The EU was caught by surprise by the whole chain of events that preceded Russia’s aggression: the refusal of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013; the Euromaidan protests that erupted in reaction; Yanukovych’s indecisive but bloody attempts to crack down; and the regime’s sudden fall in February, followed by the swift annexation of Crimea by Russia.
The EU’s response up until the summer of 2014 could be characterised as slow and reactive. Many dignitaries visited the Maidan before the events took a violent turn. These visits did not contribute to a political solution, but instead confirmed Moscow’s view that the protests were Western-sponsored. During the violent phase, the EU watched helplessly, offering statements of “concern”. Europe had no adequate response when Russia took Crimea and ignited a rebellion in much of eastern Ukraine, finally establishing – with the help of its regular army and firepower – a rebel stronghold in parts of the Donbas.
Europe, it seems, should have done more. But it is unclear that it had realistic alternatives. Perhaps Europe should have mediated for peace between the protestorsand Yanukovych earlier. However, while the protestors were determined, they lacked leadership, whereas Yanukovych lacked determination and faced heavy Russian pressure, a combination that left him without a strategy. The peace deal negotiated by the Weimar ministers on 21 February was useful, in the end, since its provisions provided a framework for the transfer of power after Yanukovych fled the country a day later.But that was an unintended rather than planned result.
One could ask whether a rapid deployment of a strong observer mission in eastern Ukraine – something that the EU or member states at least in theory could have attempted – might not have changed the course of events there. But it is hard to see how anyone could have prevented the annexation of Crimea: diplomatic outreach to the Kremlin did not do the trick, and military action was simply neither feasible nor desirable.
The EU might have been in a better position to influence events if its own earlier Russia policies had been different. But during much of the last decade, economic interest gained the upper hand over a more principled approach. Moscow faced no consequences after its 2008 war with Georgia, which may have led Vladimir Putin to expect similar passivity about Ukraine. Thus, the EU’s track record made its warnings unconvincing.
The initial sanctions package was equally unconvincing. Sanctioning individuals – regardless of whether they were foot soldiers or belonged to Putin’s assumed “inner circle” – was unlikely to reverse policy in Moscow. Butthe so-called sectoral sanctions adopted in July were more serious and their effects were felt in Russia. Combined with falling oil prices, the sanctions have drastically damaged Russia’s economic outlook, which is likely to be affecting the leadership’s calculations.
Moscow is alsostarting to realise the depth of policy change in Europe. Germany has emerged as the driving force behind the sanctions and the leader – even if occasionally an unprepared one – of the EU’s Russia policy. The European Commission played an important role in devising common ground for sanctions. France has, for now, delayed the sale of Mistral warships, but may cancel it altogether – which would constitute a significant sacrifice. The UK has implemented measures to limit Russia’s access to capital. Counter-intuitively, post-communist EU member states Slovakia and Hungary were among the most stubborn opponents of sanctions, but in the end, they too subscribed to the common approach.
For the first time, there is also a greater common line on energy policy towards Russia and a greater apprehension of dependence on Russian gas. This has given new momentum to diversification efforts, propelling Poland’s initiative for an Energy Union high on the agenda. The South Stream pipeline, which would have brought gas to Europe through the Black Sea, was cancelled. Member states also increased capacities for LNG regasification.
With Europe absorbed by the new conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, no progress was made on the protracted conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh or South Ossetia. Other issues such as human rights and political freedom in Russia also took a backseat this year, with the sanctions policy eliminating whatever leverage Europe might have had to affect domestic policy in Russia.
In the months to come, the challenge will be to manage and balance the multiple and sometimes contradictory aims in the EU’s new agenda with Russia. These include reaching a settlement in the Donbas, averting the destabilisation of the rest of Ukraine, protecting neighbouring countries’ freedom of choice, anticipating Russia’s actions, and – hardest of all – finding a new framework for living with a combative and uncooperative Russia.
This task is complicated by Moscow’s deluded worldview and the brittlenature of Putin’s regime. Many in Moscow believe that the West harbours aggressive designs against Russia, which could lead to dangerous misinterpretations. Contrary to Moscow’s claims, regime change in Russia has not been the aim of the EU’s policies, nor should it be. However, while the collapse of Putin’s regime due to economic hardship and domestic oppressiveness remains unlikely, it is no longer unthinkable. And Moscow will, whatever happens, see the West as the agitator behind its problems and will continue to foment anti-Western sentiment to bolster the regime at home.
The instability with Russia will continue to create risks for the neighbourhood. In Ukraine, it erupted into violence, but the battle of influence between Russia and the EU is quietly going on in Moldova, in Georgia, and, in particular, in the Balkans. The EU has entered a dangerous and demanding period in its relations with Russia.
