Bringing out the big guns

This piece was published in E!Sharp on 15 September 2009.  

Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts have one thing in common these days: they are all unhappy about the state of EU foreign policy. The former complain about attempts to curtail national freedom of action; the latter are frustrated about the lack of EU-level coordination.

Events in Tehran in August showed that the enthusiasts have more to be upset about. Even though European governments have expressed concern about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's usurpation of power, they have reacted in different ways. The French, British, Italian and German leaders refused to send messages of congratulation on his re-election. Most EU countries also failed to send representatives to his inauguration. But a British envoy attended the event, as did the Swedish ambassador to Iran. So much for a common stance.

Henry Kissinger is said to have once asked, "Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?" This confusion, some now hope, will be fixed by the Lisbon Treaty, should the Irish vote for the document in their October 2 referendum. The treaty enhances the role of the high representative for foreign and security policy and create a European "External Action Service" to be staffed by the European Commission, the Council secretariat and member state officials.

How exactly this will fit together is still anyone's guess. Fights about the high-level jobs - the presidents of the European Commission and European Council and the high representative - have pushed into the background talk of how to make the bureaucratic set-up work. Moreover, improved structures do not guarantee successful diplomacy. That is not only, or even mainly, about institutions; it is about effective policies. Effective means being proactive; being willing to take controversial positions, even when powerful actors disagree; and being willing to back up policies with all available means, up to and including economic coercion and, as a last resort, military force.

This kind of approach is usually the hallmark of superpowers and bigger states with centuries-old traditions of foreign policy-making and a worldwide diplomatic presence. Newer states, whose experience of global diplomacy is shorter, have mainly regional interests. Because Europe is made of many small states and a few big states, the EU's default position is not the activist, big-country, foreign policy pursued by the likes of France and Britain, but the cautious, accommodative small-nation stance associated with Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Spain.

True, the EU has deployed over 20 peacekeeping missions, led negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme and negotiated a ceasefire to last year's Russia-Georgia war. But these cases have often seen France, Britain and Germany push for a particular EU stance, bringing the rest of the 27-strong bloc with them.

When the large EU states do not chart a course - which is the case on most issues, most of the time - the EU reverts to foreign policy type. So it is timid in the face of electoral fraud in Albania; unwilling to boycott the "Durban II" World Conference against Racism; and slow to follow up its rhetoric against Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe with action. Worse still, as the big EU states can only prioritise so much, their diplomats often sublimate their activist instincts in the pursuit of a common EU position, which rarely emerges (and, when it does, is often weak - or worse, counter-productive).

There are exceptions to this rule. The EU's failure to deal with Russia can be blamed on Germany's accommodative Russia policy. Conversely, small states can punch above their proverbial weight; Sweden's Foreign Minister Carl Bildt "bigs up" his country's international profile. And the EU can be united and strong: it was so vis-à-vis Burma and Serbia. But in the day-to-day interactions that make up the main part of a diplomat's work, it is "New Europe" - rather than, as former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thought, "Old Europe" - which makes the EU ineffectual.

Can this problem be fixed? The outlook is bleak. The lack of a Europe-wide security culture is well-known. And future rounds of enlargement are likely to introduce more small states into the Union, reinforcing the problem.

There are grounds for hope. Security policy is always going to be hard, especially for those countries like Sweden, Austria, Finland and Ireland which have a history of neutrality, but foreign policy ought to be easier. Several smaller EU states have also changed their outlook. Denmark is no longer a foot-dragging, neutral-leaning state, but an active player in NATO and a close ally of the US. The EU has also become more activist, for example on Kosovo's independence. Having a permanent EU presidency, instead of the current six-monthly diplomatic relay, which puts smaller states in charge of the EU's foreign policy most of the time, will help.

The EU can have a foreign policy of sorts, but this is not a given outcome and the policy might not be a good one per se. With the Eurosceptic Conservative Party likely to win power in Britain next year, the focus for the EU will have to be on delivering foreign policy results. Having a common position on Russia or China only works if the position is right and strong. Put simply: common but weak is not good enough if the EU is to become a global player.