Balkan ghosts still haunt Europe

By Daniel Korski - 20 Nov 07

Clad in white from head-to-toe, unarmed and mockingly referred to as the "Ice-cream Men", the EU's monitors in the Balkans were powerless to stop the unfolding Bosnian genocide in the mid-1990s, which saw at least 100.000 people die and millions driven from their homes.

Like accountants, the Ice-cream Men recorded what they saw and sent their tallies back to Brussels, London and Paris. There, in chanceries, and at successive conferences, Europe's leaders struggled to seize what Jacques Poos, the Luxembourgian Foreign Minster, called the "hour of Europe" and end the conflict.

As the Balkans burned, the EU babbled. Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia had pre-empted a common European stance while attempts at negotiating peace, in partnership with the UN, failed repeatedly. All the Ice-cream Men could do was watch. And record.

In the end, and to the EU's chagrin, it took US gun-backed diplomacy to bring the parties to Dayton and the Bosnian War to an end. But from Europe's inaction in Bosnia and its military weakness during the subsequent Kosovo campaign, came a renewed impetus for a common European foreign policy.

Europe's global reach

Ten years on, Europe's foreign policy has truly entered its post-Balkan phase. Military forces - cap-badged with the star-studded blue-and-yellow EU flag -are deployed in trouble spots from Africa to the Middle East. Most visibly, in Lebanon 3.000 Italian and French troops are policing the still-tense stand-off following Israel's 2006 strikes.

The EU may remain divided over Iraq, but on other issues in the Middle East, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, guaranteeing Lebanon's stability and ending Iran's nuclear enrichment, they have an increasingly common perspective. In Congo and Chad, EU forces have deployed and in Aceh, European monitors patrolled the ceasefire after a decades-long conflict.

In the Balkans, the EU's has played an important role in the region's reconstruction, deploying solders, policemen and development workers in their thousands. EUFOR's mission in Bosnia saw a robust 7,000 troops deploy while the EU has spent billions of euros. Much like its impact in the rest of Eastern Europe, it has provided a model for the countries trying to escape their sectarian and misgoverned past. As Paddy Ashdown, the Liberal Democrat leader and UN envoy in Bosnia explained: the "pull" of Brussels, rather than any push by any outsiders would transform the Balkans.

Instead of being weighted down by additional tasks, the EU's bureaucratic tree has been given new branches and put down deeper roots. Innovations include the formation of ‘battle groups', 1,500-person military formations, eventually giving the EU a deployable force of 3,000 troops and potentially beyond.

The EU Treaty, now agreed in Lisbon, will provide for better integration between the European Commission and the Council. The post of High Representative will be strengthened and a diplomatic corps - the External Action Service - will be set-up to support the post. The EU's common foreign policy has become global in its reach, broad in its remit, and supported by new bureaucratic structures.

Balkan ghosts return

But the ghosts of the past have come to haunt, or came back to haunt, the EU's common foreign policy. Progress is obvious in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and even newly-independent Montenegro. Slovenia's already in the EU - and ranks twelfth in terms of GDP- with Croatia and Macedonia both on the way. They are in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, the ante-room for NATO membership and Lilliputian Montenegro has, since its peaceful departure from Serbia-Montenegro, been an example of stability.

However, from the Unna River in northern Bosnia across to Belgrade in Serbia and south to Kosovo a triangle has formed in the region. Within it, old-style nationalism has returned to the region. Kosovo receives the most attention, as the U.S and Europe wrangle with Russia and Serbia over the UN-run province's future. The recent electoral victory of former KLA leader Hacim Thaci, who ran on a platform to declare Kosovo's independence on 11 December, have seen tensions escalate with militants on both sides of the border arming for conflict.

In Serbia proper, the electorate remains divided over their country's place in the world and between the draw of Europe and the imagined glories of the nationalist past. War criminals like Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb army chief and architect of the Srebrenica massacre remains at large. For years, the EU had assumed there would be an inexorable, if occasionally diverted, march of progress.

But with Russia's articulation of an alternative European order has tempted many in Belgrade to march to Moscow's beat instead. Prime Minister Kostunica has made clear he has little interest in joining NATO and is increasingly lukewarm on European integration.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where CSFP was originally forged in the late 1990s, a twelve year internationally-run democratisation has been underway. But instead of creating a new workable state, the country's three communities - Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks - have drifted further away from each other. The Bosnian economy is in tatters - with at least 60 percent unemployment - and the billions of EU aid spent have produced little sustainable development.

Independence for Kosovo may encourage a Russian-backed Serb push for the break-up of Bosnia. In all three countries, the prospect of European integration has become distant, as European publics - led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy - are reluctant to accept new members into the European club.

Europe no longer deploys monitors - the hapless "Ice-cream Men" - but with its policies in the Balkans - of using the "pull" of EU membership and the "push" of ESDP - in shatters, the risk of a conflagration on its doorstep is no longer unimaginable, even if military action remains unlikely for now.

Yet despite this, there is precious little discussion in Europe about the Balkans, beyond how to solve Kosovo. This will need to change. The Slovenian Presidency of the EU, which starts in January, provides an opportunity for the one country that has exorcised its Balkans ghosts to lead the way for others to do so too.

Comments for this entry are closed.

You make an interesting analysis of the past and the present situation in the Balkans, but stopping short of offering proposals on how to move forward. Any concrete ideas?

Georgi Kamov | Sofia, Bulgaria | 20 Nov 07, 20 Nov 07 EST | www

60% unemployment….. Yet again, lack of early focus on livelihoods (sustained employment)haunts the reconstruction process, as we have seen in so many theatres. When will we learn?

Richard Brown | 20 Nov 07, 20 Nov 07 EST

Good article - would be even better with a couple of recommendations. No easy fixes. However, BiH, the EU and the IC have to address the “national question” sooner rather than later. The “cease-fire” agreement from Dayton needs to be replaced by a proper peace agreement. Whether we like it or not, for most people in the Balkans, security means territory. From secure territory one can build inter-territorial trust. From trust one can reach contractual arrangements with each other and then EU. EU member states should know, EU was painstakingly built in that order.

Lastly, you write 200.000 people died in the BiH war. That is not correct. The ?Human Losses Project? by the Research and Documentation Centre documented this summer in Sarajevo that around 98.000 people were killed in BiH between 92-95. Still an appallingly high and tragic number. Still, it’s important to get the number correct not least in respect for those who died and their surviving relatives.

John | Copenhagen | 20 Nov 07, 20 Nov 07 EST

Dear Georgi, Richard and John,

You have rightly taken me to task for supplying only analysis and no policy prescriptions. So to get the discussion going, I think the EU essentially has seven options in dealing with the Balkans:

1) Continue as is, with the likely outcome that Kosovo becomes independent and is boycotted by Serbia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia seizes the opportunity to become de facto independent and the EU polices the region to avoid bloodshed, but sees no progress while a new generation grows up to hate one another.

2) Provide a specific date ? for example 2012 ? when the entire region will become members of the EU if 60 percent of the accession criteria have been met. This would contravene the hitherto underlying rationale behind the accession process, but there may be no other way. At any rate, if Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo adopt ?only? 60 percent of the aqcuis and genuinely implement these, they will be fundamentally different countries than today.

3) Stop dealing with the Balkan countries individually, and develop a truly regional approach. No more SAAs with individual countries, only a Balkans SAA. Each country will be held accountable not only for its own progress, but also that of its neighbors. If Serbia, for example, can affect things for the worse in Bosnia, why should it not be held to account to help deliver positive outcomes? Bureaucratically, amalgamate the individual desks in the Council and Commission dealing with the individual countries into a Balkans Team to enforce a cross-regional perspective.

4) Develop what my colleague Jose Ignacio Torreblanca calls ?enlargement without the institutions? or what we can call the Norwegian model. The EU? allows all the Balkans countries access to all the EU?s benefits ? directives, regional aid etc. ? by a certain date, say 2012 again. This will be a more developed ante-room to the EU, much like PfP is for full NATO membership.

5) Make Bosnia ? the biggest sore in the region ? a member of the EU immediately.

6) Address what one of you called the ?national question?. As I see it, this can mean one of two things. Either allow the break up of Bosnia with the establishment of Kosovo on the condition that all will be re-integrated into the EU eventually (at which point having a separate ?Serb? Republic will be irrelevant); or force, through arms and diplomatic arm-twisting, a new Balkan ?grand bargain?. In effect a Dayton Peace Agreement II.

7) Introduce a policy of ?benign neglect.? This is a variant on option no. 1, which effectively means telling the Balkan countries that EU membership is irrevocably off the table ? at least for the next decade or two - unless they become more serious about the reform agenda.

None of these options, including the status quo, is particularly attractive, but Europe has itself to blame for not dealing with the Balkans from 2000 to 2005 when there was a genuine window of opportunity.

Are there any other options that I have left out? If so, let?s hear them.

Daniel Korski | London | 20 Nov 07, 20 Nov 07 EST

What is most frustrating from my perspective is the EU’s consistent underplaying of its own hand in the Balkans. As you note in your article, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was born here - as memory serves, at the impetus of Tony Blair when the Clinton Administration was not addressing Kosovo in 1998. If the CFSP can’t work here, it can’t work anywhere. And yet still it is a muddle. The very day after the EU and the US delivered a sharp rebuke to Serbia’s Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica for interfering in Bosnia’s internal affairs, Serbia got to initial an SAA with the EU - despite not fulfilling stated conditions that there must be full cooperation on war crimes, which is far from the reality.

And the lack of unity on Kosovo has allowed spoiler Putin more room for maneuver. One is left with the impression that the CFSP only exists if one - or both - of two conditions are fulfilled - 1) all member states agree, usually because the topic is innocuous or uncontroversial or 2) nobody really cares. And these are not mutually exclusive.

I don’t mean to let the US off the hook - the gift of PfP to Serbia last fall was a US-driven initiative that undercut a number of allies (UK, NL, DK, even FR) who were holding to the stated conditionality that PfP would only be granted with full cooperation with the ICTY.

The mixed signals from the peace implementing powers have sent the message that there is little to gain by full compliance with entry conditions, and everything to gain from recalcitrance and brinkmanship. The tragedy is that once leverage is abandoned, it is very difficult to resurrect.

The EU never did use the inherent leverage it has as gatekeeper to its own club by stating a few things clearly in the region:

a) Croatia’s membership would depend not only on full ICTY compliance, but an end to barriers to refugee return.
b) Serbia and Kosovo would have to come to terms for either of them to advance toward SAA. Serbia would not have a prayer of entering the EU with Kosovo - and this could have been stated. The ugly reality is that Kosovo is likely to be de facto partitioned at the Ibar, given the demographics and mistakes of all involved since 1999 - Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, Belgrade, and the international community. Germany’s Wolfgang Ischinger was unfairly pilloried for stating that so long as this was mutually agreed, this would be acceptable.
c) NO country in the region should be able to advance in the SAA/membership without full compliance with the ICTY and in terms of allowing refugee return and protecting basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.
d) clarity on what sort of Bosnia and Hercegovina the EU is willing to accept into the fold. This has been unbelievably vague. But it is up to the EU to set the conditions - which can be basic principles for constitutional reform here.

The US and other Western PIC countries could firmly align behind these, were they stated and maintained. Instead, the West has been incredibly diffuse in its policies, and has continually signalled an attention deficit disorder toward a region in which there is no alternative to a long-term commitment. These failings have undercut the peace implementers on the ground and the allies they might be able to develop in each of these countries by giving confidence to the established nationalist political elites. Worse yet, in the fetish to proclaim potemkin progress toward European norms, the balndishments and incentives given to governments that are not fulfilling their obligations have undercut real progressives. Kostunica received PfP and SAA, and he can claim that he did so without “betraying Serbian dignity.” How does this help Serbia’s democratic development?

Kurt Bassuener | Sarajevo | 21 Nov 07, 21 Nov 07 EST

Daniel,

Nice article, good assessment of where we stand in some parts of the W-Balkans ? but afraid I couldn’t disagree more with most if not all of your ultimate policy recommendations. Maybe you shouldn’t have been asked to provide them in the first place, as usually there is s strict division of labor between analyst and policy makers for a good reason…

Your recommendation Nr. 1 is essentially not a policy but yet more analysis, and a dairly undisputable one, with the one remark that the RS doesn’t have to seize any opportunity to become de facto independent, it already is… Which was the fundamental if known flaw of Dayton.

As for 2., I am aware of course of the ongoing discussions in that direction, but I much disagree, and you in fact stated the very reason why:

It would contravene the hitherto underlying rationale behind the accession process ? which worked fairly well so far, or as long as we actually played that card we we stopped doing after the EU constitutional crisis). Obviously, if any of the W-B states adopted and implemented even 60 percent of the acquis, they will be fundamentally different countries than today, no doubt about that. Only that I’d have limited hopes they would still do that AFTER being in the EU ? Bulgaria and Romania are the last (but not the first) to prove that point, reforms came virtually to a stand- still. And finally, even if such a policy succeeded in changing those new “members”, it would inevitably also change the very EU itself, and move it even further away from any true integration (or joint foreign policy, for that matter) to a club in which the many very diverging interests prevail without any common raison d’etre.

Your worst proposal, I dare say, is 3, however. Not only is this the policy applied in the Middle East (NB I currently live in Syria) ? and the results speak for themselves. But it’s also the opposite of what made us succeed in Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia et al in the early years of this decade. There we applied the exactly opposite tactics, we taught the various camps to play in their own yard, to do their own homeworks. We didn’t ask the RS what they thought abut Kosovo, on the contrary, they weren’t allowed to have an opinion. The same applied to the Albanians in Macedonia or the Kosovars on Macedenia respectively. And it worked. I deeply believe that on of the mistakes made in the past couple of years was exactly to give up this strict policy of “mind your own business”. I noticed that at the latest while I was Deputy High Representative in BiH (Banja Luka) last year: On the one hand we constantly actively told the RS not to think of Kosovo (which is like telling somone: don’t think of a cow, don’t think of a cow, don’t think of a cow ? well guess what that person will think of right away). On the other hand each and every international visitor asked the RS/Dodik what he thought about Kosovo and what impact it will have on the RS. It was like an invitation to link the two issues.

Which brings me to 5., another recommendation I would largely disagree with, albeit I fully understand your motives. Bosnia is not only the biggest sore in the region, it is also the least interested in the EU, as national agendas still overshadow any true EU aspirations. And the sad truth is that nowhere is it more obvious that the EU and the IC are much more interested in BiHs EU perspective than BIH itself. Which again the BIH actors figured out very accurately, which again is part of the reason the are behaving as they are. Because they think they’ll get there anyway, not only without doing anything, but maybe even because of it.
That brings us to 7., the ?benign neglect?. Which is exactly the policy the IC applied in the 80s and early 90s, which you rightfully criticized in the beginning of your original article. It didn’t work then, but just caused bloodshed and tragedy, and it would work even less now, because if there is one thing all of the various actors figured out and agree upon, is that trouble ? and that very much includes violent trouble ? pays off.

Therefore I wouldn’t recommend any radical change of policy, but rather a return to the winning horse policy of some years ago. That is

in the short-term: finally finish that endless Kosovo saga while continue the containment policies on, above all, Macedonia and Bosnia. Nobody ever said it would be easy, and it doesn’t get easier with time, on the contrary. The other way round, if we don’t manage to contain and resolve Kosovo, nothing will stop others from following suit in rejoining the Balkans abyss scenario. There are Lemmings still all over the place.

In the mid-term, use the hopefully renewed external rather than internal focus of the EU after the agreement on the new treaty later this year to return to what Paddy called the EU pulling force. If the Balkans ghosts are reappearing, this is also because a lack of pushing met with an equal lack of pulling. The EU didn’t exactly present itself in a particularly attractive light the past two years, and our carrots seemed gray and dry rather than crunchy and lively orange. Not much of a temptation. The more the EU believes in itself, the more attractive will it become again to join it and to actually work for that. Nobody will take us seriously if we don’t ourselves.

All so that in the long term all the W-Balkans states will indeed find themselves in the EU, as they should. Which I gather is the underlying assumption we all agree upon.

Clarisse Pasztory

PS: Kurt. Much agree, except for the assessment re Ischinger & partition. For once, he didn’t actually suggest partition. I believe what he skillfully does is rather to launch one trial balloon after the other just to have them shot down by one or more of the other partners in the game, or if need be, to do it himself. With the sole objective to be able to ultimately say they have tried everything, to no avail, nothing is agreeable, so the best option remains Ahtisaari’s proposal. A perfect diplomatic stunt. As for any de jure partition, it would be the worst of all options, as it would reopen territorial issues in all other places (BiH, MK, etc), without closing the ethnic issue in Kosovo itself, as 2/3 of the Kosovo-Serbs live south of the Ibar. But then I know that you know that, too…

Clarisse Pasztory | Damascus, Syria | 22 Nov 07, 22 Nov 07 EST

Clarisse,

Thank you for your comments. I now see I have pulled ?an Ischinger”.

As you say, the EU carrots have indeed looked rather drab and with the likely problems awaiting the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland, prospects for a better-looking vegetable are still a far way off.

But I have to take you to task. What concretely does it mean for the EU to make itself more attractive? Let?s get beyond metaphors and down to business. What do you think the EU needs to offer, which is currently not on the table? How can it offer more without ? as Kurt reminds us ? jeopardizing key principles? How do you address the very real enlargement fatigue that exists across the Union, that is encouraged in France and Austria, and which the South Slavs are aware fully of. Finally, how do we put the onus on Balkan politicians to deliver, rather than have their hand be forced by us.

Daniel

Daniel Korski | London | 22 Nov 07, 22 Nov 07 EST

Ha, funny! And I just realized I a still able to play the Serb, Kosovar and international simultaneously. The very reason I had to take a Balkans time-out, which you just proved to me I should extend still.

As for your questions, to start with, I did not hitherto contemplate any new problems with the treaty this time coming from Ireland, I assumed this to be a routine call. If you are right, though, we are in deep deep deep trouble and I at my wit?s end. There is no moving forward without moving at all. The closure of the treaty issue is a conditio sine qua non for the EU.

Once this is overcome, I do not actually believe we need to reinvent the wheel, we don?t need anything particularly new, particularly not any new complicated ?processes? or ?instruments? which are all, rightly or wrongly, only understood as delay tactics rather than genuine support anyway. Nor do we need much more of the same, all it takes, in my humble view, is ?better of the same?. And that largely takes us down to the operational level. A number of immediate steps would have to include:

? streamline the EU presences all over the place. Currently we are represented with up to 6 EU offices/agencies in the various W-Balkans states. Even if and when the MS or better (worse) still Council and Commission agree on something, the vanities on the ground amongst the various HoMs & CO again spoil it.

? quality above quantity: we don?t necessarily needs 100s of diplomats and 1000s of technical experts on the ground(s), fewer but truly experienced and dedicated people can get the same job done, if better. Representatives of all WB-countries publicly complain about third rank personnel, and partly these claims are justified. In other places (BiH in particular) some of the staff has been around for 12 years or more, and went fully local, with all family, children, real estate property - and a 9 to 5 mentality, ideally to be continued for the next 100 years.

? de-technocratize: the mentioned processes, instruments and programmes, from Thessaloniki downwards to all the innumerable programmes with unmemorable abbreviations are all well-intended, but need to be translated in different language if you want to capture the famous hearts of the people - or even only the interest and engagement of the political class.

These are just a view ?technical? adjustments that do not necessitate much policy make-over and would yet greatly increase the trust of those concerned that we mean it - both that the accession option is real, and that they need to do their homeworks. Much of above stated is bthw not necessarily (just) my own view, but what I have been hearing from relevant domestic actors (I won?t harm them by mentioning their names here) in jut about all WB countries over the past years.

The enlargement fatigue mentioned by you bthw meets with a fair degree of ?understanding? by those countries. They know they won?t be in by tomorrow anyway, their planning horizon is mostly 6-8 years. Plus they are fairly aware that the real issue here is Turkey (which is a sad subject worth a separate discussion), much less the Balkans. On the contrary, I uphold that the problem right now is much more that some of the Balkans countries (unfortunately correctly) assess that we are much more interested in their integration than they are. To underline this point let me to quote Serbia?s Ilic from two days ago: ?If the EU wants Serbia, it should protect it? If the EU wants Serbia to become one of its members, (it should help Serbia WRT Kosovo).?

Finally, to come back to the issue of principles and criteria: again, I believe most of the countries have a great understanding for the need to adhere to some principles and criteria (which doesn?t stop them from trying to avoid their respective obligations whenever possible, but that?s only human). What they are worried about is the seemingly constant change of criteria (example: Serbia and the pifwcs), and what is perceived as different and unequal standards (example: Police Reform requirement in BiH). In short: let?s set the requirements clearly and once and for all and stop ?adjusting? them as Tages-politically ?induced?.

Then we can go back and indeed force their hands, which is part of the job and what they expect from us.

Ah, yes, and then about something not completely different and separate: Russia and our approach to her. As much a condition sine qua non as the treaty. But that too requires a separate discussion.

Clarisse Pasztory | Damascus, Syria | 25 Nov 07, 25 Nov 07 EST

Just a few points to add to what you’ve said, Daniel and Clarisse.

Clarisse - you are dead right when you say that the impression that many in the region have is that the EU is hotter to have them join than they have to be. They are being begged to get on “the European path.”

No politicians anywhere do heavy lifting if they can avoid it. Nothing specifically Balkan about that. But the the EU’s incentive structure here is perverse. The more recalcitrant you are, the better deal you get with the EU. There seem to be no absolute standards, because too many - all the way up to Solana - seem to have staked so much on proclaiming “progress,” real or fictive.

Today’s news is a case in point. B-92 reports that Solana said that the EU is ready to sign the SAA with Serbia (see http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2007&mm;=11ⅆ=26&nav;_id=45715). Now THAT’LL show ‘em in Belgrade that the EU is serious about holding to the war crimes cooperation conditionality they undercut by allowing Rehn to initial the SAA. Genius. We in the West might as well wear “kick me” signs with such brilliant policy statements.

Perhaps starting with the Stability Pact in ‘99, an idea seemed to grow that opening the path to membership would suffice to induce good behavior in the region, and that it alone constituted a strategy. But clearly, there IS no strategy toward the region that has any coherence. I broadly agree with your tweaks to the EU approach in terms of mechanics, but the problem is much bigger. The EU as a democratic community of shared values and obligations doesn’t have as much profile as it should regionally, and Brussels’ low-balling stated conditions does nothing to build that perception.

There also seems to be an almost wilful ignorance of who we are dealing with in terms of political interlocutors. This is region-wide. Note the self-delusion that there is a wide ideological gap between Kostunica’s Serbian Democratic Party and the Radicals, which Kostunica has used very effectively with the EU and the US as well. Or the repeated gravitation to “fixers” who will somehow deliver on the issue du jour - there are tons of examples, including Ramush Haradinaj in Kosovo, now an ICTY indictee…

Precious little has been done in terms of developing constitutencies for the sorts of politics that the EU would like to see. It’s a sales job, but is necessarily labor intensive and involves skills that are more often associated with politics than diplomacy or executive bureaucracy. In Bosnia and Kosovo, where we had executive missions and a lot more to work with, this omission is particularly glaring…and debilitating.

What becomes brutally obvious when one looks at the region now is that the lack of having a clear strategic end-state plan from which peace implementers and policymakers could reverse engineer has led us to a place where the options are far more limited, and less appetizing than they might have been at the outset.

It’s not on the horizon, but if the EU wanted to have a more effective regional policy, it would have to have a senior-level rethink of its approach(es), informed by people who have had to take point for these disjointed and contradictory polices on the ground.

Kurt Bassuener | Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hercegovina | 27 Nov 07, 27 Nov 07 EST

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