Member states engage in crisis management, both in their immediate neighbourhood and globally, through various multilateral institutions. While the EU itself is now the primary stabilising force across the Balkans, NATO remains the primary conduit for European efforts in Afghanistan, and the EU turned to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to deploy a police mission during the Kyrgyz crisis. Meanwhile, in African crises European governments typically engage in indirect crisis management, providing financial and diplomatic support to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU). This fragmentation is reflected in the assessments included here. European governments have staked far greater resources and taken much greater political risks in places where troops, police or civilian crisis experts are deployed through the EU or NATO. But since the EU frequently states its support for UN and OSCE operations in high-profile trouble spots such as Sudan and Kyrgyzstan, they must also be included in any assessment of Europe’s contribution to crisis management.
A small number of European governments – France, the UK and, to some extent, Germany – play a crucial role in defining not only EU and NATO policy but also the governance of the UN and the OSCE. The European Commission has also been an essential donor to the AU’s peace operations. The activities of these organisations are an important but overlooked dimension of European power, even if they do not fly a European flag or involve many European personnel. We have also covered European activities ranging from conflict prevention (as in West Africa) to long-term statebuilding (as in Kosovo). With the all-important exception of Afghanistan, neither the EU nor NATO is at present directly involved in “hot” crises involving significant conflict. Instead, European efforts are largely focused on averting violence and, in particular, on long-term post-conflict peacebuilding.
|54 - Crisis management in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia||2/5||3/5||5/10||10/20||B-|
|55 – Crisis Management in Sudan and Chad||4/5||3/5||4/10||11/20||B-|
|56 – Crisis management in West Africa||3/5||3/5||4/10||10/20||C+|
|57 – Response to the earthquake in Haiti||4/5||4/5||8/10||16/20||A-|
|58 – Response to flooding in Pakistan||3/5||3/5||5/10||11/20||B-|
|59 – Response to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza||4/5||3/5||3/10||10/20||C+|
|60 – Stabilisation in Georgia||5/5||4/5||6/10||15/20||B+|
|61 – Crisis management in Kyrgyzstan||4/5||1/5||1/10||6/20||C-|
|62 – Crisis management in Somalia||4/5||4/5||5/10||13/20||B|
|63 – Stabilisation and state building in Afghanistan||2/5||4/5||3/10||9/20||C+|
|64 – Stabilisation and state building in Iraq||5/5||2/5||4/10||11/20||B-|
|65 – Stabilisation and state building in Bosnia and Hezegovina||4/5||4/5||5/10||13/20||B|
|66 – Stabilisation and state building in Kosovo||3/5||4/5||5/10||12/20||B-|
|67 – Stabilisation and state building in Congo||4/5||3/5||4/10||11/20||B-|
ECFR's Scorecard is quoted in an FT examination of European foreign policy
Spain's decline in Europe is reflectected in ECFR's 2012 Foreign Policy Scorecard.
ECFR's Scorecard is featured in a long piece on European foreign policy
ECFR's 2013 Scorecard is used to argue that small countries can play a big role in Europe
Jonas Parello-Plesner is interviewed about ECFR's European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013
A detail report from ECFR's Scorecard 2013 launch in Latvia
Andreas Schockenhoff is being asked about Russian policy towards the EU.
A report on Lativia's preformance in ECFR's 2013 Scorecard
A report from ECFR's Scorecard event in Warsaw