After Afghanistan

This piece was originally published in E!Sharp's September-October 2009 edition.  

However the Afghan war ends, Europe's militaries will emerge exhausted. Even if NATO creates stability, the United States will take most of the credit.

While the Obama administration has ramped up its forces, something very much like defeatism has spread across European capitals. The Netherlands is committed to withdraw next year. British generals have been blisteringly frank about the campaign's corrosive effect on the army.

It is hard to imagine that more than a fraction of the 35,000 European troops now in Afghanistan will be there in three or four years. Perhaps, as in Iraq, some trainers will stay on. But if 2001 to 2011 will go down in European military histories as the Afghan decade (as the 1990s were defined by the Balkans) it is time to look ahead to the next chapter.

Some commentators doubt that there will be another chapter - at least not one worth reading. Europe's military outlook is horrible. Public appetite for new operations is minimal. The recession is cutting into defence budgets. European cooperation on big-ticket projects like the Eurofighter and A400M transport aircraft has been riddled with setbacks.

As the last European troops return home from Afghanistan, they may be headed for a quiet life in barracks - without the money, kit or political will for long-range operations.

But defeats can have unexpected consequences. In the 1970s - having gone through a trauma over Vietnam far worse than NATO's experience in Afghanistan - American military intellectuals began to develop revolutionary concepts and weaponry. More recently, Europe's Balkan peacekeeping failures stimulated cooperation on EU defence.

Similarly, severe setbacks in Iraq after 2003 led General David Petraeus and his allies to rewrite US counter-insurgency doctrine. Most European officers are yet to catch up.

But the growing sense of failure in Afghanistan has sparked a new wave of debate on military policy in the European Union, most strikingly in Britain. This debate has not permeated everywhere - in parts of Brussels, it is deemed impolite to suggest that anything is really that bad in Afghanistan - but it is likely to gather pace as the Afghan adventure ends.

It might just rejuvenate European defence thinking. And some serious rejuvenation is required. The great post-Cold War European security debate - over whether to prioritise NATO and the transatlantic alliance or the Union's defence identity - is agonisingly repetitive. Recent events suggest that it may also be a fuss about nothing. Those who insisted on sticking close to Washington now face the reality that many American commanders view European troops as (at best) a quaint distraction.

Yet the strongest advocates of EU defence - meaning, of course, the French - also feel let down. European operations in places like Chad and Congo have been limited in scale and ambition. Neither NATO nor the EU currently seems very relevant to the balance of power in emerging geopolitical hot-spots in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

So the NATO/EU debate may soon move to a close - not because either side won, but because it is getting silly. Fundamental questions about the type of wars Europeans need to fight in the post-Afghan era are rising up the agenda instead, with three schools of military thinkers emerging: New Cold Warriors, Small War Specialists and Power Projectors.

The New Cold Warriors focus on the threat from a resurgent Russia - and point to Moscow's unsophisticated but effective 2008 assault on Georgia as a model for future fights. Nobody believes that Russia has the forces to launch a full-scale invasion of Europe anymore. But it can still use "salami tactics": slicing off bits of territory on its borders, as it has with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and piling pressure on its neighbours.

These fears are common not only among former members of the Warsaw Pact but also in Finland and Sweden. Security analysts in Stockholm and Helsinki are talking about deeper security cooperation - or even joining NATO, although public support is limited. Most New Cold Warriors recognise the financial and civilian aid to fragile states on Russia's borders is a more effective way to fight "salami tactics" than troops alone.

The Small War Specialists are also interested in mixing civilian and military tools - but to tackle insurgents and militias in weak and failing states. They believe that, even if Europeans may not want to fight counter-insurgency wars like Afghanistan again, they may have little choice. That does not have to mean fighting far-off wars: there is evidence of al-Qaeda buying friends and gaining influence in weak states in North Africa.

Small War Specialists want to ensure Europe will have light and mobile forces able to move in and hit the bad guys as fast as possible - plus a cadre of civilian specialists able to start cleaning up the mess. Sweden, taking advantage of its EU presidency, is aiming to push other member states to provide more civilians to help rebuild former war zones.

For the Power Projectors, a narrow focus on counter-insurgency and state-building is a hangover from Afghanistan and the Balkans and ignores looming strategic shifts. These include China and India's growing spending on high-tech military hardware. While the Small War Specialists want to concentrate military spending on helicopters and body armour, the Power Projectors prefer aircraft carriers, long-range fighters and submarines.

At present, the Small War Specialists dominate public debate, not only because of events in Afghanistan but because finance ministries tremble at high-cost defence spending. But a crisis elsewhere - like an Iranian attempt to close shipping lanes in the Gulf as tensions rise with the West - could shift attention to the Power Projectors. If Russia uses force again in the Caucasus, the New Cold Warriors will come to the fore. While some observers believe that "NATO's Afghan defeat means the end of European defence too", it is equally likely that unpleasant surprises elsewhere will spark new security initiatives.

Not all EU members are likely to join in these initiatives with equal enthusiasm. Some, like Ireland and Austria, feel the pull of more traditional UN peacekeeping. Others, like Germany, may prefer to absent themselves from military debate altogether.

There is a risk that other EU members may split off in different directions. Eastern European countries will focus more resolutely on Russia. Mediterranean countries, looking nervously southwards, may emphasise preparedness for the next small wars.

Former naval heavyweights like France, the Netherlands and Britain might still want to play Power Projectors - although all will face budget trouble, and a Conservative victory in next year's British elections would reduce London's influence over European defence.

But if European defence priorities diverge, none are likely to be met.

Recent efforts to facilitate EU security cooperation, such as the European Commission's drive to open up the defence procurement market, would go to waste. The US would look to other allies - such as Australia, which plans increased military spending - to help in future crises.

It is too early for EU leaders to say openly, "yes, we're losing Afghanistan, so what comes after that?" But they should be quietly commissioning and sharing studies of just that question.

Britain's wartime leader Winston Churchill described his best general, Bernard Montgomery, as "insufferable in victory" but "indomitable in retreat". Europe is often insufferable about its importance in world affairs. Now may be the time to see how well we can manage retreat.