Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark)
Chairman, Baltic Development Forum; former Foreign Minister

Steven Everts (The Netherlands)
Adviser to the Vice President of the European Commission and EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy

Tanja Fajon (Slovenia)
Member of the European Parliament

Gianfranco Fini (Italy)
President, Chamber of Deputies; former Foreign Minister

Joschka Fischer (Germany)
Former Foreign Minister and vice-Chancellor

Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA)
Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc

Lykke Friis (Denmark)
Member of Parliament; former Minister for Climate, Energy and Gender Equality

Jaime Gama (Portugal)
Former Speaker of the Parliament; former Foreign Minister

Timothy Garton Ash (United Kingdom)
Professor of European Studies, Oxford University

Carlos Gaspar (Portugal)
Chairman of the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI)

Teresa Patrício Gouveia (Portugal)
Trustee to the Board of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation; former Foreign Minister

Heather Grabbe (United Kingdom)
Executive Director, Open Society Institute – Brussels

Charles Grant (United Kingdom)
Director, Centre for European Reform

Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)
Director of the Center for International Resolution, Columbia University; former Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on Syria

Elisabeth Guigou (France)
Member of Parliament and President of the Foreign Affairs Committee

Fernando Andresen Guimaraes (Portugal)

Head of the US and Canada Division, European External Action Service

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (Germany)
Former Defence Minister

István Gyarmati (Hungary)
President and CEO, International Centre for Democratic Transition

Hans Hækkerup (Denmark)
Former Chairman, Defence Commission; former Defence Minister

Heidi Hautala (Finland)
Minister for International Development

Sasha Havlicek (United Kingdom)
Executive Director, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)

Connie Hedegaard (Denmark)
Commissioner for Climate Change

Steven Heinz (Austria)
Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Lansdowne Partners Ltd

Annette Heuser (Germany)
Executive Director, Bertelsmann Foundation Washington DC

Diego Hidalgo (Spain)
Co-founder of Spanish newspaper El País; President, FRIDE

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (The Netherlands)
Former NATO Secretary General

Danuta Hübner (Poland)
Member of the European Parliament; former European Commissioner

Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden)
Member of the European Parliament

Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland)
Former Ambassador and former Executive Director, Crisis Management Initiative

Toomas Ilves (Estonia)
President

Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)
Chairman, Munich Security Conference; Global Head of Government Affairs Allianz SE

Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US)
International Advocacy Director, Open Society Foundation

Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)
Professor, London School of Economics

Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey)
Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey on foreign policy and public diplomacy

Sylvie Kauffmann (France)
Editorial Director, Le Monde

Olli Kivinen (Finland)
Writer and columnist

Ben Knapen (The Netherlands)
Former Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation

Gerald Knaus (Austria)
Chairman of the European Stability Initiative and Carr Center Fellow

Caio Koch-Weser (Germany)
Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; former State Secretary

Bassma Kodmani (France)
Executive Director of the Arab Reform Initiative

Rem Koolhaas (The Netherlands)
Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Graduate School of Design, Harvard University

David Koranyi (Hungary)
Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center of the Atlantic Council of the United States

Bernard Kouchner (France)
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria)
Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies

Aleksander Kwaśniewski (Poland)
Former President

Mart Laar (Estonia)

Minister of Defence; former Prime Minister

Miroslav Laičák (Slovakia)

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Alexander Graf Lambsdorff (Germany)

Member of the European Parliament

Pascal Lamy (France)

Honorary President, Notre Europe and Director-General of WTO; former EU Commissioner

Bruno Le Maire (France)

Member of Parliament; Former Minister for Food, Agriculture & Fishing

Mark Leonard (United Kingdom)

Director, European Council on Foreign Relations

Jean-David Levitte (France)

Former Sherpa to the President of the French Republic; former Ambassador to the United States

Sonia Licht (Serbia)

President, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

Juan Fernando López Aguilar (Spain)

Member of the European Parliament; former Minister of Justice

Adam Lury (United Kingdom)

CEO, Menemsha Ltd

Monica Macovei (Romania)

Member of the European Parliament

Emma Marcegaglia (Italy)

CEO of Marcegaglia S.p.A; former President, Confindustria

Katharina Mathernova (Slovakia)

Senior Adviser, World Bank

Íñigo Méndez De Vigo (Spain)

Secretary of State for the European Union

David Miliband (United Kingdom)

Member of Parliament; Former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Alain Minc (France)

President of AM Conseil; former chairman, Le Monde

Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria)

Foreign Minister; former Defence Minister; former Member of the European Parliament

Dominique Moïsi (France)

Senior Adviser, IFRI

Pierre Moscovici (France)

Finance Minister; former Minister for European Affairs

Nils Muiznieks (Latvia)

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

Hildegard Müller (Germany)

Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft

Wolfgang Münchau (Germany)

President, Eurointelligence ASBL

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Romania)

Professor of Democracy Studies, Hertie School of Governance

Kalypso Nicolaidis (Greece/France)

Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford

Daithí O'Ceallaigh (Ireland)

Director-General, Institute of International and European Affairs

Christine Ockrent (Belgium)

Editorialist

Andrzej Olechowski (Poland)

Former Foreign Minister

Dick Oosting (The Netherlands)

CEO, European Council on Foreign Relations; former Europe Director, Amnesty International

Mabel van Oranje (The Netherlands)

Senior Adviser, The Elders

Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain)

Member of the Board, Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas; former EU Commissioner

Monica Oriol (Spain)

CEO, Seguriber

Cem Özdemir (Germany)

Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Green Party)

Ana Palacio (Spain)

Member of the Council of State; Former Foreign Minister; former Senior President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group

Simon Panek (Czech Republic)

Chairman, People in Need Foundation

Chris Patten (United Kingdom)

Chancellor of Oxford University and co-chair of the International Crisis Group; former EU Commissioner

Diana Pinto (France)

Historian and author

Jean Pisani-Ferry (France)

Director, Bruegel; Professor, Université Paris-Dauphine

Ruprecht Polenz (Germany)

Member of Parliament; Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee

Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg)

Member of Parliament; former Foreign Minister

Charles Powell (Spain/United Kingdom)

Director, Real Instituto Elcano

Andrew Pudddehatt (United Kingdom)

Director, Global Partners & Associated Ltd.

Vesna Pusić (Croatia)

Foreign Minister

Robert Reibestein (The Netherlands)

Director, McKinsey & Company

George Robertson (United Kingdom)

Former Secretary General of NATO

Albert Rohan (Austria)

Former Secretary General for Foreign Affairs

Adam D. Roitfeld (Poland)

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters, Commissioner of Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

Norbert Röttgen (Germany)

Minister for the Environment, Conservation and Nuclear Safety

Olivier Roy (France)

Professor, European University Institute, Florence

Daniel Sachs (Sweden)

CEO, Proventus

Pasquale Salzano (Italy)

Vice President, International Institutional Affairs, ENI

Stefano Sannino (Italy)

Director General for Enlargement, European Commission

Javier Santiso (Spain)

Director, Office of the CEO of Telefonica Europe

Marietje Schaake (The Netherlands)

Member of the European Parliament

Klaus Scharioth (Germany)

Dean of the Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs; former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the US

Pierre Schori (Sweden)

Chair of Olof Palme Memorial Fund; former Director General, FRIDE; former SRSG to Cote d'Ivoire

Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria)

Member of Parliament; former Chancellor

Karel Schwarzenberg (Czech Republic)

Foreign Minister

Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy)

Executive Vice President, Head of Public Affairs, UniCredit Spa

Narcís Serra (Spain)

Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice President of the Spanish Government

Radosław Sikorski (Poland)

Foreign Minister

Aleksander Smolar (Poland)

Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory Foundation

Javier Solana (Spain)

Former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy & Secretary-General of the Council of the EU; former Secretary General of NATO

George Soros (Hungary/USA)

Founder and Chairman, Open Society Foundations

Teresa de Sousa (Portugal)

Journalist

Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia)

Playwright and Academic

Rory Stewart (United Kingdom)

Member of Parliament

Alexander Stubb (Finland)

Minister for Foreign Trade and European Affairs; former Foreign Minister

Michael Stürmer (Germany)

Chief Correspondent, Die Welt

Ion Sturza (Romania)

President, GreenLight Invest; former Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova

Paweł Swieboda (Poland)

President, Demos EUROPA - Centre for European Strategy

Teija Tiilikainen (Finland)

Director, Finnish Institute for International Relations

Luisa Todini (Italy)

Chair, Todini Finanziaria S.p.A

Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece)

Professor, University of Athens and President, ELIAMEP

Erkki Tuomioja (Finland)

Foreign Minister

Daniel Valtchev (Bulgaria)

Former Deputy PM and Minister of Education

Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia)

Former President

Antonio Vitorino (Portugal)

Lawyer; former EU Commissioner

Andre Wilkens (Germany)

Director Mercator Centre Berlin and Director Strategy, Mercator Haus

Carlos Alonso Zaldivar (Spain)

Former Ambassador to Brazil

Stelios Zavvos (Greece)

CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd

Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia)

EU Representative to Kosovo; Former foreign Minister

ALSO AVAILABLE FROM ECFR

New World Order: The Balance of Soft Power and the Rise of Herbivorous Powers
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, October 2007 (ECFR/01)

A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations
Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, November 2007 (ECFR/02)

Poland's second return to Europe?
Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 (ECFR/03)

Afghanistan: Europe's forgotten war
Daniel Korski, January 2008 (ECFR/04)

Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession
Andrew Wilson, February 2008 (ECFR/05)

Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy
Nick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06)

Can the EU win the Peace in Georgia?
Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Andrew Wilson, August 2008 (ECFR/07)

A Global Force for Human Rights? An Audit of European Power at the UN
Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, September 2008 (ECFR/08)

Beyond Dependence: How to deal with Russian Gas
Pierre Noel, November 2008 (ECFR/09)

Re-wiring the US-EU relationship
Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and Mark Leonard, December 2008 (ECFR/10)

Shaping Europe's Afghan Surge
Daniel Korski, March 2009 (ECFR/11)

A Power Audit of EU-China Relations
John Fox and François Godement, April 2009 (ECFR/12)

Beyond the "War on Terror": Towards a New Transatlantic Framework for Counterterrorism
Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 (ECFR/13)

The Limits of Enlargement-lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood
Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, June 2009 (ECFR/14)

The EU and human rights at the UN: 2009 annual review
Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, September 2009 (ECFR/15)

What does Russia think?
edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard and Andrew Wilson, September 2009 (ECFR/16)

Supporting Moldova's Democratic Transition
Nicu Popescu, October 2009 (ECFR/17)

Can the EU rebuild failing states? A review of Europe's Civilian Capacities
Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, October 2009 (ECFR/18)

Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations
Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, October 2009 (ECFR/19)

Dealing with Yanukovich's Ukraine
Andrew Wilson, March 2010 (ECFR/20)

Beyond Wait-and-See: The Way Forward for EU Balkan Policy
Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus and Daniel Korski, May 2010 (ECFR/21)

A Global China Policy
François Godement, June 2010 (ECFR/22)

Towards an EU Human Rights Strategy for a Post-Western World
Susi Dennison and Anthony Dworkin, September 2010 (ECFR/23)

The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2010 Review
Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, September 2010 (ECFR/24)

The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe
Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard with Dimitar Bechev, Jana Kobzova & Andrew Wilson, October 2010 (ECFR/25)

Beyond Maastricht: a New Deal for the Eurozone
Thomas Klau and François Godement, December 2010 (ECFR/26)

The EU and Belarus after the Election
Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova and Andrew Wilson, January 2011 (ECFR/27)

After the Revolution: Europe and the Transition in Tunisia
Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, March 2011 (ECFR/28)

European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010
March 2011 (ECFR/29)

The New German Question: How Europe can get the Germany it needs
Ulrike Guerot and Mark Leonard, April 2011 (ECFR/30)

Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood
Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, May 2011 (ECFR/31)

Egypt's Hybrid Revolution: a Bolder EU Approach
Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski and Nick Witney, May 2011 (ECFR/32)

A Chance to Reform: How the EU can support Democratic Evolution in Morocco
Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu and José Ignacio Torreblanca, May 2011 (ECFR/33)

China's Janus-faced Response to the Arab Revolutions
Jonas Parello-Plesner and Raffaello Pantucci, June 2011 (ECFR/34)

What does Turkey think?
Edited by Dimitar Bechev, June 2011 (ECFR/35)

What does Germany think about Europe?
Edited by Ulrike Guerot and Jacqueline Hénard, June 2011 (ECFR/36)

The Scramble for Europe
François Godement and Jonas Parello-Plesner with Alice Richard, July 2011 (ECFR/37)

Palestinian Statehood at the UN: Why Europeans Should Vote "Yes"
Daniel Levy and Nick Witney, September 2011 (ECFR/38)

The EU and Human Rights at the UN: 2011 Review
Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, September 2011 (ECFR/39)

How to Stop the Demilitarisation of Europe
Nick Witney, November 2011 (ECFR/40)

Europe and the Arab Revolutions: A New Vision for Democracy and Human Rights
Susi Dennison and Anthony Dworkin, November 2011 (ECFR/41)

Spain after the Elections: the "Germany of the South"?
José Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark Leonard, November 2011 (ECFR/42)

Four Scenarios for the Reinvention of Europe
Mark Leonard, November 2011 (ECFR/43)

Dealing with a Post-Bric Russia
Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Nicu Popescu, November 2011 (ECFR/44)

Rescuing the euro: what is China's price?
François Godement, November 2011 (ECFR/45)

A "Reset" with Algeria: The Russia to the EU's South
Hakim Darbouche and Susi Dennison, December 2011 (ECFR/46)

Ukraine after the Tymoshenko verdict
Andrew Wilson, December 2011 (ECFR/47)

European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012
February 2012 (ECFR/48)

The long shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germany's Approach to the Euro crisis
Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike Guerot, February 2012 (ECFR/49)

The end of the Putin consensus
Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson, March 2012 (ECFR/50)

Syria: Towards a Political Solution
Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012 (ECFR/51)

How the EU can support reform in Burma
Jonas Parello-Plesner, March 2012 (ECFR/52)

China at the crossroads
François Godement, April 2012 (ECFR/53)

Europe and Jordan: Reform before it's too late
Julien Barnes-Dacey, April 2012 (ECFR/54)

China and Germany: Why the emerging special relationship matters for Europe
Hans Kundnani and Jonas Parello-Plesner, May 2012 (ECFR/55)

After Merkozy: How France and Germany can make Europe work
Ulrike Guerot and Thomas Klau, May 2012 (ECFR/56)

The EU and Azerbaijan: Beyond Oil
Jana Kobzova, May 2012 (ECFR/57)

A Europe of Incentives: How to regain the trust of citizens and markets
Mark Leonard and Jan Zielonka, June 2012 (ECFR/58)

The Case for Co-operation in Crisis Management
Richard Gowan, June 2012 (ECFR/59)

The Periphery of the Periphery: The Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis
Dimitar Bechev, August 2012 (ECFR/60)

Lebanon: Containing Spillover from Syria
Julien Barnes-Dacey, September 2012 (ECFR/61)

A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations
Nick Witney and Anthony Dworkin, September 2012 (ECFR/62)

Transnistria: A bottom-up Solution
Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra, September 2012 (ECFR/63)

Why the Euro Crisis threatens the European Single Market
Sebastian Dullien, October 2012 (ECFR/64)

The EU and Ukraine after the 2012 elections
Andrew Wilson, November 2012 (ECFR/65)

China 3.0
Edited by Mark Leonard, November 2012 (ECFR/66)

Time to grow up: What Obama's re-election means for Europe
Dimitar Bechev, Anthony Dworkin, François Godement, Richard Gowan, Hans Kundnani, Mark Leonard, Daniel Levy, Kadri Liik and Nick Witney, November 2011 (ECFR/67)

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. This paper, like all publications of the European Council on Foreign Relations, represents only the views of its authors.

Copyright of this publication is held by the European Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the European Council on Foreign Relations

© ECFR November 2012.

ISBN: 978-1-906538-68-2

Published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 35 Old Queen Street, London, SW1H 9JA, United Kingdom

london@ecfr.eu