Securing a Political Resolution to the Libyan Crisis

The ebb and flow of the Libyan civil war has led most American and European commentators to draw two conclusions.  First, the conflict will end with a negotiated settlement. Second, international peacekeepers may be required to make any deal work.

The case for a negotiated settlement is based on the simple fact that a military solution to the crisis is unlikely: The rebels probably cannot win on the battlefield, and Moammar Gaddafi cannot be allowed to do so. A stalemate is also unappealing, not least because it would require the US and Europeans to continue policing Libya's airspace, at significant expense, for the foreseeable future.

So even the most ardent members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition now accept the need to talk to his regime. Three weeks ago, in an article for World Politics Review, I argued that such an effort might involve both covert contacts and overt, UN-led diplomacy supported by a "contact group" of concerned countries. Both approaches are now underway.

Last week's murky reports of Gaddafi's aides engaging in exploratory talks with the British were followed by the announcement over the weekend by the Greek foreign minister that a Libyan government envoy had been to Athens for the same reason. The New York Times also reported that two of Gaddafi's sons had proposed a plan whereby their father would step aside, allowing them to preside over a transition to democracy.

Meanwhile, last Tuesday's London conference on Libya gave its blessing to a diplomatic contact group bringing together some 40 governments and international organisations. However, the group does not include several potentially significant players, including Russia and China. Western diplomats will want to find ways to keep Beijing and Moscow at least minimally involved in efforts to find a settlement, lest they use their leverage at the United Nations to disrupt or delegitimise the anti-Gaddafi campaign.

What sort of settlement is possible?  Some dovish European governments, including Germany and Italy, have pressed for an early ceasefire.  But although the Libyan rebels have set out terms for one, halting hostilities cannot be a goal in itself. Ceasefires were made and broken as a matter of routine in Bosnia in the 1990s, and Gaddafi's regime has already declared more than one such cessation of hostilities without actually halting the fighting.

For purely humanitarian reasons, it is possible to consider a limited ceasefire around the isolated rebel city of Misrata, which has been brutally bombarded by Gaddafi's forces. The West could demand that Gaddafi unilaterally halt this siege in order to maintain credibility in further negotiations. In return, the rebels would then be expected to reciprocate by declaring Misrata a no-fire zone and promising not to launch offensives from it.  The two sides already agreed to a time-limited and highly restricted version of just such a ceasefire around the neighbourhood of Misrata's port, to allow a Turkish vessel to evacuate roughly 250 wounded for whom the city's hospital lacked supplies to treat. But even a permanent truce in Misrata would be a localised affair and one based on the -- highly uncertain -- good faith of both sides.

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