The European Council on Foreign Relations

Germany in Europe: Is France ready for more Europe?

Date: 1st September 2011 | Author: Ulrike Guérot,

Categories: Germany in Europe,
Tags: , euro crisis, euro zone, merkel, germany

The last German “Heißer Herbst” (hot autumn) was in 1983, when Chancellor Kohl pushed through the controversial deployment of US missiles on German soil despite huge protests. In deciding to go ahead, Kohl had received great support from François Mitterrand, who became the first French President to speak in the German Bundestag when in January 1983 he delivered a speech warning against Europe decoupling militarily from the US in the face of the Soviet threat. France helped convince the Germans of the right thing to do.

This year, Germany is again entering a ‘hot autumn’ and all eyes are turned to Berlin. The crucial issue this time is not missiles, but the legal framework of the EFSF and the eurozone agreements of July 21^st, which are nearly as explosive as the missiles in 1983.

The prelude to this will come during September, when major hurdles are awaiting Merkel's government. The first will be the decision of the German Constitutional Court, due on September 7^t^h, which will rule on whether the measures taken in 2010 to bail out Greece, and the extension of the competences and the funding of the EFSF, are in compliance with German law. Nobody is seriously expecting that the Court will put the EFSF into question, but it will surely set some basic principles about the parliamentary component of the EFSF voting procedures.

The second hurdle will be the second and third readings of the EFSF legislation, scheduled for 29^thSeptember. The problem is not that the EFSF will not pass the Bundestag – the Greens and the Social Democrats will ensure that it does. But a number of parliamentarians within Merkel’s own ranks have declared that they will not vote in favour of the legislation. This group recently received prominent backing from the Federal President Christian Wulff and President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert. Various members of the CDU and FDP parliamentary group fear that the right of the Bundestag to decide on the budget is being hollowed out, and that the parliament will be bypassed.

Thirdly, all this will happen against the difficult backdrop of various local and regional elections in North-Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

However, having been one of those who over the past year has persistently criticised the government for its slow and uncourageous management of the euro crisis, I must now acknowledge that the German government finally seems to have a strategy, and is stepping into a leadership role in a bid to save the euro. The German political system at large is getting to grips with three facts: Eurobonds are ultimately the only valid option, they will cost something, and treaty change is needed to get them – and for this a change of the German Basic Law is first needed.

Triggered essentially by the discussion on Eurobonds, which in fact mean collective debt backing, a debate has begun in Germany about the big questions at stake in the European integration project. Unlike Merkel’s initial ‘small steps’ approach at the beginning of the euro crisis – one bailout after another – Germans are now discussing the fundamentals of their country's relations with Europe. Notions of ‘political union’ or even a ‘United States of Europe’ (Minister of Labor Ursula von der Leyen and former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer) have entered the debate, terms that have been absent from public discussion for a long time.

Many are waking up to the fact that there is unfinished business in Europe, as the eurozone enters a new phase with the EFSF the entry gate into even deeper fiscal integration. Hence, if Germany is to accept Eurobonds, it has the right to demand trade-offs from its EU partners, in two respects: Firstly, a renouncement of national budget sovereignty – beyond the introduction of a ‘golden rule’ – through some kind of supranational decision-making body on European expenditure; and, secondly, the creation of Europe-wide legitimacy for these common decisions through a parliament for the eurozone (or better: for the Eurobonds zone).

If the break-up of the eurozone can be avoided over the next 24 months (collective economic suicide is still an option!), then the German elections in 2013 must and will be framed around the following question: is Germany able and willing to change its own legal basis in order to allow more Europe in the 21^stcentury? The Karlsruhe constitutional court’s judgment on Lisbon does not block the path towards the kind of European federation that would be necessary before the German ‘Parlamentsvorbehalt’ could be replaced by a European vote.

This discussion isn’t new to Germans: from the Schäuble-Lamers paper in 1994 to Fischer’s famous Humboldt speech in 2000, many in Germany have been thinking for some time about a legitimised political union. By this they mean, de facto, a European federation, as German historian August Winker, explains brilliantly in his new piece. Indeed, political union is the logical counterpart to Eurobonds, not to say its precondition! Eurobonds are not free. They come with a price tag.

The real question, therefore, is whether Germany’s partners – particularly France – are up for this discussion. Paris has failed once before, in 1994, to deliver political union, after Germany delivered EMU following unification. My take is that France will have to move this time. Like Germany, it simply has no other option than to deliver more on Europe. If Germany cedes the ‘no bailout’ clause of Art. 125 of the Maastricht treaty, France will need to renounce, like all other EU countries, full budgetary sovereignty. Even more importantly, it will need to accept a strong parliamentary component in the eventual future European federation: a parliament that has the key to lock or unlock European expenditure at large, holding the ceiling for national parliaments. This would be at odds with France’s own political system. Will it get on board, if the German debate goes further in this direction? Perhaps Merkel should prepare to deliver a speech at the Assemblée Nationale during the 2012 French election campaign!

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7 comments

Joe 2nd September 2011 at 08:09pm

Are discussions about relations within the EU really with considered “foreign relations”? They can’t have it both ways forever.

François Heisbourg 5th September 2011 at 12:09pm

Dear Ulrike,
thank you for an exciting post towards which I was directed by Shahin Vallée. Doesn’t this extraordinary political ‘Wende’ in Germany imply a substantial and rapid broadening of the Chancellor’s political base, bringing in the Greens and the SPD? Changing the Grundgesetz is not going to be a small venture. Your thoughts?
As to the French: I suspect that the only politically acceptable European-wide parliament would be one emanating from the European delegations of the natioanl parliaments.For many in France, the current EP is probably not legitimate in the way the national parliament is: so wrenching institutional debate is going to be part of the process leading to the new European treaty which would flow from Germany showing the federal lead…
François

Übersetzung 7th September 2011 at 04:09pm

Your thoughts?
As to the French: I suspect that the only politically acceptable European-wide parliament would be one emanating from the European delegations of the natioanl parliaments.For many in France, the current EP is probably not legitimate in the way the national parliament is

Kimi 8th September 2011 at 09:09pm

Wow… who would have thought. A spark of sanity. Other countries have to deliver something too… A novel thought.

Does that mean germany doesnt have to unilateraly disembowel itself and give in good old Niebelungentreue a blank cheque to greece and italy? That they would actually have to cede rights in return so germany - or the citizens - could make them stop buying themselves more and more entitlements on german money?

A nice first step. It remains the problem that while germany is the most populous country, the “southern” countries - which include France herself aside Italy, Spain, Protugal, Greece - are more numerous still. Without the poles, the east europeans and… yes, the british, in I dont see this end well.

giraud 12th September 2011 at 04:09pm

I beg to desagree srongly with François Heisbourg postulate that “the only politically acceptable parliament would be one emanating from delegations of the national parliaments”.

Not only would this be a fantastic step back to a pre-1979 legal order - but it would also make little constitutional sense to give national MP a dual mandate vis à vis national and european legislation alike (european deputies are understandably supposed to defend common EU interests before national ones) .

Besides, on a practical point of view, the european parliamentary mandate is a full-time one that requires a very specific and complex expertise and others specific qualifications (such as speaking “foreign” languages).

I suppose François Heisbourg reaction is based on a purely national (ie. French) experience . The well known problems of the representativity, qualifications and assiduity of most french MEP’s (many of them having dual local mandates) does raise a real question.

But this should and could be delt with domestically. It cannot be a valid argument for stepping back to a system no longer compatible with the vastly increased competences and responsibilities of the EP. Re-opening such a rear-guard debate does not make sense.

Jean-Guy GIRAUD

François Heisbourg 13th September 2011 at 09:09am

Jean-Guy Giraud is right correct in his assessment of what I wrote about national versus EU parliamentary representation: I was being descriptive (describing attitudes in France), not prescriptive. French taxpayers will not readily transfer major taxation powers in a federalising Europe to the EU Parliament.
On a related topic, and turning towards towards Ulrike, what are today the chances of a major shift in Germany towards federalising options; will the EFSF ratification by the Bundestag at the end of the month be a turning-point in political terms (e.g. in the form of dumping the FDP or otherwise redrawing the perimeter of the governing coalition, with or without early elections?)?
François Heisbourg

giraud 13th September 2011 at 04:09pm

“French taxpayers will not readily transfer major taxation powers in a federalising Europe to the EU Parliament”. FH

The basic decision of a transfer of taxes to the EU will be taken by a unanimous vote of the EU Council (after consultation of the EP). National parliaments might be associated in the negociation/decision by their respective governments.

The new EU own ressources will be either a share of national taxes (ie. AVT) or new taxes based on financial transactions/ carbon emissions/ ... The maximum level of these taxes will be included in the Council decision ( probably 1.5% of EU GDP).

The role of the EP will be limited ( as it is now) to co-decide with the Council the annual amount and repartition of EU budget expenses and revenues within the above stated limit.

Moreover, the annual EU budget will itself be restricted by a pluri annual (2014/2019) framework set by a Council unanimous decision (with the consent of the EP) that might also involve national parliaments.

In summary, the “transfer of major taxation powers to the EP” has - at least - to be qualified.

In those limits, democratic representation in EU taxation will inevitably shift from national to EU parliamentarians. The present arrangements of reciprocal contacts and consultations between these two parties will have to be strenghtened. The EP itself has been and will remain very active in this process.

Jean-Guy GIRAUD

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