On Sunday, all three will be independent states although it may be some time before Kosovo takes it seat in the world body as Russia is likely to block its membership. Most analysts assume there will be a peaceful, albeit contentious end to Kosovo's ten-year limbo. But Balkan history suggests this benign scenario could be derailed. Either way, Kosovo presents the European Union (EU) with at least three challenges over the medium-term.
Moves and countermoves in Pristina are likely to escalate conflict in Belgrade between the pro-Western president Boris Tadic and his nemesis, the nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. New parliamentary elections are likely in which the Serb Radical Party will be expected to do well.
The Serbian electorate appears divided between the draw of Europe and the glories of the nationalist past. For years, the EU had assumed there would be an inexorable march of progress across the continent, driven by the lure of expansion. But many in Serbia are tempted to march to the beat of Moscow's drum instead. Fears of increasing regional separatism elsewhere in Serbia have also hardened attitudes against Kosovo's independence.
In the recent presidential elections, Miroslav Nikolic, the SRS, leader ran a successful campaign based on an anti-corruption, pro-change, pro-reform, pro-EU, pro-Russia platform. He presented himself as the candidate of change and his party is likely to capture between 30-40% of the votes in any elections. In this case, the key issue will be whether Mr. Tadic's DS or Mr. Kostunica's DSS strike a deal with the SRS and form a government.
Whoever comes out on top - or rather with the least blame - in the days immediately after Kosovo's independence may well determine the respective strengths of DS and DSS and thus the post-electoral coalition. It is not unlikely that Mr. Kostunica, a wily operator, will be able to find his way back to power. If this happens, the EU will have to deal with a split and increasingly radicalized Serbia. How will the EU rebuild links with the largest country in the Balkans?
The second challenge to the EU from Kosovo's independence, as my colleague Ulrike Guérot points out, is the way in which it shows how the Union tilts its institutional balance towards smaller states, as regional entities or countries within larger member states i.e. Bavaria, Padonia, Catalonia or Scotland have no representation at the EU table although, in terms of GDP per capita or population, they greatly outrank a country like Kosovo. Until now, Russia, Cyprus and China have been most concerned about the precedent set by Kosovo's independence. But in the longer term it may affect Europe too.
Third, for the foreseeable future, Kosovo will be dependant on EU hand-outs, rife with crime and simmering with ethnic tensions. Will the EU have to take an increasingly direct role in the management of the country, much like the international community has had to do in Bosnia? Does this mean that the EU will take on a sort of imperial role that it criticises the U.S for? Ivan Krastev once asked whether the EU is ready to endorse what he calls "imperial Europe"? Is there a risk that imperial fatigue may set in, as Europeans tire of aiding Kosovo, and this ends up further undermining the EU's enlargement?
Whatever happens in the next few days, Kosovo's independence presents a number of key medium-term challenges for the EU, the Serbs and the Kosovars. One day Kosovo's UN envoy will be able to sit between his Kiribati and Kuwaiti counterparts and find more parallels between their countries, after which he will attend the once-weekly meeting of EU ambassadors alongside Serbia. However, to make this a reality, restraint, calm and forward-looking will be required not only after Kosovo´s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) - and what threatens to be a UDD (a Unilateral Declaration of Dependence) by the Kosovo Serbs - but in many years to come.
|
|
Tweet |
How well did European foreign policy perform over the last year?
From a major exporter of goods to a major exporter of capital
To Chongqing or Guangdong? China’s big development decision
Instead of lecturing Ukraine the EU must show that it means business
Algeria is at risk of turmoil without EU-backed reform
Learning to deal with a changing Russia under a familiar leader
What price will Europe pay for China's help in rescuing the euro?
The impossible is also necessary if the euro and Europe are to be saved
Spain's election, caught between the euro crisis and Arab revolutions
The EU's role in building accountable societies in North Africa
Building sustainable EU military power at a time of defence cuts
Justin Vaïsse gives an Analysis of US presidential elections
Spravy Pravda reviews ECFR's European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012
Ulrike Guérot comments on Germany and Europe
José Ignacio Torreblanca pens an article on EU and no-nation States
Comments for this entry are closed.
The fourth and biggest challenge for the EU will be the planned deployment of its EULEX-mission on the whole territory of Kosovo. The success of this mission will be crucial for the future of the EU?s security and defence policy. At the moment it looks as if the EU will face immense resistance in the Serb-dominated northern parts of Kosovo by the Kosovo Serb population. All politicians there called for a complete boycott of the EU as, according to them, it is violating UN Security Council Resolution 1244. With the strong support of Russia, the parallel Serb institutions are very well entrenched in northern Kosovo and it would require an enormous amount of political will by the EU to confront local authorities and impose its rule of law mission. (To exemplify, on Monday the EU-contract with the hotel in northern Mitrovica where its offices were based so far, was cancelled and - for security reasons - no EU official even dared to pick up the computers from the hotel until now?). To be sure, the success of the decision by most EU states to give independence to Kosovo, will be judged in Mitrovica and the territory north of the Ibar river, - and currently de-facto partition of this area is looming.
Another, possibly fifth challenge, will be for the EU to explain how it can reconcile its constant (rhetoric) commitment to international law and multilateralism while deploying a mission without endorsement of the UN Security Council and in contradiction to existing UN Resolutions. The Russian foreign minister might have had a point when he pointed out to the irony of deploying a rule of law-mission, which at the same is violating main principles of international law. Pointing out to the ?sui-generis? character of Kosovo as done by EU foreign ministers on Monday will not be enough of an explanation,—- coz many things in life are sui generis?
Thank you Daniel for this article and the important points you make, e.g. with respect to smaller entities and respresentation.
I think it is very important to recognise the critical importance that Kosovo has in Serbia’s history. Kosovo is the “cuna” of Serbian religious and insitutional traditions, and it is true that many Serbians would agree with Kostunica when he says that Serbian identity will begin to fade the moment they give up on Kosovo.
Kostunica obviously uses emotional and passionate tones in this discussion, and he does remind me of Milosevic, who started his nationalistic career talking about Kosovo.
But, let aside passion, it is an historical truth.
Is Europe prepared to face the future turmoil that this UDI presents? In the medium-long term, is this a sustainable and fair solution? Are we ready to claim, and take responsibility for what we claim today, that there will be no war to take Kosovo back?
Thank you for your attention.
Kind regards,
Anna