Something odd is happening across Europe's security landscape. In spite of British Prime Minister Brown's euro-scepticism, and Britain's supposed European isolation following the Iraq War, London is once again becoming the centerpiece of European security cooperation.
Britain has always been Europe's most militarily-capabale power due to its history of warfare, defence spending, but also proximity to the U.S. Like in tennis so in military affairs, it pays off to play with a better partner and Britain has learnt a lot from the U.S.
But something else seems to be happening. Countries once loyal to the build-up of European defense and their military relationships with Germany are turning towards Britain.
The Netherlands, for many years wedded to its military relationship with Germany - the two armies even share equipment storages - is turning towards London. Its Navy and Royal Marines have close links with their British counterparts, forged in part by fighting the Taliban.
In Denmark, the centre-right government has gradually detached the country from its traditional Nordic anchor and moved closer to London. "There is simply no scope for cooperation with Denmark", a Swedish MP recently complained. Danish soldiers, who in the 1990s deployed to the Balkans as part of a Nordic Battle Group, now operate under British command both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Europe's two most militarily-capable newcomers - Poland and Romania - are also privileging links with Britain. Romanian soldiers serve under British command, both on deployments and in key multinational exercises. Britain provides an adviser to the Polish government to give advice on defence planning, programming and budget management.
Britain's traditional military counterweight - France - has committed to re-joining NATO and is likely to obtain changes inside the alliance and hopes to get support for ESDP build-up.
But both these require Britain's support and French president Nicolas Sarkozy has made it clear he hopes to cement an Anglo-French axis to generate a new "critical mass" driving EU foreign and security policy when he makes a state visit to Britain next week.
Germany, meanwhile, is turning increasingly inwards. It remains unwilling to send the Bundeswher into combat in southern Afghanistan despite repeated U.S entreaties, and its defense budget has declined almost continuously since reunification; spending is only one percent of its GDP on defense, which puts it at the bottom end of any NATO ranking. The two U.S.-German army corps, created in 1993, have been disbanded thus depriving the German army of the benefits of interaction with the U.S army.
The turn towards London has also seen a return of the "Iraq caucus" inside Europe - now more appropriately identified as the "RC South caucus" i.e. those countries deployed as part of NATO's Regional Command South, which encompasses the southernmost districts or provinces of Afghanistan. Led by Britain, this caucus is driving NATO's Afghan policy and will determine the Alliance's overarching Afghan plan, to be agreed at the Alliance's Bucharest Summit in April.
But it may only be a matter of time before its discussions turn from one theatre to joint exercises, cooperation on purchases and greater interoperability. This represents a threat to the viability of both NATO and ESDP on a number of levels.
First, the concern used to be the gap between the U.S military and European armies. Today, the U.S has moved so far ahead in terms of capability and battle-field experience that European militaries cannot hope to catch up. The new danger is a clearer division inside Europe with the caucus on one side and the rest of Europe on the other.
Second, as NATO's article V becomes increasingly meaningless - with so many allies refusing to come to others' aid in the fight again the Taliban - this caucus may develop a real, albeit unofficial, collective security guarantee.
These developments are not predetermined and if more countries move troops to southern Afghanistan, as many analysts predict will happen after the U.S presidential elections, the problem may go away.
Moreover, Britain had a similarly strong position in the early 1990s with all the Eastern European countries, as London sponsored their NATO entrance, and helped on defence reform. But the advantage was eroded because of British skepticism about ESDP.
For now, however, the pendulum has swung towards London and the reconfiguration of Europe's security landscape is a reality.
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A very interesting piece Daniel which picks up on an under reported trend: that is an orientation towards UK security strategy leadership by a small but significant number of European Union Member States. However I think you may be counting too many chickens before they are hatched.The Danish government’s position is very vulnerable to domestic challenge - its involvement in NATO strategy is a source of real polarisation in the country. The same is also broadly true of the Netherlands - although the politics are somewhat less polarised.
But UK leadership is also weakened by the continuing strategic confusions in Afghanistan. Incidentally what has happened in the case of the (British) EU and UN officials who were sacked because Karzai objected to their contacts with the Taliban in Helmund? That policy now seems to be back in favour again. Final judgement about Britain’s new influence on security strategy will also have to await the November US election - and the consequential recalibration of the UK-US “special relationship.” There HAS been a snail like shift by the UK to greater involvement with ESDP. That MAY herald a new future for British influence in the European Union. But it is too soon to call it that way as yet.
This article does indeed pick-up on an often overlooked aspect of European security and defence integration. On so many levels, Britain is frequently seen as a reluctant European, but as you rightly point out, on a deeper level, Britain’s role in what is perhaps going to become by far the most important dimension of European integration—the icing on the cake, so to speak—that is to say, integration in ‘high politics’, has been, and will likely continue to be, considerable. Britain’s armed forces and ability to project force over vast distances puts it in a very special place, and its willingness to use power to secure political objectives makes it, alongside France, unique in the European Union. For an effective European foreign and defence policy, these Anglo-French attributes must be transferred up to the European level.
And I think you have detected another important trend, which might become a bigger obstacle to future European security and defence integration, as well as to a more coherent and effective foreign policy, and that is German reluctance to go global and to funnel power in the service of European interests and desires. This strikes me as the biggest problem facing Europe today, and it will need concerted effort and some well intended pressure on Berlin by Britain and France in order to overcome it.
Dear John, James,
I admit that I am going out on a limb here, but I’m pleased to see, John, that you have detected the same trend as I have.
The key follow-up questions I have are as as follows: first, what will the UK do with this priviliged position; and how will this impact ESDP? Some argue that ESDP has reached an institutional high-water mark; others maintain that momentum can be re-started. If there is a shift - which you note - what will the UK focus on?
You mention negotiations with the Taliban, as I argued in my report (which can be found elsewhere on this site). I don’t think there is any way aruond this, but we still have a very ad hoc and unstructured approach to political reconcilliation. It was described to me as a “cafeteria approach”; we cater to walk-in customers, but don’t have a strategic approach. Key here will be to get the U.S on board, including with targeting the right people, providing incentives, end-to-end service, security guarantees, cooperation with Pakistan etc.
James, you echo my point about Germany, which is leaving a lot of commentators concerned. But do you think that this is a temporary develoment, due to the constraints of the political situation, or more permanent?
Daniel
Daniel,
Interesting piece - though I can’t help thinking you could have been more explicit on the lack of political leadership in this area. My impression is that (as you point out) most of the changes you highlight have been influenced by operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. While European militaries seem to have profited from these collaborative ventures, respective governments have yet to cash in - I think the disagreements at NATO recently was a sign of this political malaise.
To that end I wonder if the title of your article was a tad misleading. I don’t think London is leading European security - I don’t think the Government would even know if it was, such are current number of problems the MoD is having to deal with. It strikes me there is a neat , if tongue in cheek, parallel with governing Italy - the country works, inspite, not because, of its government.
Charlie,
You are right - there is precious little leadership coming from from No 10 on this issue. Moreover, there is plenty of disagreement across Europe on key security issues.
But with France promising to return to NATO, the Alliance’s 60th birthday next year can be a moment for both NATO and ESDP to be re-launched. The key question is what the UK will do with its “natural-born” position of security leadership?
Your point on MoD, I’m afraid, I don’t agree with. From the UK, the situation may look miserable, but across Europe the UK - and the MoD - is still respected. Its problems do not impact on this, however bad they look on this side of the Channel.
Daniel
Daniel, your points about Afganisthan and the role of the UK are informative and well taken. They certainly show a “natural born” UK leadership. But let’s call a spade a spade. This leadership concerns the military aspects, however important they are, of security, to be precise the use of force in conflict management. “Running security” is something else. Without indulging in fashionable abstract concepts on security - and the EU role on it - let’s look at the most topical current security issue:the Kosovo crisis, the Nato enlargement, the Iraq debacle or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is fair to note that in any of these crisis there is a UK leadership. I wish there was. To this effect the UK should make clear choices about the strategic and operational commitments of its considerable diplomatic, military, industrial and civilian security capabilities.
Through its NATO new position and the initiatives to come in the next semester Sarkozy seems to be ready to move in this direction as the driving force in the security leadership on this side of the Atlantic.