The European Council on Foreign Relations

The BRIC bloc

The first years of the new century have seen the beginnings of tectonic shifts in the distribution of world power. What we might call the Political West (the United States, Europe and Japan) still has 73 percent of global wealth and 80 percent of military expenditure, despite only accounting for 14 percent of total population. But now there are new kids on the block (or should that be bloc?) who have started tilting this bias in world power in new directions away from the Political West.

In his 2003 study Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, the Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill estimated that within four more decades the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China would equal in size those of the G6 (US, Germany, Japan, UK, France and Italy). That shift seems well underway: In 2000 the BRIC countries accounted for a sixth of the world economy; they now account for a quarter (in equivalent buying power). While the US, Europe and Japan are in the doldrums, the BRICs go on growing. A third of world growth in the last decade has taken place in these countries.

So far, so good for the BRICs, but where next? Obviously these trends are extrapolations, based on scenarios which may or may not come true, and forecasting exercises also contain arbitrary elements that ring less true when fully under the microscope. Russia, for instance, is not an emerging power, but a power in decline. In fact her problems bear comparisons with other European powers: she had an empire but lost it; her demography is in sharp regression; her neighbours are culturally distinct, and distrust her; and her economy is uncompetitive (though with plenty of raw materials).

So there are those who prefer not to include Russia in the group, and use other labels such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), or IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), or even Second World, the label used by Parag Khanna in his book of the same title. In one bloc he puts the US, Europe and China, who he says now govern the world in practice; and in the other, those who are trying to get in on the act.

However, setting aside the many caveats and qualifications, the trend seems clear, and even accentuated by the financial crisis. The emerging countries have been less hard hit by the recession - they are weathering it, and indeed emerging from it in a relatively strengthened position. Take the example of Turkey, which the EU cold-shoulders. It is growing at seven percent: three times the average of the euro zone. The political consequences are there for all to see.

The question, then, is not whether the new countries will grow more, and not whether they will catch up with the West, for we already know they probably will. Rather the question is what the political consequences of this might be.

One answer is that in the 21st Century we may be left without anybody able or willing to supply governance. On economic matters, look at the G20's failure to come up with coordinated action to manage the global economy. On security matters, see how Brazil and Turkey are going their own way over sanctions against Iran. And as for the maintenance of our shared inheritance, the environment, Copenhagen made it clear that a multipolar order (where there are several poles of power) is a very different thing to a multilateral order (where there are norms binding on everyone).

As we in the Political West watch the BRIC countries rise, the question arises of how we should deal with them. Three options suggest themselves: 1. We could accommodate them in the present order; 2. We could work with them to change the parameters of the existing order; 3. We could divide them and pit them against each other, thus preserving our hegemony for as long as we can.

But all this depends on our knowing exactly what they want. Do they want to have a share in the existing order? Or to change it? Does the present order seem unjust to them because their role in it fails to reflect their size and aspirations? Or because it is an inherently unjust order, in which only the strongest have power? For the moment, we don't know. And they themselves have yet to work out just what they want. The difference is that while both sides doubt, they keep growing. Time is on their side. jitorreblanca@ecfr.eu

This article was published in El País English edition on 6 July 2010.

(English translation)

¿Qué quieren los BRIC?

El siglo XXI será testigo, está siendo testigo, de un movimiento tectónico en cuanto a la distribución del poder mundial. El Occidente político (que incluye a Estados Unidos, Europa y Japón) acumula hoy, con solo el 14% de la población, el 73% de la riqueza y el 80% del gasto militar. Un poder tan impresionante como desequilibrado e insostenible a largo plazo. Pero en el barrio se han instalado nuevos vecinos, y quieren compartir riqueza y poder con los de siempre.

En su conocido estudio de 2003 Dreaming with BRIC, the path to 2050, el economista jefe de Goldman Sachs, Jim O'Neill, estimó que en 2050 el tamaño de las economías de Brasil, Rusia, India y China sería igual a la de los miembros del G-6 (Estados Unidos, Alemania, Japón, Reino Unido, Francia e Italia). La trayectoria está clara: hace 10 años, coincidiendo con el comienzo del siglo, estos países (también llamados BRIC) representaban un sexto de la economía mundial; hoy son ya un 25% (en poder de compra equivalente). Mientras Estados Unidos, Europa y Japón están en crisis, los BRIC siguen creciendo. De hecho, un tercio del crecimiento mundial registrado en la última década se ha originado en esos países.

Obviamente, se trata de extrapolaciones, y por tanto están basadas en escenarios que pueden cumplirse o no, en parte o en su totalidad. De hecho, todo ejercicio de prospectiva contiene elementos arbitrarios: se mire como se mire, Rusia no es una potencia emergente, sino una potencia en declive. En realidad, sus problemas son los típicos de una potencia típicamente europea: tuvo un imperio pero lo perdió, su demografía está en alarmante retroceso, sus vecinos son culturalmente distintos y recelan de ella y, para colmo, tiene una economía escasamente competitiva (aunque, eso sí, con abundantes materias primas).

Es por ello que hay quienes prefieren no incluir a Rusia en el grupo y usar otras etiquetas, como BASIC (Brasil, Sudáfrica, India y China), IBSA (India, Brasil y Sudáfrica) o incluso, "Segundo Mundo", que es la etiqueta que utiliza Parag Khanna en el libro del mismo título para poner a un lado a Estados Unidos, Europa y China, que según él ya gobiernan de hecho el mundo, y a otro a los que intentan hacerse un hueco. Dejando a un lado los matices y las cualificaciones, la tendencia no solo parece clara, sino que la crisis financiera la ha acentuado: los emergentes han sufrido la recesión de una forma mucho más suave, la están superando antes y, para colmo, están saliendo de ella con mucha más fuerza. Turquía, a quien la UE se permite ningunear todos los días, está creciendo al 7%, lo que triplica la media de la zona euro: las consecuencias están a la vista de todos.

Por tanto, la pregunta no es si los nuevos crecerán más y si alcanzarán o no a Occidente, porque ya sabemos que lo harán, sino cuáles serán las consecuencias políticas. Aunque es pronto para abandonarse al pesimismo, parece claro que, por el momento, el siglo XXI no tiene quien lo gobierne. En lo económico, véase el fracaso del G-20 en actuar coordinadamente para gestionar la economía global; en los aspectos de seguridad, véase cómo Turquía y Brasil han decidido ir por su cuenta en el tema de las sanciones a Irán; y en cuanto a la provisión de bienes públicos, como el medio ambiente, Copenhague dejó bien claro que una cosa es un orden multipolar (donde hay varios polos de poder) y otro un orden multilateral (donde hay normas vinculantes para todos).

Viendo comportarse a los BRIC, surge la pregunta de cómo tratar con ellos. Hay tres opciones con implicaciones prácticas y normativas distintas: una, acomodarlos en el orden actual; dos, unirse a ellos para cambiar los parámetros básicos del orden vigente; tres, dividirlos y enfrentarlos para preservar nuestra hegemonía el máximo tiempo posible. Pero todo ello depende de averiguar primero qué quieren ellos: ¿Quieren su cuota de poder en el orden actual? ¿O cambiar ese orden? Dicho de otra manera: ¿el orden actual les parece injusto porque su papel en él no hace justicia a su tamaño y aspiraciones? ¿O porque se trata de un orden económicamente injusto en el que solo los más fuertes tienen poder? Por el momento la respuesta no está clara: ni nosotros sabemos lo suficiente sobre ellos, ni ellos han dilucidado todavía internamente qué es lo que quieren. La diferencia es que, mientras ambos dudamos, ellos, además, crecen. El tiempo juega a su favor.

Este artículo fue publicado en El País el 5 de julio de 2010.


1 Comments

#1

Strategic powers in the world are given by the thinkings of bloc of nations in it. the charactericstics of the bloc is attributed by the thinking in the whole sphere of the poeple inside the bloc. Their application in political system & influence, in technic & methodlogy of component societies, in psyche, spirit & the way of analyse, in extent of self-assurance & of flow, in material powers they used with the above mentioned aspects.
As a guy situated in front of a terminal, i can field that europe with its sophistication born out of the chapters of history, can safely be termed as a enduring power of civilisation, whether its institutions can flex other aspects of their power either developed or developing will cast their place in the evolving sphere of power of this world.
In the us, it is the interaction of their different components leading to what they do & what they can hold back. wish they can be in peace of mind and get through it.

matt cheuk | asia | 10 Jul 10, 10 Jul 10 EST

Submit a Comment

Your message will be submitted to a moderator before appearing online. Name and email address are required, all other fields are optional. Your email will not be displayed.

Please enter the word you see in the image below:

Remember my personal information

Latest Publications

European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012

How well did European foreign policy perform over the last year?

China Analysis: Facing the risks of the 'going out strategy'

From a major exporter of goods to a major exporter of capital

China Analysis: One or two Chinese models?

To Chongqing or Guangdong? China’s big development decision

Ukraine after the Tymoshenko verdict

Instead of lecturing Ukraine the EU must show that it means business

A 'reset' with Algeria: the Russia to the EU's south

Algeria is at risk of turmoil without EU-backed reform

Dealing with a post-BRIC Russia

Learning to deal with a changing Russia under a familiar leader

Rescuing the euro: what is China’s price?

What price will Europe pay for China's help in rescuing the euro?

Four scenarios for the reinvention of Europe

The impossible is also necessary if the euro and Europe are to be saved

Spain after the elections: the 'Germany of the south'?

Spain's election, caught between the euro crisis and Arab revolutions

Europe and the Arab revolutions: a new vision for democracy and human rights

The EU's role in building accountable societies in North Africa

How to stop the demilitarisation of Europe

Building sustainable EU military power at a time of defence cuts

Reinvention of Europe

In the Press

France Culture
09 Feb 12

Justin Vaïsse gives an Analysis of US presidential elections

Spravy Pravda
09 Feb 12

Spravy Pravda reviews ECFR's European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012

Svenska Dagbladet
09 Feb 12

ECFR's Scorecard 2012 appears in a leader article by Svenska Dagbladet

Bloomberg TV
08 Feb 12

Ulrike Guérot is interviewed about Angela Merkel's handling of the eurocrisis

Read more press >

Publications side bar