Crisis Management

Overall grade

B−
Member states engage in crisis management, both in their immediate neighbourhood and globally, through various multilateral institutions. While the EU itself is now the primary stabilising force across the Balkans, NATO remains the primary conduit for European efforts in Afghanistan, and the EU turned to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to deploy a police mission during the Kyrgyz crisis. Meanwhile, in African crises European governments typically engage in indirect crisis management, providing financial and diplomatic support to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU). This fragmentation is reflected in the assessments included here. European governments have staked far greater resources and taken much greater political risks in places where troops, police or civilian crisis experts are deployed through the EU or NATO. But since the EU frequently states its support for UN and OSCE operations in high-profile trouble spots such as Sudan and Kyrgyzstan, they must also be included in any assessment of Europe’s contribution to crisis management.

A small number of European governments – France, the UK and, to some extent,
Germany – play a crucial role in defining not only EU and NATO policy but also the governance of the UN and the OSCE. The European Commission has also been an essential donor to the AU’s peace operations. The activities of these organisations are an important but overlooked dimension of European power, even if they do not fly a European flag or involve many European personnel. We have also covered European activities ranging from conflict prevention (as in West Africa) to long-term statebuilding (as in Kosovo). With the all-important exception of Afghanistan, neither the EU nor NATO is at present directly involved in “hot” crises involving significant conflict. Instead, European efforts are largely focused on averting violence and, in particular, on long-term post-conflict peacebuilding.

In a year in which many cash-strapped European governments announced big defence cuts, two major natural disasters – the Haitian earthquake and the Pakistani floods – highlighted significant gaps in the EU’s humanitarian response mechanisms. The European anti-piracy operation off Somalia had some success but security debates were dominated by increasing pessimism – sometimes bordering on defeatism – over operations in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the EU’s members struggled to sustain lasting political progress in the Balkans. Politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia still frequently return to chauvinist ethnic politics. In Kosovo, EULEX, the EU’s rule-of-law mission, has adopted an increasingly tough stance towards high-level political corruption, but quashing this will take many years at best. Further away, in Iraq, where the EU has a technically focused police mission but a low political profile, Europe’s long-term contribution to stability is slight.

The European presence in Afghanistan, which is approaching its 10th anniversary, has become emblematic of the problems in long-term peacebuilding. As the Afghan security situation deteriorated throughout 2010, European contributors to the NATO-led military force displayed obvious exhaustion. The Netherlands was the first to break ranks and draw down its troops, but other major troop contributors also talked about deadlines for departure. Meanwhile, the EU’s Afghan police mission – which is meant to contribute to civilian security – has been all but written off. The Afghan situation has much wider implications for European security policy, as it has contributed to broader political disillusionment with direct interventions in fragile states.

It is notable, if unsurprising, that there were few voices raised in favour of European intervention in last year’s crises in Kyrgyzstan and Côte d’Ivoire. Given this apparent wariness towards direct actions, European governments are increasingly likely to look to indirect engagement in future crisis, for example by backing UN
missions. However, a number of components (55, 56, 62 and 67) show that the UN, the AU and other organisations are struggling with crisis management. European officials also queried the costs of supporting other organisations’ operations in 2010.

If Europeans had general doubts about the utility of interventions and peacebuilding, they had notable successes in 2010 in unusual, tailor-made operations. These included French special-forces operations against al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (see component 56) and naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden, which have had some success in thwarting Somali pirate attacks. After Afghanistan, the success of these operations is likely to stimulate EU interest in options other than extended peacebuilding.

The humanitarian crises in Haiti and Pakistan have also already raised questions about Europe’s responses to natural disasters. Immediately after the Haitian earthquake, individual member states and the European Commission assessed the shattered country’s needs separately, but the Commission played an important role in bringing some coherence to their efforts. During the Pakistani floods, the UK and the Commission led the European response, with many other major EU members making very small donations. The weaknesses revealed by both crises have at least engendered a significant European debate about how to act in future humanitarian disasters.

Overall, Europe’s response to crises over the last year has been characterised by pervasive doubts: the lack of progress and setbacks in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Africa have combined with military cost-cutting to raise questions about the future of European crisis management. It is also notable that the cases analysed here are largely confined to Europe, Africa and central Asia – Europe’s ambitions to shape crisis management do not stretch into strategically vital tracts of East Asia and the Pacific. These trends were not new in 2010: many of the challenges described here are arguably the result of European failures to engage more effectively in crisis management in previous years (in the Balkans, for example, the EU is still paying the price for mistakes it made nearly 20 years ago). Even if EU member states hope to break with the ineffectual crisis management policies of the past, or simply cut security spending, they will find it hard to disentangle them from the troubled states and crises described here.
The EU has played a central role in stabilising the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) since the country’s Macedonian and Albanian populations came close to war in 2001. Although this previously included military and police deployments, it has since 2005 involved mainly diplomacy and aid coordinated by an EU Special Representative (EUSR). The EUSR has worked closely with NATO, the OSCE and US representatives. The EU’s approach to FYROM is complicated by Greece’s insistence that it drop its claim to the name “Republic of Macedonia”. Athens sees this as an implicit challenge to its sovereignty over its own province of Macedonia and has blocked FYROM’s progress towards EU and NATO membership while the dispute continues.

Although there was no high-profile crisis in 2010, FYROM’s overall stability remained uncertain. The EUSR and his diplomatic counterparts in Skopje issued strongly worded warnings about the government’s need to honour agreements with the Albanian population. However, the EU expressed some optimism that police reform, a key plank of inter-ethnic reconciliation, was making progress. Relations between the government and opposition parties of all ethnic affiliations were tense, with government projects – including an extremely costly plan to beautify the capital – a source of constant criticism. The EU devoted €36.3 million in pre-accession assistance funds towards transition assistance and institution building programmes. An effort to break the deadlock with Greece on the name issue in October failed, despite a call by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy for progress.

A new EU Head of Delegation will take on the EUSR’s tasks in 2011. The chances of FYROM’s government making significant advances towards resolving its internal and external challenges are reducing ahead of elections in 2012. While the name dispute has not prevented the EU from taking a lead role inside FYROM, the range of outstanding tensions is a serious concern.
The EU primarily engages in conflict management in Sudan through financial and diplomatic support to the UN-commanded peace operations in Darfur and South Sudan and funding for humanitarian aid to both regions. The EU also supports the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) pursuit of Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, for war crimes and genocide. The UK and Nordic countries have the greatest investment in Sudan’s affairs.

2010 was a tense year, with widespread predictions of major violence in South Sudan after the referendum on secession in 2011. National elections in late April were an important test of stability. The EU sent monitors but withdrew those based in Darfur shortly before the vote, citing safety concerns. The EU found heavy irregularities in the poll in general, which resulted in a sizeable victory for Bashir. With the primary focus on South Sudan, less attention was paid to events in Darfur. UN peacekeepers there were subjected to frequent attacks, while the Sudanese government placed heavy restrictions on humanitarian workers. Efforts to mediate between Khartoum and Darfuri rebels in Doha went nowhere. By contrast, steady low-level violence failed to disrupt progress towards the January 2011 referendum in South Sudan.

EU support for the ICC case against Bashir had limited impact, as African governments rejected the indictment. Bashir traveled to Kenya with impunity in August. However, a European threat to walk out of the EU-Africa summit in Tripoli in November if Bashir attended persuaded the Libyans to ask the Sudanese leader to stay away. Nonetheless, Europe’s ability to affect developments within Sudan appeared limited.

In Chad – where France drives European policy – the EU backed a UN peacekeeping force deployed to replace EU troops in 2009. However, at the insistence of the Chadian government and despite European objections, this force was removed at the end of 2010 – a further sign of the EU’s limitations.
West Africa was a growing source of concern to the EU in 2010. Some EU members continue to take an interest in their former colonies (France focuses on Côte d’Ivoire, Britain on Sierra Leone, and Portugal on Guinea-Bissau). But there are more general worries about the rise of drug trafficking in the region and a growing al-Qaeda presence in the Maghreb, which is associated with a number of recent kidnappings of EU citizens.

European policy in the region has fluctuated between toughness and confusion over the last year. French special forces participated in a series of raids in Mali and Mauritania against al-Qaeda bases, but a proposal by the European Council secretariat for a CSDP mission to support governance in states affected by al-Qaeda failed to win approval. The Council also agreed to close a security-sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau that had been operating in 2008. This had never made much impact, and looked irrelevant when soldiers launched a coup attempt in April. The mission closed in August.

The biggest test for the EU came in December when a political standoff followed Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential elections. The European Council was quick to agree sanctions against incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo after he refused to accept results that showed he was the loser. But as violence mounted, the 900 French troops in the country refrained from intervening – primarily out of concern for the safety of French civilians – and the main diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis involved the US, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The EU has more direct leverage in West Africa than in much of the rest of the continent, and French interventions in Mali and Mauritania are a significant contribution to the wider international campaign against al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, events in 2010 showed that EU policy towards the region remains piecemeal, varying markedly from crisis to crisis.
The earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010 stimulated a huge response from EU member states. This response was partially overshadowed by criticisms of a lack of clear EU branding for much of the aid operation, but the scale and speed of European action were impressive.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, a number of EU states sent separate assessment teams, which raised concerns about a lack of coordination. By late January, however, 24 EU member states plus Norway were contributing to relief efforts coordinated through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. France, Italy and Spain also fulfilled a request from the UN for 300 civilian police, and over 2,000 EU uniformed personnel were involved in providing relief to Haiti in 2010. Although the US and the UN took the lead in disaster management, EU personnel deployed rapidly and made a major operational contribution. Financially, EU member states made very large pledges to assist Haiti, passing the €1 billion mark in mid-March. The EU itself provided €330 million for short and long-term relief programmes. However, by the late summer concerns were raised that many European governments were failing to fulfil their pledges fast enough and there were also delays in disbursing funds in Haiti itself.

When cholera struck Haiti in the last quarter of the year, the European Commission again activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and provided additional funds to fight the outbreak. A smaller number of EU member states helped to deal with the cholera than contributed to the original earthquake response. Nonetheless, the EU’s overall performance in Haiti was broadly very positive, with member states accepting the need for coordination and the Commission providing the necessary framework for action alongside the UN. Criticisms that, for example, High Representative Catherine Ashton did not visit Haiti soon enough after January’s disaster missed the mark: the EU mounted a well coordinated if inevitably imperfect response to a chaotic situation.
Monsoonal floods in July and August 2010 displaced nearly 20 million people. The EU’s response was on a smaller scale to that following the Haitian earthquake but, by November 2010, just over €320 million had been pledged to addressing the crisis by European donors. However, three-quarters of this sum came from the European Commission and the UK, which pledged €150 million each in the first two months after the floods struck. British politicians were critical of other large EU members for not giving more.

The Commission played a lead role throughout the crisis, deploying experts through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to coordinate aid in August. EU military staff in Brussels helped coordinate aid flights for the first time, while NATO also organised a series of flights. Two-thirds of the EU’s members made some sort of in-kind contribution such as providing generators, tents or water-purification systems. However, potentially significant donors, including France and Italy, gave relatively limited amounts – both financially and in kind. Mid-sized donors such as the Nordic countries and the Netherlands made comparatively greater contributions, while the Czech Republic chartered aid flights. In addition to its coordination and financial assistance, the Commission also responded to a request from the European Council to give indirect economic relief to Pakistan. In October, the Commission proposed liberalising trade on 75 types of goods from Pakistan valued at €100 million a year. This proposal was watered down after opposition from European textile manufacturers.

The EU’s mixed response to the Pakistani crisis contrasted with a very large US effort – intended to win hearts and minds in the context of growing anti-American feeling – as well as an unusually high-profile Chinese relief effort. With European humanitarian aid budgets under significant pressure after Haiti, the EU’s overall response in Pakistan was at best uneven.

**RESPONSE TO THE FLOODING IN PAKISTAN**

While the European Commission, the UK and some other member states made significant efforts to help Pakistan after monsoonal floods, the overall EU response was fragmented.

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B−
Throughout 2010, the EU has made it a priority to lift the blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt, which has been in place since 2007 and has created, in the words of the European Council, a “humanitarian crisis”. An EU mission to help monitor the main Gaza-Egypt border crossing at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) is suspended, and a separate mission training Palestinian police (EUPOL COPPS) only operates in the West Bank.

High Representative Catherine Ashton visited Gaza in March to discuss the situation but was unable to persuade Israel to reduce the blockade. The political context for the EU’s efforts changed fundamentally after the flotilla incident in May, in which Israeli commandos boarded ships trying to force the blockade and take aid to Gaza, and killed several activists. Egypt responded by partially reopening the Rafah crossing, but the EU monitoring mission – which has to access the crossing from Israel – did not deploy there.

European diplomats pressed the US to accept a UN Security Council call for an investigation into the incident, although this caused a split between EU members of the UN Human Rights Council (see component 72). European diplomatic pressure within the Quartet contributed to an Israeli decision to relax the blockade in June. In July, Ashton visited Gaza again and repeated the EU’s established position that the blockade should be lifted altogether. This declaration of intent is supported by a special measure for the financing of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, capped at €100 million, which comes on top of the €632 million for the 2007-2013 period. Visits to Gaza by a number of European foreign ministers, including those of Finland, France and Spain, also produced few results. In November, Ashton declared progress on lifting the blockade “unsatisfactory”: although the supply of food into Gaza did rise, other items such as construction materials continued to be held up. While the EU welcomed Israeli proposals to ease restrictions further in December, Israeli politicians have been increasingly dismissive of European overtures.
Launched after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is mainly concerned with observing boundary lines between Georgian-controlled territory and the secessionist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, contrary to its mandate, the mission is barred from operating in Abkhaz and Ossete-controlled territory. Nevertheless, EUMM facilitates meetings between all sides – including Russian forces – to address border incidents. While the mission previously collaborated with the UN and OSCE missions to Georgia, these closed in 2009 at Russia’s insistence. EUMM also monitors Georgia’s adherence to commitments to limit its deployments of weapons near the boundary lines.

EUMM’s limitations were underlined in June and July, when violence in the Abkhaz buffer zone increased and the mission was unable to patrol the affected area. In October and November, however, it was able to report two pieces of good news from the buffer zone around South Ossetia. First, Russian troops withdrew from their last checkpoint on undisputed Georgian territory. Second, the Ossete authorities agreed to recommence regular incident-reduction meetings with the Georgians, which had been suspended for a year.

Some critics complain that EUMM’s activities are detached from other EU initiatives to strengthen the Georgian state, and even senior mission staff members fear that the operation may outlive its usefulness. In July, however, the European Council extended EUMM’s mandate to mid-2012. The exact budget was €52 million according to the European Council and €26 million according to EUMM itself. All member states except Cyprus provide some personnel to the mission, with Finland, Germany, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden making the largest contributions. This spread of contributors points to a broad consensus among EU members that, while EUMM cannot resolve the tensions in Georgia, it still plays a useful stabilising role as the last peace operation left in the country.
Instability in Kyrgyzstan took EU member states by surprise in 2010 – although it appeared to unsettle Russia and the US to an equal degree. While the ousting of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April created widespread concern, the situation escalated in June, when there were attacks on the Uzbek minority in and around the city of Osh. This spike of violence displaced 300,000 to 400,000 people and left at least hundreds dead.

European diplomacy helped ease this crisis (see also component 24) and the European Commission released €5 million for humanitarian aid and €7 million for social-stability programmes. However, EU support for a police mission to Osh under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was first floated in June and approved in July, had extremely disappointing results. All EU states backed the OSCE proposal to monitor the behaviour of the Kyrgyz police through joint patrols, although it had particular support from eastern European member states. However, the proposed mission was very small – just 52 uniformed personnel – and it became clear in August that the Kyrgyz government could not persuade the local authorities in Osh to accept its deployment in their region. The fact that Kyrgyz security forces had apparently been involved in anti-Uzbek violence raised tensions over the mission.

In spite of warnings from human rights groups of ongoing abuses in or near Osh, it proved impossible to deploy the OSCE mission there. In November, the OSCE recalibrated its operation to focus on the Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan, involving support to the Kyrgyz interior ministry and confidence-building projects to connect police and minority communities. Although EU members cannot be held directly responsible for this outcome, the low-profile OSCE police efforts have proved to be a poor response to one of 2010’s highest-profile acts of ethnic violence.
62 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

EU naval forces have made a significant contribution to fighting piracy off Somalia, but progress towards stabilising the country and countering Islamist forces has been more limited.

| Unity     | 4/5 |
| Resources | 4/5 |
| Outcome   | 5/10|
| Total     | 13/20|

The EU has a complex range of priorities in its policy towards Somalia, including reversing the rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean and supporting the extremely weak Somali government against its Islamist opponents, al-Shabaab. The EU pursues these goals through a naval operation off the Somali coast, Atalanta, which has an €8.4 million budget, plus a related NATO naval operation; an EU training mission working with Somali military personnel in Uganda; and financial support to an African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) based in Mogadishu.

There was some progress in thwarting pirate activities in the Indian Ocean, but there were a similar number of attacks as in 2009 and evidence that the problem is now spreading to a wider area. The EU has also had problems over the prosecution of captured pirates, although it handed over 75 detainees for trial in Kenya in the first nine months of the year.

It is too early to judge the impact of the EU training mission in Uganda, as its first trainees did not graduate until mid-December 2010. Meanwhile, AMISOM has made some progress in securing Mogadishu in block-to-block fighting in the last months of 2010. But al-Shabaab still controls a good deal of territory. Terrorist attacks in Uganda’s capital Kampala by al-Shabaab in July 2010 underlined the difficulty of containing threats emerging from Somalia.

At High Representative Catherine Ashton’s instigation, the EU has begun to make efforts to consolidate the various strands of its Somalia policy into a more coherent whole. However, in 2010, there was still a clear discrepancy between the relative success of Atalanta in addressing piracy and the limited progress in stabilising Somalia itself. Making a success of the latter would require a much larger peace-enforcement operation than AMISOM – about which member states are sceptical.
Afghanistan represents Europe’s biggest commitment to crisis management. European troops account for over 30,000 of the 130,000 NATO troops now deployed, while an EU mission (EUPOL Afghanistan, which has a €54.6 million budget) has been involved in police training since 2007. The EU is also a major donor of aid. EU governments and the US are committed to the “Afghanization” of governance and security, a goal confirmed at the January 2010 London Conference (see also component 36).

However, although they claim unity, European governments lack a common strategy. The Netherlands implemented a prior commitment to withdraw combat troops in the autumn, while other major NATO contributors, including France, Italy, Poland and the UK, set separate goals for withdrawing their forces in the years ahead. Meanwhile, EUPOL Afghanistan received severe criticism for its lack of results throughout 2010: reports in the second quarter of 2010 suggested that only 12 percent of Afghan National Police Units were capable of operating autonomously, and even EU officials admit that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is now taking on a greater role in police training to substitute for EUPOL’s weaknesses. EUPOL-ISAF contacts also remain poor.

More broadly, US and European aid to the Afghan government has not resulted in a stable political relationship with President Hamid Karzai. Over the course of the last year, Karzai has frequently attacked NATO’s strategy and even indicated his willingness to work with the Taliban. Most European policymakers believe that Karzai’s administration is irretrievably corrupt, but there was little significant progress in 2010 in efforts to initiate talks with elements of the Taliban. By the end of the year, US commanders were cautiously optimistic that they were making headway against the Taliban, but European forces played only a limited role. Evidence that the insurgency is expanding into northern Afghanistan – a region primarily patrolled by European NATO forces – is a new source for serious concern.
2010 was a momentous year for Iraq with the end of US combat operations in the country and highly contentious elections. European powers no longer play a significant direct role in Iraqi security, but the EU has expanded the work of EUJUST LEX, a rule-of-law mission focused on training Iraqi criminal justice officials – including judges, senior policemen and penitentiary advisors – since 2005. However, the budget of EUJUST LEX is just €17.5 million.

Prior to 2010, EUJUST LEX oversaw the training of Iraqi officials in EU member states rather than in Iraq itself for security reasons. A relatively small number of member states – notably France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK – have hosted most training programmes. In July 2010, the European Council approved a decision to move the bulk of mission staff from Brussels to Baghdad to oversee more in-country training. Having peaked at over 1,000 in 2009, the overall number of individuals being trained appears to have dropped off slightly in 2010. However, far more officials are now attending courses in Iraq and the mission is mandated to continue to 2012.

EUJUST LEX clearly only focuses on a narrow dimension of strengthening the Iraqi state, and other international actors – not least the US – have also worked on criminal-justice reform. There is evidence that unlawful detentions and the use of torture in Iraqi jails remain common. This suggests that the EU’s programming – although generally agreed to be useful for trainees – has failed to resolve fundamental problems in the delivery of justice in post-war Iraq. However, the decision to finally move EUJUST LEX’s centre of operations to Baghdad at least gives the EU the potential to play a more substantial role in the future.
The EU retains primary responsibility for security in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with around 1,600 troops and a police mission in the country, whose combined budgets total €37 million. However, both missions have shrunk in recent years and the police mission is slated to close in December 2011. The EU’s priorities include tackling organised crime and contributing to defence sector reform. European powers also have leverage over BiH through NATO, as rationalising the country’s defence systems – which were divided on ethnic lines after the civil war – is a precondition for NATO membership.

In 2010, the EU force in Bosnia did not face any direct security challenges. NATO and the EU were frustrated by their failure to persuade Bosnian Serb politicians (who want to secede from BiH) to move forward on defence sector reform. NATO offered BiH conditional agreement of its Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April, but the Bosnian Serbs refused to transfer ownership of defence-related properties to the federal government. The EU’s advocacy of a tough line against organised crime paid some dividends, with Bosnian police conducting major waves of crime raids in the early summer and early autumn.

Some analysts argue that the EU military and police missions have outlived their usefulness, and in January 2010 the European Council directed the EU force to concentrate on building up BiH’s own capacities. The primary challenge for the EU is to find a political strategy to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to put aside hopes of secession and work with the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats towards NATO and EU accession. At the end of 2010, plans for a strong EU delegation in Sarajevo were in the works. In the meantime, the EU’s contribution to BiH’s security has not translated into sufficient political leverage over the Bosnian Serbs to resolve the political problems left over from the 1990s.
While the EU’s members remain split over whether Kosovo is independent from Serbia (see also component 34), there is broad support for EU efforts to maintain stability. The primary tools for crisis management are NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), which largely consists of European troops; an EU rule-of-law mission (EULEX) with over 3,000 personnel; and the political leverage provided by the EU Special Representative (EUSR), who also acts as International Civilian Representative. The main challenges are corruption, organised crime and the refusal of Serbs living in northern Kosovo to recognise the Kosovar authorities.

In 2010, EULEX and the EUSR took significant steps to address these issues. EU police arrested leading political figures, including the central bank governor, on corruption charges. An “EU House” was set up in northern Kosovo to strengthen the EU’s presence in the contested region, while EULEX police faced down riots by Serbs in the summer. Kosovo-wide elections in December went off without significant security incidents, although the polls were marred by accusations of vote-rigging and had to be repeated in some areas. These steps, and especially EULEX’s anti-corruption activities (part of the €38 million in European initiatives devoted to the reinforcement of the rule of law), signaled a much tougher line by the EU in Kosovo than in the immediate aftermath of the declaration of independence in early 2008. Concerns that the EU would be constrained in Kosovo while Spain (one of the five member states that does not recognise the country) held the EU presidency proved unfounded. By October, NATO felt confident enough to announce a significant drawdown of KFOR over the next two years.

In spite of these positive developments, the EU’s investigations have only underlined the extent of corruption in Kosovo, while the number of irregularities in the national elections raised concerns about Kosovo’s democracy. Finally, the EU has not been able to decisively alter the attitude of Serbs in northern Kosovo towards independence.
Although the main actor in crisis management in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the UN, the EU also has a security sector reform mission in the country and member states are leading providers of development and humanitarian aid. Belgium and France are the most heavily involved EU members in the country, but Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the UK have also made it a priority for development aid.

Early in 2010, rebel violence in northern DRC took the government and UN by surprise. Nonetheless, President Joseph Kabila announced that he wanted UN peacekeepers to leave DRC before the national elections. The US, EU member states and African governments persuaded Kabila to accept a compromise that gave the UN force a new mandate. However, the UN’s reputation was damaged when rebels carried out large-scale rapes near one of its bases in the east of the country in July and August.

The performance of the EU’s security-sector reform mission (EUSEC RD Congo, operating under a €12.6 million budget) has been even worse. While it has focused on facilitating payments for troops and other administrative affairs, the Congolese military has repeatedly been accused of human rights abuses and crimes against civilians. Military campaigns in the east of the country in summer 2010 saw indiscriminate violence by the army and rebels alike, despite a promise by Kabila to crack down on human rights abuses.

While next year’s elections will have a major impact on DRC’s future, there is a growing consensus that the UN and other international actors have lost much of their leverage over Kabila in recent years. The EU is now likely to focus on technical programmes to improve the governance of DRC, such as a joint initiative launched in 2010 to stop the highly lucrative flow of illegally logged timber from DRC to Europe.